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Claims in construction projects are inevitable and can result in costly litigation. 
Construction contract ambiguity, overly restrictive terms, and unfairly allocated risks are 
among the factors increasing the likelihood of conflict between parties in construction 
claims. The source of conflict is a gap between parties’ beliefs over specifics of a claim. 
This research introduces a settlement negotiation model that provides methods for 
disagreeing parties to understand the gaps in their beliefs and possibly to come to an 
agreement before litigation. The quantitative decision analysis approach identifies a range 
for the optimal settlement amount in the claim process.  
Each party holds private information regarding its belief over the specifics of a 
claim. The specifics of a claim are classified into Liability, the likelihood of the defendant 
being found liable at a trial, and Damages, unanticipated expenditures plaintiff incurred 
 
due to the defendant’s alleged fault. A Bayesian Network model quantifies parties’ beliefs 
over Liability and Damages. This model represents parties’ legal arguments and their 
respective strengths and credibility. These beliefs become inputs to a non-cooperative 
game theory model. Non-cooperative game theory analyzes interactions between the claim 
parties at each stage of the claim.  The asymmetric information game considers each party’s 
actions and strategy based on its belief over the expected outcome from litigation, and its 
belief over the opponent’s expected outcome from litigation. The analysis results in 
equilibriums that help parties decide how to resolve the claim and avoid costly and timely 
litigation. The resulting approach reveals predictive outcomes in construction claims using 
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Definitions and Notations 
Liability: The likelihood of the defendant being found liable at a trial, or the portion of the 
damages that the defendant will be held liable at the trial. 
Damages: unanticipated expenditures plaintiff may have incurred due to the defendant’s 
alleged fault.  
Judge: officials appointed to form an opinion or conclusion about cases. Judge includes 
court officials, jury, board of appeal, arbitrators, mediators, or other types of adjudicator. 
Verdict: the monetary value decided by the judge to be transferred from the defendant to 
the contractor. 
Discovery: Discovery is a pre-trial procedure in a lawsuit in which Judge can obtain all 
pieces of evidence related to the issue both parties. 
Claim: means a demand or assertion by one of the Parties seeking, as a matter of right, 
adjustment or interpretation of the terms of any agreement between the Parties in 
connection with the Project, for payment of money, extension of time or other relief. 
Law: means all laws, statutes, ordinances, building codes, orders, rules and regulations of 
any Government applicable to the Project. 
Design-Build: Design-Build is a project delivery system where the design and construction 
services are contracted by a single entity to fully design and build a project for a project 
owner 
xvii 
Services means the services, labor, material and equipment used or incorporated in the 
design and construction of the Project. 
Contract Deliverables means those documents and materials to be prepared by the contract 
party for delivery to other party under their Agreement. 
Preliminary Design Documents means all conceptual design drawings, outline 
specifications and other documents necessary  to comply fully with the Owner 
requirements, including the design of the size, quality and character of the Project, its 
architectural, structural, mechanical and electrical systems, and the materials and such 
other elements of the Project. 
Proposal means the complete set of materials the Contractor intends to submit to the 
Owner, including design drawings, outline specifications, cost estimates, time schedules, 
models and other graphic and written materials. 
Construction Schedule means the schedule for the design and construction of the Project 
as established by Contractor. 
Design Deliverables means the list of the dates for completion of certain selected design 
services critical to maintaining the Construction Schedule. 
Construction Budget means the Contractor's price proposal for Project design and 
construction. 
Construction Documents mean the documents, consisting of drawings and specifications, 







This dissertation provides a model to predict outcomes in construction claims. It 
uses economic theory to analyze construction disputes in an attempt to ascertain the 
outcome prior to settlement or litigation. The model also shows how divergent 
expectations, or belief gaps, impact settlement negotiations. The questions this research 
aims to answer are how to define construction disputes in quantifiable elements, how to 
categorize the elements into measurable variables given complexities and 
interrelationships, and how the variables determine a each party’s decision making process, 
based on their beliefs over the specifics of the dispute.  
This research defines construction claims, and the elements of a claim. Next, it 
classifies the elements of a claim into variables, or causes, for claim. Next, this research 
examines the variables of the claim, applying the Bayesian Network to depict the 
dependencies among variables. The significance of such dependencies in the decision 
making process is measured by parties beliefs over specifics of a claim. The beliefs become 
inputs to a game theoretic negotiation model.  The game theoretic negotiation model 
establishes a bargaining tool that identifies the best actions or strategies that each party can 
take in settlement negotiations, given their information and beliefs at a certain time about 
a claim.  
The model provides a way to identify discrete points of conflict between the parties. 
It provides a way to ascertain each party’s expected outcome, leading to an acceptable 




The method proposed in this research is designed to address the following: 
 Best action each party should take at each stage of a claim 
 Best strategy that a claim party can take to achieve a desirable outcome 
 Parameters for selecting the best strategy based on available information  
 Incorporation of the strategic parameters into a decision making process 
 Impact of a party’s belief on their expectation toward litigation outcomes 
 Quantitative approach to measure parties belief regarding argument strength 
 Optimal amount of settlement offers or demands  
 Thresholds of each party in accepting or rejecting settlement offers 
 Parties motive to settle or peruse the case to the court 
 Impact of attorneys, experts, judges and other parties on forming beliefs 
 
 
The following are brief discerptions on the content of each chapter: 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature on Construction Conflicts “Analysis of Construction 
Contracts” discusses the literature review of construction claims. This chapter focuses on 
construction conflicts, defines claims, and categorizes the causes of claims. It also provides 
a review of different analytical models used to calculate different aspects of the 
construction claims, and introduces decision tree models to analyze trial outcomes and 
Bayesian Networks to predict probability of potential disputes. 
Chapter 3 - Literature on Game Theory is a literature review of game theory and 
Bayesian games used in dispute resolution.  
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Chapter 4 - Modeling Settlement Negotiation  introduces all key variables in 
context of game theoretic analysis of construction conflicts.  
Chapter 5 - Legal Reasoning with Bayesian Networks applies the Bayesian 
Network to the variables in assessment and modeling the parties’ beliefs. It is discussed 
how Bayesian Network is applied in the game theoretic model of Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 - Case Analysis & Result Discussions analyzes two-real world 
construction claims and compares parties’ beliefs over claim variables. 
Chapter 7 - Limitations and Future Research discusses the limitations of this 
research and future research opportunities with citation to the most recent sources in each 
field. 









 Literature on Construction Conflicts  
 
Construction contracts face uncertainty resulting from imperfect contract terms and 
a myriad of supplemental documents. In order to mitigate project risk and uncertainty, 
contract parties needed to collaborate conscientiously. Any flaw in collaboration may 
create or advance a conflict. Conflicts arising from failure to collaborate may include 
incomplete or defective plans and specifications, contracts with ambiguity, overly 
restrictive, or unfairly allocated particularly burdensome risk to one party alone (Rubin, 
Fairweather, Guy, & Maevis, 1992). 
If a conflict is not resolved between the parties, either party may seek clarification 
and relief from the judicial system in the form of a claim. Claim is defined as a demand 
asserted by one party on another party relating to services or products specifies in the 
contract (Barnard, 2005). Construction claims generally are over the four main elements of 
construction project management: cost, time, quality, and safety. All of these elements 
eventually boil down to monetary compensation or time relief sought by the contractor.  
A claim can be analyzed from different aspects such as engineering, legal issues, 
relationships, and project constraints. However, regardless of the issue the analysis of the 
claims are fairly similar. Common elements that become essential in claim considerations 
are monetary values, liable party for damages, causation and reasoning, and applicable 
laws and contract terms or conditions.  
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2.1. Stakeholders in Construction Disputes  
The stakeholders for construction claims are not always the same as project 
stakeholders. In construction claims, there are additional parties that may be involved in 
the claim processes. In addition to the claimants (i.e. contractors, owners, 
Architect/Engineers) other stakeholders of a claims includes attorneys, judges or jury, 
construction experts, and consultants. Each of these stakeholders may have different 
viewpoints and as a result different interests in the claim. For example, contractor’s 
viewpoint is typically maximizing its interest, and judge’s viewpoint is proper application 
of law to the case. The following provides more detail regarding each stakeholder’s 
viewpoint on a claim. 
2.1.1. Claims from contractor’s perspective 
Contractors in construction projects face a multitude of risks. Inflation, inclement 
weather, labor problems, material shortages, accidents, and unforeseen conditions are some 
examples of these risks.  Such risks have monetary consequences that may harm 
contractor’s profitability. Contractors tend to be inveterate optimists, believing that the risk 
is either contractually imposed upon them, or will not occur to them; or even if the risk 
occurs the contract clause will not be enforced (Rubin et al., 1992). Therefore it is important 
to consider contractors as risk takers in the calculations. In general, contractors may make 
a claim about changes to the work, project schedule, or work means and methods. 
2.1.2. Claims from owner’s perspective 
Owners usually bear the risk that the project will not finish on-time, on-budget, or 
be of expected quality. Less common perils include environmental or regulatory issues or 
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public protests.  In general, owners may have concerns about contractor’s failure to perform 
the work as specified in the contract, which includes performance (time), quality, and 
safety on top of costs. Examples where owners file a claim against contractor include 
failure to pay subcontractors, completion or repairs of defective work, on time project 
completion, costs incurred by contractor’s suspension or failure to perform the work. In 
most cases contractors are bonded, therefore any substantial damages owners will seek 
after bond and surety companies. Therefore, further elaboration of this topic can be 
contractually analyzed by adjusting contract language. This topic is beyond the scope of 
this research and needs to be analyzed further by scholars who have contextual interests in 
contract law.  
2.1.3. Claims from Architect/Engineer’s perspective 
Architect/Engineers (A/Es) usually take the risk of error and omissions in the 
design. Depending on type of contract and delivery method, if the design does not meet the 
minimum requirements mentioned in the contract, the A/E is at risk of being sued for design 
negligence. Contractibility issues or the products malfunctioning post-construction can 
also be the main reasons for this type of claim. The case study chapter, below, describes 
how a contractor seeks damages from the A/E due to insufficient designs in the planning 
phase of the project. 
2.1.4. Claims from Attorneys and Expert’s Perspective 
Attorneys and Experts are typically hired separately by each party to provide 
support in presenting and defending a case. Experts are typically in charge of finding and 
stating the facts through a series of reports. Attorneys are in charge of linking those facts 
7 
 
to the contract and defining credibility of the arguments. Attorneys and Experts in 
construction claims typically charge their clients based on an hourly rate fee. One may 
argue that these stakeholders make more profit by attempting to extend the duration of the 
claim and avoid settlement. However, due to nature of this business, in the long-term, the 
Attorneys and Experts that attempt to reach the best outcomes for their client tend to attract 
more customers and gain more profit by gaining reputation over time. 
2.1.5. Claims from Judges Perspective 
Judge, jury, board of appeals (or appellate courts), arbitrators, mediators, or any 
type of adjudicator is the stakeholder who has a slightly different perspective than the 
others on claims. Judges typically attempt to find the best application of the law or the 
contract on the merits of the case. The judge’s goal is to implement justice between the 
parties based on the contract and facts presented. This stakeholder perspective introduces 
a new challenge to the game theoretic approach, which is limited to an economic-based 
analysis. Section 4.2 provides details regarding how to overcome this challenge. 
 
2.2. Types and Causes for Construction Claim 
The construction claim process begins with a dispute between the parties involved 
in the contract (Construction Industry Institude, 1990). The study conducted by the 
Construction Industry Institute suggests that each party has limited knowledge and 
understanding of the claim process. The knowledge includes an interpretation of the facts 
surrounding the dispute, the contract, and the applicable law. Parties’ knowledge on the 
origin of dispute and type of claims available will affect their decision to pursue a claim. 
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Therefore, it is important to define and analyze different types of claims from both 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s perspective.   
Unresolved disputes by either party may climb up the dispute ladder to become a 
claim. The root cause of the claims are often unclear since there are many parameters that 
may lead to a claim. The competitive bidding scheme and tight economic positions often 
force contractors to find profit via post-contract execution negotiations, change orders, and 
disputes. This method is often referred to as Opportunistic Bidding. Opportunistic Bidding, 
or bidding at an amount below the contractor’s acceptable profit margin in hopes of 
winning the contract and subsequently increasing the total contract price. A proper 
categorization of the claims provides assistance to discover the root causes to complicated 
claims where elements such as Opportunistic Bidding exist.  
Barnard (2005) categorized all types of claims based on typical contract terms and 
provisions. Understanding the types of claims helps parties realize potential disputes and 
prevent claims by providing adequate documentation or notification, and focuses the 
parties on the most relevant portions of the contract. The following includes different types 
of claims based on the contract language: 
 
 Delay 
 Directed change 
 Constructive change 
 Acceleration and constructive acceleration 
 Differing site conditions 
 Defective and deficient contract documents 
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 Owner-furnished items 
 Impossibility of performance 
 Interference with performance 
 Defective inspection 
 Misinterpretation of the contract 





 Default or nonpayment 
 Termination 
 Warranty  
 
Another categorization is based on root causes. The main root causes for the claims 
include: risk and uncertainty, collaborative conflict, contract incompleteness, 
inconsistency, deficiency and defectiveness, relationship factor, and affective conflict. The 
following provides a comprehensive list of root causes categorized based on the nature of 
causes: 
 
 Risk and uncertainty 
 Inclement weather 
 Change of government policy 
 Strike 
 Fluctuations in material price or in labor cost 
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 Shortage of materials or labor 
 Uncertain ground condition 
 
 Contract incompleteness 
 Ambiguity pf contract 
 The scope of work is unclear  
 The specification is unclear 
 The rules to evaluate the work rate are unclear 
 Measurements are unclear 
 
 Collaborative conflict 
 Contractors employed directly by the client delays in works 
 Nominated subcontractor or supplier delays in works  
 Architect fails to issue instruction within time 
 Engineer fails to provide adequate site investigation details 
 Consultant fails to give information within due time 
 Client requests acceleration unreasonably 
 Client requests change unreasonably 
 
 Inconsistency  
 The quantity of the same items in the contract bills are substantially different  
 Some items are missing from the contract bills  
 The drawings contradict with the specification  
 
 Relationship factor 
 Opportunistic behavior 
 Contractor fails to notify omission of items in the contract bills of quantity 
 Contractor purposely works below the specified standard of care 
 Contractor purposely fails to notify the substantial difference in quantity between 
contract bills of quantity and actual quantity 
 Client rejects outright extension of time claim submitted by the contractor  
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 Client rejects outright monetary claim submitted by the contractor 
 Contractor excessive costs for progress acceleration 
 Contractor purposely fails to disclose the specification of the materials used 
 Contractor purposely does not provide invoice for the materials used 
 Client orders extra without providing proper cost reimbursement 
 Client orders extra without granting justified extension of time 
 
 Affective conflict 
 Psychological distress such as fear, anger, and guilt project team member(s)  
 Emotions such as dominance, assertion, bullying, and forcefulness are displayed 
 Intellectually curious, behaviorally flexible, and liberal in their attitudes and 
values are qualities displayed by project team member(s)  
 Hostility, callousness, and cynicism are manifested by project team member(s) 
 Excessively neat or overly exact attributes are displayed by team member(s)  
 Certain member(s) of the project team are nervous,  upset or agitated, irritable or 
overreacting, impatient, or find it difficult to relax 
 
2.3. Literature on Statistical Analyses over Construction Conflicts 
This section provides a literature review of methods for analyzing construction 
claims.  
Aibinu et al. (2011) developed a theoretical model to demonstrate the influence of 
organizational justice on conflict intensity and contractors’ dispute tendencies. They use a 
structural equation modeling technique with partial least-squares estimation.  The main 
constructs of organizational justice are identified as outcome favorability, decisions 
outcome fairness, procedural fairness, quality of treatment (the way people are treated), 
and quality of decision-making process (the way claims are administered). 
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Barough et al. (2012) applied a game theory approach to develop a decision making 
framework for conflict in construction projects. They discussed Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Chicken Game to analyze two specific situations in construction conflicts. The application 
of game theory in construction conflicts is useful due to the existence of multi-agent 
decision analysis. The model introduced in their research is a basic format of the game 
theory, complete information zero-sum games. Parties’ information, optimism, 
uncertainties and litigation fees are disregarded in their model.  
Cakmak (2014) used the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to determine the 
relative importance of the main causes for construction disputes. He identified 28 main 
causes of disputes and categorized them based on the responsible party that caused them. 
The proposed ranking measure helps to conduct a pair-wise comparison. Contract related 
issues were found to be the most common disputes in the construction industry.  
El-adaway (2008) tried various multi-agent simulation and Risk Management 
models for construction dispute mitigation. He identified change order factors and used 
them to develop a logical induction algorithm with case-based approaches on the dispute 
process. The influence of identified factors in the proposed algorithm is simulated by 
Distributed Artificial Intelligence and Monte Carlo. The simulations resulted in an 
algorithmic framework to analyze a claim and estimated the mean amount of the settlement 
based on specific situations.   
Ho and Liu (2004) analyzed the relationship between construction claims 
Opportunistic Bidding. They proposed a game theoretic based model to study people’s 
behavior in various types of claims. The model is based on Subgame-Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium on sequential offers, where extensive form games are drawn based on all 
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possible scenarios of claims. This study contains advanced application of game theory in 
construction claims; however, a fundamental assumptions in the study was that the game 
was modeled by ignoring parameters such as uncertainties and optimistic beliefs by each 
party. In addition, their research proposes number of possible scenarios that may occur in 
specific situations rather than providing a generic model. As a result, the model is good for 
analyzing closed cases and will not provide useful inputs for decision-making before the 
case is either settled or the court renders an order. 
Love et al. (2011) developed a causal diagram with the factors that influence 
construction disputes. This research analyzed latent conditions inherent within 
organizational and project related processes, which is referred to as pathogens. Love’s 
method involved analyzing similarities between various social phenomena to determine a 
casual chain for disputes. The analysis showed a strong association of pathogens with 
circumstance, practice, and task performance accounted for many disputes. The main 
contributors to construction disputes were found to be use of traditional lump sum 
contracting, resistance to altering old policies and procedures, failing to detect errors, and 
misinterpretation of contract terms and conditions.  
Zhang et al. (2015) addressed hidden transaction costs in project dispute 
resolutions. They designed questionnaires to identify a comprehensive list of claim 
transaction cost variables and their relative importance in the dispute process. The variables 
were ranked by a scoring method on questionnaires. Classified factors were also analyzed 
including reputation, cooperation and trust, emotion, time, and execution of judgments. 
The results show the most important factors to the contractor are a lack of future 
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cooperation and reputation damage, while project delay is the most critical variable for 
project owners. 
Omoto et al. (2002) analyzed the dispute resolution processes as a two-sided 
bargaining model with arbitration as an alternative option. This research provided a 
theoretical analysis of construction claims based on the bargaining model introduced first 
by Rubenstein (1982). Major limitations of this research are lack of empirical analysis and 
using a single type of claim procedure (FIDIC). 
Yiu and Cheung (2006) used a catastrophe-theory-based analysis on three variables 
of construction conflict, level of tension, and the amount of behavioral flexibility. Their 
empirical analysis shows behavioral states can respond dynamically as the magnitude of a 
conflict increases. In a later paper (T. W. Yiu & Cheung, 2007) they applied Moderated 
Multiple Regression (MMR) to the mentioned three variable system. Their more recent 
analysis showed the interactions between behavioral flexibility and the conflict-tension 
relationship can change radically. Their later model could identify thresholds for flexible 
individuals that are willing to avoid or resolve construction conflicts. 
Yiu et al. (2015) applied a fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) approach to 
conceptualize the root causes of construction dispute negotiation failure. Inadequate 
preparation, inappropriate behavior, and contract governance were found to have the 
highest occurrence likelihood in construction dispute failures.   
Jelodar et al. (2015) used a three-stage approach to identify sources of dispute and 
explore the quality of relationship changes during a dispute event. Causes of conflict are 
classified into three main categories: project uncertainties, contract and processes, and 
people behavior. The methodology consists of collecting massive data to assess the 
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construction relationship quality through literature review, review of court cases, and 
expert interviews. The results show that three factors of contract provision, evidence, and 
reasoning are essential in success of dispute prevention or handling a claim. 
Cheung and Pang (2013) established that claims can be organized into two general 
categories types: contractual disputes, and speculative disputes. A complementary study 
(Cheung & Pang, 2014) provided diagnostic approaches to identify construction disputes. 
The result of this study is a comprehensive list of causes for construction disputes with 
their respective occurrence likelihood. The ranking of these causes has been determined by 
designing questionnaires to ask expert opinions on the causes. Results show that 
construction disputes can be either contractual or speculative. Contract incompleteness and 
people factors have been identified as main drivers of construction disputes. 
2.4. Decision Models for filing claims 
One of the most relevant and sound approaches to analyzing claims is by using 
decision trees. There are numerous research papers that introduce the application of the 
decision trees to model decision makings in claims. An important decisions in the dispute 
process is determining whether to pursue a claim at all. For example, Clemen (2014) uses 
a decision tree model to analyze a famous court case between Taxaco versus Pennzoil. In 
this study Clement shows how to use the decision tree in a structured problem to find 
preferred alternative strategies. However, decision trees cannot analyze the interaction 
between the parties, and may only be valuable for the party who considers the claim from 
its own point of view.  
In decision tree models, the decisions are identified by rectangles, chance nodes are 
identified by circles, and triangles represent an outcome. Figure 2-1 identifies each party’s 
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decisions and chance nodes in parallel to each other. As shown below, each player goes 
through a sequence of decision and chance nodes. The chance node of one party is 
equivalent to its opponent’s decision node. For example, defendant’s decision on whether 
to offer settlement or litigate impacts Plaintiff’s decision on the following step. Therefore, 
parties have to make decisions in a sequential form and each decision impacts the 
opponent’s actions. 
 








Figure 2-2 shows the merged decision tree for both Plaintiff and Defendant, where 
decisions for each player impact other player’s decision. The right handside column 
provides both player’s payoffs depending on their strategies. This figure provides a 
representation of the claim process and the extend of the impact for each party’s decisions 
and actions.  
 
 
Figure 2-2 Decision Tree Model for both parties’ action 
 
2.5. Probability of Facing Disputes or Claims 
Multiple organizations provided extensive research on reducing the risk of claims. 
For example, Project Management Institute dedicates an entire chapter to claim 
management in its construction extension to the Project Management Book of Knowledge 
(Project Management Institute, 2007). The topic of claim management is large and covers 
multiple disciplines such as project management, risk management, psychology, and 
cognitive sciences. The intent of this research is to limit the deliberations to the analytical 
studies on construction claim.  
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Diekmann et al. (1994) introduced a model that quantifies the risk of having claims 
in construction projects. This model determines the relationship between project 
characteristics and the likelihood of contract disputes. The calculations result in a measure 
to anticipate the likelihood of disputes in a construction called Dispute Potential Index 
(DPI). The DPI is developed based on correlation between project variables and dispute 
vulnerability. The project variables that are related to the disputes are categorized in three 
independent groups: People, Process and Project.  
In a previous paper Lessani (2016) suggests using Bayesian Networks rather than 
regression analysis to advance the DPI index. Bayesian Network is a type of statistical 
model that represents a set of random variables and their conditional dependencies (N. E. 
Fenton & Neil, 2012). I my previous paper I modeled the main causes of claims introduced 
by Dikemann using Bayesian Networks to capture the interrelationships between the root 
causes. This model shows each cause can impact the probability of disputes or claims as a 
whole. Figure 2-3 shows the three main causes for disputes in a Bayesian Network format. 
 
Figure 2-3 Main Causes for Dispute 
The following elaborates on each aspect of the potential dispute risk factors:  
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2.5.1. People Factor 
Risk factors involving people may affect organizational relationships, roles and 
responsibilities, and individual’s expectations. The people factor is usually considered to 
be a main source for claims. For example, claims may not be submitted to maintain a 
working- relationship in hopes for future projects. Although it is hard to quantify people 
factors in monetary terms, they are highly probable and can highly influence parties’ 
decision in pursuing the claim. The following causal model suggests dependencies between 
parameters of people factor.  
 
Figure 2-4 Bayesian Network Model for People Factor 
 
2.5.2. Process Factor 
Process risk factors include all project management activities throughout the project 
lifecycle. Typically, process problems lead to clear responsibility of a party in a claim. 
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Process factors include contractual language, risk allocation, scope definition, 
communication, and dispute resolution. Figure 2-5 is a causal model for process factor. 
 
 
Figure 2-5  Bayesian Network Model for Process Factor 
 
2.5.3. Project Factor 
Project risk factors define technical issues with the nature of the project. Project 
factors are usually associated with monetary values or potential damages for a claim. Since 
each project has its own unique characteristics, the cause-effect relationships between the 
nodes may vary from project to project. However, the proposed model is subject to change 





Figure 2-6  Bayesian Network Model for Project Factor 
 
The BN models provided in Figure 2-6 illustrate conditional dependecies between 
all project risk factors. In order to complete the model, it is necessary to define the 
probability tables for the nodes, to ultimatley define the mathemathical relationship 
between the risk factors. There are various methods to define the probability tables. 
Previous research suggests to gather historical data from projects that resulted in claims. In 
cases where there is limited historical data, various expert elicitation methods can define 
the probability tables for the rest of the nodes. Expert elicitation methods are beyond the 






 Literature on Game Theory 
 
This chapter provides literature review on statistical analysis of construction 
claims, with an overall focus on game theoretic analysis. The material provided in this 
chapter become a foundation for the models developed in Chapter 4. 
3.1. Game theory 
Game theory is a mathematical tool used to analyze interactive decision making for 
multiple agents (also called parties or players). Each agent takes one action within a set of 
available choices. The decision, or action, that one agent made, potentially influences the 
other agent’s decisions or actions. A set of actions that a player is intended to take in a 
game forms that player’s strategy. Game theory helps to model behaviors of all players and 
provide suggestions regarding decisions or strategies that lead to best possible outcomes. 
Modeling the interactivity between players distinguishes this tool from traditional decision 
theory (Maschler, Solan, & Zamir, 2013). 
This research applies game theory models to analyze the problems in construction 
claims or disputes. Disputes are defined as conflicting interactions between two contract 
parties, for example between project owners and construction contractors. In construction 
disputes, players’ desires include maximizing their payoff by considering their opponent’s 
strategy. Players may or may not have complete information about all the details of the 
game, especially in cases of construction claims.  
Without complete information, each player has limited knowledge about the 
parameters of game. This is the reason that construction claims fall into the category of 
23 
 
incomplete information games. The lack of complete information results in parties’ 
uncertainties regarding specifics of the claim. Since parties form their beliefs based on 
available information, the uncertainties result in creation of different beliefs on the 
specifics of the game. Incomplete information game is the main theme of this research and 
is discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
3.2. Settlement Negotiation Features 
This section introduces the set of features and their associated variables form a basis 
to analyze settlement negotiation games in construction claims. The following sub-sections 
introduce the key features of the game used in this research, which includes: players, 
actions and strategies, outcomes and payoffs, timing, information, and prediction. 
3.2.1.  Players 
The primary players, also known as parties or litigants, include the plaintiff and the 
defendant. General Contractors, Project Owners, Architect/Engineering firms, or 
subcontractors are the key construction parties that may participate as either plaintiff or 
defendant in construction claims. This research considers only two litigants, construction 
parties, in the game. In more sophisticated models other players such as judge or Jury, 
attorneys, experts, and other contracting agents (Consultants, Commissioning Agents, etc.) 
can be considered in calculations.  
3.2.2. Actions 
An action is player’s move out of all of the available options at each stage of the 
game. The set of actions each player takes during the game is called player’s strategy. For 
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example, Contractor’s action can be submitting a proposal, filing for claim, or requesting 
settlement. Project owner’s actions could be approving the proposal or offer, rejecting, or 
responding to counter-proposals. Some models allow for multiple rounds of actions or 
proposals and some other only consider the final action (take-it-or-leave-it offers). 
Depending on the rules of the game, there are limited allowable actions at each 
decision opportunity of players. Moreover, actions taken at one stage of the game may limit 
player’s future actions. Actions in construction claims usually carry some information to 
the opponent both explicitly and implicitly. Therefore, players need to carefully evaluate 
the case before taking any action. Players choose their strategy considering observable 
actions taken by their opponent, actions taken by the player himself in the past, and the 
current information player possesses. 
3.2.3. Outcomes and Payoffs 
The result of all actions played by parties is defined as the outcome. There are broad 
ranges of outcomes, from the contractor not pursuing the claim and no amount transfer 
between the parties, or the judge ruling full amount of damages to be transferred from 
owner to contractor. In general, the outcome is a list of relevant final attributes for each 
player (Daughety & Reinganum, 2008).  
The numerical value of the outcome associated to each party is called the payoff, 
modeled as either dollar amounts or utility functions. Expected decisions by the judge are 
different than final payoffs because players incur other costs other than the awarded 
amount. Additional expenses that each party realizes within the litigation process include 
court costs, attorney and expert costs, and case preparation overhead. As a result, payoffs 
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include judge’s award minus all expenditures each party has associated with the litigation. 
For the purpose of this research, calculations of expected payoffs are all in dollar values.  
3.2.4. Timing 
The early settlement models initiated by Nash in 1950, called axiomatic models, 
were developed based on general theoretical models of bargaining processes. After 
developments and improvements of these models, a strategic approach was suggested to 
capture more details of the settlement negotiations, including timing features.   
The sequence of play and duration of the claim are the two topics of interest for the 
timing feature. In the strategic approach timing features, such as sequential versus 
simultaneous offers, play an essential role in the analysis. In the sequential model, each 
party may offer and wait for the other player’s response. In simultaneous offers, actions 
from either party cannot be observed by their opponents, or it may not have influence on 
the opponent’s decision for players’ strategy. 
Duration also can affect the settlement analysis of the claim. Disputes and claims 
have a finite length of time. Either party may withdraw the claim before the court date, the 
parties could settle, or the statute of limitations could legally prohibit a claim from being 
made at all (due to not filing the suit in a timely fashion). As a result, the literature considers 
multiple phases for pretrial negotiations. This research assumes players have one last 
opportunity to negotiate in the final stage, after which case proceeds to trial. This 
assumption requires parties carefully follow the time limits specified in contract clauses 




Information is defined as the knowledge that each player has to evaluate and select 
from the possible actions, strategies, and predictions. Each player’s information identifies 
which player knows what information, and at what stage of the claim.  Examples of player 
information include factual evidence, opponent’s beliefs over verdict, or strength of the 
arguments. Each player information may vary at each stage of the game due to different 
sources of information, difference in assessment of Damages or Liability, attaining new 
updates on disputes, or parties may have private information1 on one or more aspects of a 
game.  
Different informational structures form varying strategic models for settlement 
bargaining including perfect versus imperfect information games, symmetric and 
asymmetric information games, and consistent prior versus inconsistent prior information. 
In incomplete information games, players do not have full information about their 
opponents’ belief. In these games each player, in addition to its own beliefs over the case, 
considers its opponents’ beliefs. For example, Player A considers Player B’s belief before 
taking any action.  Player A also consider player B’s belief over Player A’s belief on the 
case, and so on. This concept is known as hierarchy of beliefs in context of incomplete 
information games.  
Various techniques are applied to measure the uncertainty about in the hierarchy of 
beliefs. The Bayesian approach is recognized as the one of the most widely accepted 
                                                 
 
1 Private information may refer to (1) probability of one side winning the trial, (2) the extend of the injury, 
or (3) parties’ attitude toward risk (Pauwels & Kort, 2009). 
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statistical decision making approach for modeling this type of games (Maschler et al., 
2013). In this method, players have probability distribution over parameters that are 
unknown to them. Actions taken by each player are based on their beliefs defined in a 
probability distribution format. Players also have beliefs about each other’s probability 
distribution functions, which update their prior belief on the subject matter. As a result, an 
infinite number hierarchies of belief will be formed between the players. The challenge of 
the theory is to incorporate all beliefs into the model. 
In the incomplete information game based on players’ information regarding the 
issue, players one of these three stages: Ex-post, Interim, or Ex-ante. Ex-post stage 
represents the players that know both their own types and their opponent’s type. Interim 
stage represents players that know about their own types, but are not sure about their 
opponent’s type. Ex-ante stage is when players that do not know about anyone’s type 
including their own and is more complicated to model due to high level of uncertainties in 
player’s beliefs. Although there are numerous studies done to analyze ex-ante games, there 
are disagreements between researchers about the best technique to be used for modeling 
the games. The following section describes one of the major differences between the two 
approaches developed in the current literature. 
Perfect versus Imperfect information  
If players are exactly sure about the outcome (the verdict at trial), the game is called 
perfect information. In construction claim cases, it is nearly impossible for the players to 
precisely predict the verdict. Therefore, model introduced in this research is in the 




Symmetric and Asymmetric Information 
In imperfect information games, the information may be transferred from one party 
to another. Timing can also be a source of imperfection.  If actions are taken 
simultaneously, game is analyzed in a symmetric fashion. On the other hand, if actions are 
taken sequentially, then one player’s choice impacts the other player’s strategy, and the 
game needs to be analyzed in an asymmetric fashion. If the information is shared, 
knowledge between contractor and owner the analysis of the game is symmetric. In cases 
that each party obtains private information game is considered to be asymmetric. 
Asymmetric games can be one sided, where only one party has private information, or two 
sided. Another term used for this concept is complete versus incomplete information 
games, but this research refrains using such terms to avoid confusion with perfect and 
imperfect games.  
Symmetric information settlement assumes litigants have exactly the same beliefs 
about the facts and trial outcomes for the case. There is vast literature on analyzing 
settlements with bargaining games under symmetric information. Dispute cases with 
symmetric information usually either settle out of court for a positive amount or being 
dropped by plaintiff to avoid future costs. The assumption of both parties having the same 
information and belief about the facts and judge’s award is too strong and far from reality. 
This assumption can be relaxed by changing the structure of the game and considering 
asymmetric information games.   
Asymmetric information games provide a greater accuracy in modeling 
construction claims because they account for the differences in player beliefs, or to be more 
accurate, players assessment on variables based on private information they possess during 
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the bargaining process. The information that emerges during settlement process, either 
privately or publicly to parties, may affect their expected payoff from trial. In addition, 
parties generally have a better understanding of the credibility of the supporting documents 
and evidence for a case. Furthermore, risk aversion and discount rates of parties, quality 
and work ethic of the lawyers, are private pieces of information to each player. For 
example, in construction claims, contractors have private information about the level of 
damages incurred due to the issues expressed in their claim. On the other hand, project 
owners tend to know their degree of involvement or level of responsibility in a subject 
matter (Mitchell & Shavell, 2005).  
 
Consistent versus Inconsistent Prior Information 
The Prior Belief is defined as the information that a party has before he learns about 
specifics of a case. A game has consistent prior information if a player’s conditional 
probability distribution over the other players’ information (type) comes from the same 
overall probability model. This definition requires parties to honestly share their 
assessment on their opponent’s type. In reality, parties’ assessment over each other’s type 
are in conflict with rationality. For example, how can both parties think their opponent is 
highly responsible on a certain subject where responsibility is not evenly distributed 
between the parties? Some argue that the difference in assessments reflects differences in 
private information, not differences in parties’ views. The differences may also arise from 
optimistic approach of each party, or in broader terms, irrational behavior by parties.  
Most of the current settlement negotiation models use the assumption of consistent 
prior beliefs. However, this method may not be the actual representation of the claims, but 
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Many scholars such as Waldfogel believe that the asymmetric information modeling is 
consistent with cases that settle before the court discovery process (Waldfogel, 1998).  
An alternative approach is Divergent Expectation, also known as inconsistent 
priors, first introduced by Priest and Klein (Priest & Klein, 1984). In Divergent Expectation 
models parties engage in negotiations while having optimistic assessments over the 
outcomes.  Divergent expectation assumes parties PDF on opponent’s private information 
are not a shared knowledge. However, the information received during the negotiation 
process is identical to both parties.  
The Inconsistent prior approach has been used in a number of empirical studies 
especially in medical claim cases (Yildiz, 2003) (Watanabe, 2006).  In medical claims both 
parties may receive identical information (i.e. test report) during the claim and update their 
belief. Divergent expectation describes the issue to be more about how prior belief arise, 
not the asymmetric information.  
 
3.2.6. Prediction 
The main purpose of settlement models is to make a prediction about the outcome 
of bargaining. In recent literature, the notion of equilibrium has been used for predictions. 
The two main categories of equilibrium applied to settlement bargaining predictions are 
cooperative and non-Cooperative games. In cooperative games, players bind themselves to 
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ensure the game results in an efficient solution (there is no money wasted in the process).  
Non-Cooperative games do not assume any contractual agreement over efficiency2.  
Most of the simplified models, and earlier works in the literature, use the concept 
of cooperative game theory, where the solution to the game is efficient (no money is wasted 
in the process). Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is an example of axiomatic solution that 
applies to cooperative games.  
Claims and disputes, on the other hand, are non-cooperative conflicts between the 
parties. In the strategic format of non-cooperative games, players predict the payoffs 
conditional to the opponent’s belief. When there is uncertainty about the information, as in 
incomplete information games, each player considers their opponents’ knowledge in 
addition to their own knowledge on the parameters of the game. Players may also consider 
their opponent’s knowledge about their own knowledge, and so on. This concept is defined 
as hierarchies of beliefs in context of incomplete information games.  
In this context, the Bayesian approach has been recognized as the most widely 
acceptable statistical decision making approach for games with incomplete information 
(Maschler et al., 2013). In this method, players have a probability distribution over 
parameters that are unknown to them. Actions taken by each player are based on their 
                                                 
 
2 Efficiency: Bargaining methods are inefficient if litigants are asymmetrically informed. 
One may think of Nash bargaining model as an alternative to such analysis, but due to the 
incomplete information these games are not efficient. As a result, lack of efficiency of the 
incomplete games NBS (Nash Bargaining Solution) or other cooperative solutions will not 




beliefs defined in the distributions. Players also have prior beliefs about each other’s 
probability distributions. As they receive new information from their opponents, they 
revise their assessment to form posterior probability distributions on variables. As a result, 
an infinite number of hierarchies of beliefs form between players. The challenge of the 
theory is to incorporate the hierarchies of beliefs into a model.  
3.3. Generic Game Theory Model for Claims 
Models with imperfect information involve parameters of the problem associated 
with probability distributions. If the probability distributions are common knowledge 
between the parties, then the information of the players is symmetric. Construction claims 
typically fall under the category of asymmetric information, since each party has its own 
knowledge about the matter. In such asymmetric information games, parties have different 
probability assessments over relevant uncertain aspects of the game. For example, imagine 
a plaintiff who incurred damages (X) and files a claim against the defendant. Plaintiff may 
know the true amount of X, but defendant can only estimate damages within a certain 
interval [XL, XH]. 
The private information of a party in game theory is referred to as the player’s type. 
Different type comes from asymmetric information that results in different estimates for 
each player. Once this difference exists, each player predicts what their opponent will do 
based on their type (their available information). They may also analyze the situation from 
their opponent’s viewpoint on their own viewpoint. Parties may transfer their information 
to each other by different means of communication including the claim itself. The 
information transfer may happen strategically to manipulate the opponent’s belief on key 
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variables of the game. The following section includes questions that show what parameters 
and features play a crucial role in claims.  
3.4.  Game Theoretic Approach to Settlement Negotiations 
Game theory can be used to analyze interaction between two contract parties in pretrial 
settlement bargaining, where the goal for each agent is to maximize its own payoff given 
available information. The following are key questions that show how a game can evolve 
for conflict negotiations: 
 Which player obtains private information about which aspect of the game?  
 Parties are risk neutral or risk averse? 
 How litigation expenses are shared between the two parties? 
 Lawyers fee are fixed or contingent? 
 Which player proposes a settlement? 
 Why some lawsuits resolved out of court and some go to trial? 
 What is the confidence level of judge or jury to award one party in the trial? 
 Who pays the legal expenses? 
 How to restrict the options for parties to hold lawsuits against each other? 
 
Samuelson et al. (2014) summarizes out-of-court negotiated settlements in a 
chapter of his book called A Game-Theoretic Approach to Legal Settlements. This chapter 
introduces Bayesian game theoretic approach on one-sided asymmetric information games 
with brief examples. The two-sided information games are analyzed by direct revelation 
game (DRG) in which each side reports its private information truthfully to determine 
equilibrium outcomes.  In this type of analysis there is a payoff-equivalent revelation 
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mechanism that has an equilibrium when the players truthfully report their types. This type 
of analysis does not exactly resemble the actual disputes because the assumption of having 
such rational players is strong.  
There has been tremendous progress on litigation decision models, where 
theoretical models are developed based on pure economic outcomes. Although the 
economic outcomes are considered to be a key driver to the disputes, there are other 
parameters that might play a crucial role in litigation decision making.  
Fenn and Rickman (2013) conducted an empirical analysis on medical claims to 
determine the relationship between the duration of negotiations and information about case 
strength. They analyzed data gathered from a group of English hospitals including 
resolution methods and timing for disputes, evolution of expert assessments of case 
strength, and the timing of external expert’s opinion that affected litigation outcomes. This 
research defines that of five stages, defendant’s liability is at two stages, the initial and the 
final liability estimates. As time elapses and more information is revealed to each party, 
parties’ decisions may change. Conditional probabilities of different types of claim 
resolutions are estimated by the cause-specific regression method. There are two major 
findings in this research. First, over time, the assessed strength of the case diminishes, 
which increases the probability of case dropping or settling rather than being litigated. 
Second, the cases that have relatively little uncertainly about liability tend to be resolved 
over cases with unclear liability. 
Sullivan (2011) analyzed settlement delays in asymmetric information over the 
expected trial verdict. He conducted an empirical analysis of the data and observed that the 
asymmetric information on the expected payoff from trial may cause up to 95% delay, 
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comparing to symmetric information situations. He also observed that policy changes to 
mitigate the settlement delays are not strongly effective in reducing the bargaining costs 
and delays. 
 
3.5.  Litigation Decisions 
The decision to litigate depends on many parameters that a plaintiff may consider 
before taking any action. One of the most important decisions involves the private cost and 
benefit from pursuing the case. For example, a rational party will pursue a case if his 
expected gross return exceeds the expected costs of litigation. The gross return could be 
the amount either judge verdicts in case of trial, or parties agreed on in case of settlement 
or Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes. The expected costs of the dispute 
includes, but not limited to, attorney fees, plaintiff’s personal costs of effort, opportunity 
costs, business reputation and future relationships between parties. Considering all these 
factors, the plaintiff will decide to pursue the litigation only if: 
 
Expected gross return ≥ Costs incurred from litigation process 
 
Plaintiffs consider the time and effort to invest in the lawsuit before making their 
decisions. Aside from business decisions, they also consider their beliefs about underlying 
facts of the case, contract language, and defendant’s possible reaction to their dispute. 
These factors determine how eager each party is to either pursue the claim or to settle 





 Plaintiff:    expected judgment at trial – Plaintiff’s Litigation Costs         (gain)    
 Defendant:        expected judgment at trial + Defendant’s Litigation Costs    (loss)    
 
It is assumed that each party pays its own litigation costs regardless of the trial 
outcome. Litigation costs paid by both parties for the trial process is known as “deadweight 
loss”. This cost can be avoided if parties can agree to settle before the trial. Deadweight 
loss is not always an element to convince parties to settle. Factors such as the amount of 
damages, length of time for settlement, strategic environment of claims, and information 
and beliefs of the two litigants are the main constraints that may affect party’s decision. 
The settlement analysis consists of a model with multiple rounds of offers between 
litigants. In each round of the repeated game, the litigants alternate between making 
settlements offers or litigate. Either party can stop the loop by selecting litigation option, 
which ends the game with a trial decision and its associated costs. This bargaining process 
is known as ultimatum game. The ultimate game can be solved with backward induction 
method. In this model, factors to be considered can be timing of the settlement offers, 
allocation of the bargaining surplus, and the first/last party who makes the offer can change 
the dynamic of the equilibrium (Mitchell & Shavell, 2005). 
 
3.6. Extensive-Form Game 
The extensive-form game is a graphical tool used to describe the games in context 
of game theory, allowing explicit representation of the sequencing of players' possible 
actions. These actions include players’ choices at every decision point, and the information 
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each player has about the other player's moves at the decision point, and the player’s 
payoffs for all possible game outcomes.  
Figure 3-1 is the extensive form game for a hypothetical construction claim brought 
by contractors. Whenever and the dispute resolution techniques are not resolving the issues 
from contractor’s point of view, they may make a decision between submitting a claim, or 
not submitting it (compromising). Factors that may be considered to submit a claim is 
beliefs about likelihood to win the case, litigation costs, future relationship, bargaining 
opportunities, and the amount of the disagreement. In response to contractor’s claim, the 
defendant has an opportunity to negotiate (or bargain) the amount of the claim with the 
contractor, otherwise the case will be litigated and judge or a third party will make the final 
decision.   
 
Figure 3-1 extensive form game for construction claim 
 
The following are the notations for the letters used in the extensive-form game: 
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K: Litigation Costs 
V: Verdict 
P: Portion of the Bargained amount during Settlement 
 
Extensive-form games can also demonstrate games with asymmetric information. 
There are two major models developed by Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986) for one-sided asymmetric information games. In addition, P’ng (1983) and Nalebuff 
(1987) are among the other researchers that contributed to the foundation of this type of 
game theoretic analysis.  In these models, one player makes a single take-it-or-leave-it 
settlement offer before trial. Most of the current analyses are attempts for generalization of 







 Modeling Settlement Negotiation 
 
 
This Chapter provides methods to analyze construction claims from an economic 
standpoint. The Chapter contains six settlement negotiation models for various situations 
based on which party holds private information about the case, and which party provides 
the settlement offer. The 6 models are categorized as follows: 
 
 Screening Games - One-sided asymmetric information 
 Defendant proposes a settlement offer 
 Plaintiff proposes a settlement offer 
 
 Signaling Games - One-sided asymmetric information  
 Defendant proposes a settlement offer 
 Plaintiff proposes a settlement offer 
 
 Two-sided asymmetric information games 
 Defendant proposes a settlement offer 
 Plaintiff proposes a settlement offer 
 
 
4.1. Modeling Claim Procedures 
 The models introduced in this chapter consider two players (A and B) involved in 
a construction claim process. Player A represents the Plaintiff, and player B represents the 
Defendant. Depending on type of the game, parties (players A and B) have private 
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information specific to the claim.  Plaintiff is typically privately informed about the level 
of damages incurred (Damages), and the Defendant is typically privately informed about 
the level of Liability for the Damages incurred by the plaintiff (Liability). Damages are 
defined as additional expenditures plaintiff may have incurred due to the Defendant’s 
alleged fault. Liability is defined as either the likelihood of the Defendant being found 
liable at the trial, or the portion of the damages that the Defendant will be held liable for at 
the trial. Since both parties have private information about different elements of the case, 
the analysis is called a two-sided asymmetric information game. 
Parties act in sequence. The process typically starts with the Plaintiff analyzing the 
situation using a decision tree model to submit a claim after failing to settle in pre-claim 
negotiations with the Defendant. At this point, one of the parties may offer or demand a 
final settlement. The party who asks for settlement may update other party’s information. 
Parties strategically offer or demand settlement amounts to increase the likelihood of being 
accepted.  Rejection of the offer results in a trial and the final amount to be transferred 
from the Defendant to the Plaintiff will be determined by the Judge (the term Judge used 
for court, jury, board of appeals, arbitrators, or mediators). The parameters determined by 
the Judge are named True Damages and True Liability. The parameters that are known to 
one party or either party are called Actual Damages and Actual Liability. This model is 
suitable for any type of civil litigations.  
The analysis of the game is provided in stages and sub-stages. Stages show what 
actions taken by who at what stage of the game. Once each action is taken, the game moves 
to its following stage. Within each stage, parties may consider strategies within the sub-
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stages. In the sub-stages players update their beliefs based on the provided information or 
analyzing their opponent’s hypothetical actions or reactions. 
4.2. Assumptions  
Development of this model requires multiple assumptions. The following are 
common assumptions for all models throughout this Chapter. Additional assumptions for 
individual models are discussed if applicable. Chapter 7, Limitations and Future Research, 
provides details on relaxing these assumptions. 
 
4.2.1. Discovery Process 
It is assumed the Judge determines the true values for Damages and Liability. The 
true values for Damages and Liability are assumed to be fully discoverable to the Judge 
during discovery. Typically, if there is insufficient information available for a case, parties 
seek the assistance of the court by filing a motion to compel discovery, or a court order 
sent to the non-complying party to produce the documentation or information requested in 
a proper and sufficient manner.  
During discovery, parties are obligated to reveal all of their information to the 
Judge. Therefore, it is assumed that the Judge has complete information about the case to 
determine the true values of Damages and Liability. This assumption is fairly realistic for 
civil cases because the Judge can hold his or her decision against the parties who do not 
reveal their private information. 
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4.2.2. Determination of Judge’s Verdict 
The Judge delivers the verdict based on the parties’ Liability and Damages. The 
Liability and Damages are typically determined during litigation. Claimants predict the 
verdict “V” by estimating the probability of being held liable at trial, and the damages that 
the Judge determines at trial. Therefore, the expected verdict is a product of Damages and 
Liability denoted, 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑦𝑖 . The following is the equation for expected value of the 
verdict: 
𝐸(𝑉) = 𝑥𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑖 
Chapter 7 provides further details on various methods used to predict Judge’s verdict. 
 
4.2.3. Prior Beliefs over Damages and Liability 
Each party forms a belief about the opposing party’s private information. The initial 
assessment of each party about its opponent’s private information is defined as the prior 
probability distribution over the variables. During pre-claim negotiations, parties exchange 
their prior beliefs before the official claim is submitted. Prior beliefs are assumed to be 
shared knowledge between both parties. This concept is often referred as Common Prior 
in literature. Depending on shared knowledge of the parties, plaintiff  (Player A) is assumed 
to know the probability that the defendant assigns to the Damages before submitting a 
complaint, or defendant (Player B) is assumed to know the probability that the plaintiff 
assigns to the Liability before the claim is filed. 
In construction claims, plaintiff and defendant are typically involved in pre-claim 
negotiations, such as change order discussions, or a dispute process. During these 
processes, the parties express their beliefs through letters, email, meetings, or other types 
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of communications in hope of reaching a resolution. Although the pre-claim negotiations 
may not fully reveal all private information from one party to another, they form a basis 
for parties to calculate the opponent’s prior belief based on their available information.  
 
4.2.4. Parties’ Beliefs Updates 
Each party forms a belief about the opposing party’s private information during 
pre-claim negotiations. The information transferred between the parties in this process 
updates their beliefs on other party’s private information.  It is assumed that the parties 
update their Probability Distribution Function after receiving new information from the 
opponent according to Bayes Rule. The following notation has been selected for prior, first, 
and second updates.  
Table 4-1 Parties Beliefs and Updating Notations 
Players  A B 
Prior Beliefs 𝐴𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) A’s prior PDF  𝐵𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) B’s prior PDF  
Prior Beliefs 𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦) A’s first updated PDF  𝐵𝑋
′ (𝑥) B’s first updated PDF over x 
Posterior Beliefs 𝐴𝑌
′′(𝑦) A’s second updated PDF 𝐵𝑋
′′(𝑥) B’s second updated PDF  
 
4.2.5. Litigation Costs 
Litigation costs are any expenses each party incurs to pursue a claim. Litigation 
costs include, but are not limited to, attorney fees, expert fees, courts costs, filing fees, 
parties’ office overhead, and other costs parties incurred during the claim process. These 
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costs may vary based on the contract, magnitude of the claim, duration of the claim, and 
complexity of the issues. Litigation costs may or may not be known to either party. This 
research assigns functions for litigation costs. Costs for players A and B are denoted by 𝑘𝐴 
and 𝑘𝐵. Total litigation costs are: 
𝐾 = 𝑘𝐴 + 𝑘𝐵  
The one-sided private information models introduced later in this Chapter assume 
the value of the litigation costs are known to both players. The two-sided asymmetric 
information model assumes litigation costs as a function.  
 
4.2.6. Allocating Trial Cost 
This research employs the American Rule for allocation of litigation costs.  The 
American Rule requires that each party to pay its own litigation costs regardless of the 
outcome from the trial. In contrast, the British Rule obligates the losing party to pay all 
litigation costs including the prevailing party’s attorney and expert fees. Depending on the 
contract agreement between the two parties, either rule may apply. The litigation costs play 
an important rule while parties are making decisions whether or not to pursue the case to 
the trial. Section 7.2 discusses researchers who advanced the application of British Rule in 
settlement negotiations. 
4.2.7. Final Settlement Offer/Demand 
All settlement offers are considered to be final offers. This is also known as take-




4.2.8. Risk Preference 
Parties are assumed to be risk neutral meaning that party's decisions are not 
impacted by their degree of uncertainty in a set of outcomes. A risk neutral party is 
indifferent between choices with equal expected payoffs, even if one choice is riskier. This 
assumption can be easily relaxed by substituting utility for money in the mathematical 
analysis. 
 
4.2.9. Consistent versus Inconsistent Prior Information 
The models provided in this research assume parties with consistent priors over 
certain elements of the claim, and inconsistent priors over the private information. Parties’ 
private information may cause divergent expectations between the parties. It is assumed 
that parties may not fully communicate the prior beliefs to each other through actions. The 
level of revealing information impacts parties’ beliefs update over Liability or Damages. 
As the claim proceeds, parties are allowed to update their own beliefs without 
communicating their private information to their opponent. This process appears to be 
consistent with civil litigation processes especially construction claim negotiations. 
 
4.3. One-Sided Private Information - Screening Models 
One-sided private information games are games where only one player has a private 
information about the factual elements of the case. The player who holds the private 
information is called the Informed Player, and the opponent player without that specific 
private information is called the Uninformed Player. Both players form beliefs based on 
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their prior assessments and all observable information including their opponent’s 
information. Parties make decisions on taking actions based on their beliefs at each stage 
of the game. The sequence of actions either player takes updates the belief of the opponent 
party.  
This section introduces the Screening Model (Sorting Model), where the 
uninformed player makes the first settlement offer and the informed player choses to 
respond. The reverse version is called Signaling model, where the informed player makes 
the first settlement offer, which will be discussed in Section 4.4. Private information of one 
party about the factual issues of the dispute result in a different assessment of the trial’s 
expected outcome. Therefore, parties’ information about the outcome of the trial is 
considered to be asymmetric, or one-sided. 
Bebchuk’s model (1984) on pretrial negotiation is believed to be a major foundation 
of screening models in pre-trial negotiations. The one-sided private information model 
introduced in this Section is essentially an advanced extension of his model. In this model, 
none of the parties know the true value for Liability or Damages; however, the party with 









4.3.1. Defendant’s Decision on making a Settlement Offer - Screening Model 
In this model the plaintiff holds private information about Damages and the 
defendant screens plaintiff’s type by offering a settlement. Plaintiff (Player A) is assumed 
to have private information on Damages 𝑋 . The private information is denoted as the 
player’s type such that a plaintiff with Damages 𝑥 is called Plaintiff type 𝑥. Plaintiff forms 
a Probability Distribution Function (PDF) over x (its own type) denoted  𝑎𝑋(𝑥). Defendant 
(Player B) does not have the private information about Damages, but it estimates Damages 
to be within [𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝐻]  interval. Defendant’s prior PDF over Damages (A’s type) is 
denoted  𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) . It is assumed that both parties agree on the true value of Liability. The 
assumptions on parties’ information are summarized as follows: 
Table 4-2  Player’s Information 
A (Plaintiff) B (Defendant) 
  𝒂𝑿(𝒙) 
 𝐲 
 𝒃𝑿




𝒌𝑨 , 𝒌𝑩 
𝐴’s PDF on Damages 
𝐵’s Liability 
𝐵’s prior PDF over 𝑥 
𝐵’s updated PDF over 𝑥 








(𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝐻) 
𝑘𝐴 , 𝑘𝐵 
 
𝐵’s Liability 
𝐵’s prior PDF over 𝑥 
𝐵’s updated PDF over 𝑥 
𝐵’s limits of Damages 
Litigation Costs 
 
The following provides details for the main stages of the game: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the parties 





Table 4-3  Screening Model for Defendant Screens with Settlement Offer* 
stage Plaintiff (Player A) Defendant (Player B) 




Submit a claim 𝐶𝐴  
B updates its PDF   𝑏𝑋










































B’s Decision Analysis  
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛      
 









B estimates A’s interim outcome, (û𝐴) 
 û𝐴 (𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥), y, 𝑘𝐴)  = 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)] y − 𝑘𝐴  
 
B thinks A would only accept SB if: 
𝑆𝐵    ≥  𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)] y − 𝑘𝐴 
 
𝐸[𝑏𝑋





A’s critical type:   𝑥𝑐 =  
𝑆𝐵+ 𝑘𝐴 
𝑦





*Blue with the white text represents the plaintiff  
*Green with the black text represents the defendant 
 
 
A Decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐴 
{
  If 𝑆𝐵  ≥  𝑢𝐴    =>     A would accept
 
If 𝑆𝐵  <  𝑢𝐴    =>     A would reject
 
 
B’s belief over A’s belief 
A’s Strategy 
{
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑋(𝑥)]    ≤    𝑥
𝑐 =>   𝐴 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑋(𝑥)]    >    𝑥
𝑐 =>   𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
B’s belief over A’s belief 
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Stage  0    Players A and B form their prior beliefs as follows: 
i. Plaintiff forms a belief over Damages, 𝑎𝑋(𝑥) 
ii. Defendant forms a prior belief over Damages,  𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) 
 
Stage 1.1    The plaintiff submit a claim 𝐶𝐴 to the defendant. It is assumed that the plaintiff 
files a claim only when the minimum awarded in the verdict exceeds the Litigation Costs. 
𝑥𝐿  𝑦 −   𝑘𝐴  >   0 
 
Stage 1.2    The Defendant updates its beliefs over Damages given Plaintiff’s claim  𝐶𝐴; 
denoted by  𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥). 
 
Stage 2.1    The Defendant makes a decision based on the following options: 
i. Reject the claim 𝐶𝐴 and pursue litigation.  
If the Defendant rejects Plaintiff’s claim, the case will be automatically 
pursued in litigation. In the litigation process the Judge will define the True 
Damages, damages to be transferred from the Defendant to the Plaintiff.  
ii. Responds to the claim with a settlement offer. 
If the Defendant decides to offer a settlement, since the defendant does not 
have the private information (uninformed player), the offer will screen 
Plaintiff’s private information with the settlement offer. The model assumes 
any settlement offer is a final offer. 
 
Stage 2.2    Defendant put itself in Plaintiff’s situation to see how Plaintiff would react to 
Defendant’s settlement offer. Defendant determines that the Plaintiff would not updates its 




Defendant analyzes Plaintiff’s decision before making its final offer. Defendant’s 
offer screens the Plaintiff for its two available options: acceptance and rejection. Defendant 
thinks Plaintiff would only accept the settlement offer if the amount offered is higher than 
Plaintiff’s expected outcome from the trial minus litigation costs. Plaintiff decides based 
on its interim payoff  𝑢𝐴: 
               {
 If 𝑆𝐵  ≥  𝑢𝐴    =>     Plaintiff would accept
 
If 𝑆𝐵  <  𝑢𝐴    =>      Plaintiff  would reject
 
  
Stage 2.3    Defendant estimates Plaintiff’s interim expected payoff, û𝐴 , from litigation 
using its own beliefs  𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥). û𝐴  is Plaintiff’s estimate of Defendant’s expected payoff 
given the settlement offer 𝑆𝐵.  
  û𝐴  (𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥), y, 𝑘𝐵)   =    𝐸 [𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)]  y − 𝑘𝐴  
 
Stage 2.4    Defendant thinks Plaintiff would only accept settlement offers that are equal 
or more than Plaintiff’s expected outcome from litigation. 
𝑆𝐵    ≥      𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)] y −  𝑘𝐴 
 
Rearranging the above equation results in: 
𝐸[𝑏𝑋





This analysis results in determination of the critical type (𝑥𝑐) for Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s 
critical type is defined as the threshold that Plaintiff accepts the offer up to that amount. 
Plaintiff only accepts offer 𝑆𝐵 if the proposed damages are less than its expected awarded 
amount of the verdict at trial. 







Stage 2.5    The Defendant considers Plaintiff’s critical type to determine its influence on 
Plaintiff’s decision in acceptance or rejection of the settlement offer  𝑆𝐵. From Defendant’s 
view, Plaintiff’s Strategy would be: 
               {
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑋(𝑥)]    ≤    𝑥
𝑐     =>   Plaintiff  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑋(𝑥)]    >    𝑥
𝑐     =>     Plaintiff  𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
Defendant’s Strategic Analyses 
Based on Defendant’s settlement offer  𝑆𝐵, 
               {
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑓                  𝑥 ≤  𝑥𝑐
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑓                    𝑥 >  𝑥𝑐   
 
 
Probability of Plaintiff accepting or rejecting Defendant’s offer will be 
               {
𝑃𝑟𝐴{𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒}  =   𝐵𝑋
′ (𝑥𝑐)        
 




Defendant’s payoff given Plaintiff’s action will be 
               {
𝑆𝐵                                     𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)] y +   𝑘𝐵          𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Therefore Defendant’s expected value from its own settlement offer 𝑆𝐵 will be 
𝑈𝐵 (𝑆𝐵, 𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥), y, 𝑘𝐵) =   𝐵𝑋
′ (𝑥𝑐)  𝑆𝐵 +  {1 – 𝐵𝑋
′ (𝑥𝑐)}  { 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)]  𝑦 + 𝑘𝐵 }  
 
Solving the equation above results in Defendant’s optimal settlement amount, denoted 
by  𝑆𝐵
∗ .  
 




′ (𝑥), 𝑥𝑐 , y, 𝑘𝐵) =   𝐵𝑋
′ [𝑥𝑐]  𝑆𝐵 +  {1 – 𝐵𝑋
′ [𝑥𝑐]}    {   





 𝑦 + 𝑘𝐵} 
 
To maximize Plaintiff’s expected outcome, the right hand side of the equation above is 
differentiated respective to   𝑆𝐵 . The solution to the differentiated equation identifies 
Plaintiff’s critical type  x𝑐. This value specifies Defendant’s optimized settlement offer 𝑆𝐵
∗ .  
The optimal settlement amount needs to be within Plaintiff’s lowest and highest expected 
outcome. 
𝑥𝐿 𝑦 −  𝑘𝐴  ≤   𝑆𝐵
∗     ≤    𝑥𝐻  𝑦 −  𝑘𝐴 
 
This equation eliminates the opportunity of having a strictly dominated strategies for the 
plaintiff, meaning that the settlement offer will not be accepted or rejected regardless of 
plaintiff’s beliefs over Damages. 
 
Conclusions 
 The likelihood of settlement is identified by the of Plaintiff’s probability of 
acceptance based on plaintiff’s critical type: 
Pr{Settlement}  =  𝐴𝑋(𝑥
𝑐∗)  
 An increase in Defendant’s updated belief over Damages 𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥), increases the 
settlement offer and the likelihood of a settlement. 
 An increase in plaintiff’s litigation costs, decreases the settlement offer  
 An increase in plaintiff’s litigation costs, increases the likelihood of settlement. 
 A plaintiff who is more confident about its Damages to be determined at higher 
amounts in litigation, will more likely reject the lower settlement offers.   
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4.3.2. Plaintiff’s Decision on Settlement Offers - Screening Model 
In this model, the Defendant holds private information about Liability and the 
Plaintiff screens defendant’s type by offering a settlement. Defendant (Player B) is 
assumed to have private information on Liability 𝑌. The private information is denoted as 
the player’s type such that a defendant with Liability  𝑦  is called Defendant type  𝑦 . 
Defendant forms a PDF over 𝑦 (its own type) denoted  𝑏𝑌(𝑦). Plaintiff (Player A) does not 
have the private information about Liability, but it estimates Liability to be within [𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻] 
interval. Plaintiff’s prior PDF over Liability (B’s type) is denoted  𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) . It is assumed 
that both parties agree on the true level of Damages. The assumptions on parties’ 
information are summarized as follows: 
Table 4-4  Player’s Information 






𝒌𝑨 , 𝒌𝑩 
 
A’s Damages 
A’s prior PDF over 𝑦 
A’s limits of Damages 
Litigation Costs 




(𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻) 
𝑘𝐴 , 𝑘𝐵 
A’s PDF on Liability 
A’s Damages 
A’s prior PDF over 𝑦 
A’s limits of Damages 
Litigation Costs 
 
The following provides details for the main stages of the game: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the parties 





Table 4-5  Screening Model for Defendant Screens with Settlement Offer 
stage PlayerA (Plaintiff) Player B (Defendant) 
0 A forms a PDF  𝑎𝑌
𝑜(y)  B forms a prior PDF   𝑏𝑌(𝑦) 
1 
1.1 
Submit a claim 𝐶𝐴  
B does not receive any new information 


























A’s Decision Analysis 
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 Litigation        
 









A estimates B’s interim payoff, (û𝐵) 
 û𝐵 (x, 𝑎𝑌
0(𝑦), 𝑘𝐵)  = 𝑥  𝐸[𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦)]  +  𝑘𝐵  
 
B thinks A would only accept 𝑆𝐴 if: 
𝑆𝐴    ≤  𝑥  𝐸[𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦)]  +  𝑘𝐵 
 
𝐸[𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦)]  ≥   




B’s critical type:   𝑦𝑐 =  






















*Blue with the white text represents the plaintiff  
*Green with the black text represents the defendant 
 
A’s belief over  
B’s belief 
B decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐵 
{
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵    =>    B would accept
 











𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑏𝑌(𝑦)]  ≥  𝑦
𝑐     =>   𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑏𝑌(𝑦)] < 𝑦








Stage  0    Players A and B form their prior beliefs as follows: 
i. Plaintiff forms a prior belief over Liability, 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(y) 
ii. Defendant forms a belief over Damages, 𝑏𝑌(𝑦) 
 
Stage 1.1    The Plaintiff submit its claim 𝐶𝐴 to the Defendant. It is assumed that the 
Plaintiff files a claim only when the minimum expected outcome exceeds the Litigation 
Costs. 
𝑥  𝑦𝐻  −   𝑘𝐴  >   0   
 
Stage 1.2    The Defendant has superior information regarding Liability; therefore, an 
information update does not occur in this phase unlike the previous screening model. 
 
Stage 2.1    The Plaintiff makes a decision based on the following options: 
 
i. Avoid Negotiations and Pursue Litigation  
If the Plaintiff avoids settlement negotiations and pursues the litigation 
process, the Judge will define the true level of Liability, to the extent the 
Defendant is found liable. 
ii. Send a Settlement Offer 
If the Plaintiff decides to offer a settlement, since the defendant does not 
have the private information (uninformed player), the offer will screen 
Plaintiff’s private information with the settlement offer. The model assumes 




Stage 2.2    Plaintiff put himself in Defendant’s situation to see how the Defendant would 
react to the settlement offer. Plaintiff determines it would not update its belief over Liability 
given the settlement offer since it already has a superior knowledge over Liability. 
Plaintiff analyzes Defendant’s decision before making its final offer. Plaintiff’s 
offer screens the Defendant for its two available options: acceptance and rejection. Plaintiff 
thinks Defendant would only accept the settlement offer if the amount offered is lower than 
Defendant’s expected outcome (payments) from the trial plus litigation costs. Defendant’s 
expected outcome is defined as total amount that it realize as out of pocket expenditures. 
Defendant would make a decision based on its interim payoff  𝑢𝐵: 
               {
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵       =>     Defendant would accept
 
  If 𝑆𝐴 >  𝑢𝐵       =>      Defendant  would reject
 
  
Stage 2.3    Plaintiff estimates Defendant’s interim expected payoff, û𝐵 , from litigation 
using its own beliefs 𝑎𝑌
o(𝑦). û𝐵 is Plaintiff’s estimate on Defendant’s expected payoff 
given the settlement offer 𝑆𝐵.  
û𝐵 (x, 𝑎𝑌
0(𝑦), 𝑘𝐵)  = 𝑥  𝐸[𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦)]  +   𝑘𝐵 
 
Stage 2.4    Plaintiff thinks Defendant would only accept settlement offers that are less or 
more than Defendant’s expected outcome from litigation. 
𝑆𝐴    ≤  𝑥  𝐸[𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦)]  +  𝑘𝐵 
Rearranging the above equation results in: 
𝐸[𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦)]  ≥   




This analysis results in determination of the critical type (𝑦𝑐)for Defendant. Defendant’s 
critical type is the threshold for the Defendant who does not accept the offer if its Liability 
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is less than that amount. Defendant only accepts offer 𝑆𝐴 if the proposed Liability is less 
than its expected Liability at trial. Plaintiff’s critical type will be: 
𝑦𝑐 =  




Stage 2.5    The Plaintiff considers Defendant’s critical type, which impacts defendant’s 
decision in acceptance or rejection of the settlement offer   𝑆𝐴 . From Plaintiff’s view 
Defendant’s Strategy would be: 
                {
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑏𝑌(𝑦)]  ≥  𝑦
𝑐     =>   𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑏𝑌(𝑦)] < 𝑦
𝑐   =>     𝐵 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Plaintiff’s Strategic Analyses 
Based on Plaintiff’s settlement offer  𝑆𝐵, 
               {
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑓                 𝑦  ≥    𝑦𝑐
 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑓                    𝑦 <    𝑦𝑐  
 
 
Probability of Defendant accepting or rejecting Plaintiff’s offer will be 
               {
 𝑃𝑟𝐵{𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒}  =    1 − 𝐴𝑌
𝑜(𝑦𝑐)       
 
  𝑃𝑟𝐵{𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}      =   𝐴𝑌
𝑜(𝑦𝑐)                
 
 
Plaintiff’s payoff given Defendant’s action will be 
               {
𝑆𝐴                                     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝑥 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
0(𝑦)]  −  𝑘𝐴        𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Therefore Defendant’s expected value from the settlement offer SA will be 
𝑈𝐴(𝑆𝐴, 𝑥, 𝑦
𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑘𝐴)  =   {1 − 𝐴𝑌
𝑜 (𝑦𝑐)}  𝑆𝐴      + 𝐴𝑌
𝑜(𝑦𝑐)  {𝑥 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
0(𝑦)]  −  𝑘𝐴}  
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Solving this equation results in Defendant’s optimal settlement amount, denoted by  𝑆𝐴
∗.  
𝑈𝐴(𝑆𝐴, 𝑥, 𝑦
𝑐, 𝑘𝐴)  =   {1 − 𝐴𝑌
𝑜(𝑦𝑐) }  𝑆𝐴  +  𝐴𝑌
𝑜 (𝑦𝑐) { 𝑥   




  − 𝑘𝐴}   
To maximize Plaintiff’s expected outcome, the right hand side of the equation above is 
differentiated respective to SA. The solution to the differentiated equation identifies 
Defendant’s critical type  y𝑐. This value specifies Plaintiff’s optimized settlement offer 𝑆𝐴
∗.  
The optimal settlement amount needs to be within Defendant’s lowest and highest expected 
outcome. 
𝑥 𝑦𝐿 +  𝑘𝐵  ≤   𝑆𝐴
∗    ≤    𝑥 𝑦𝐻 +  𝑘𝐵 
 
This equation eliminates the opportunity of having a strictly dominated strategies for the 
plaintiff, meaning that the settlement offer will not be accepted or rejected regardless of 
plaintiff’s beliefs over Damages. 
 
Conclusions 
 The likelihood of settlement is identified by the optimal amount of settlement and 
as a result optimal amount of critical type as follows: 
Pr{Settlement}  =  1 − 𝐵𝑌(𝑦
𝑐∗) 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s belief over Liability 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦), increases the settlement offer, 
and decreases the likelihood of settlement. 
 Increase in Defendant’s litigation costs, increases the settlement offer  
 Increase in Defendant’s litigation costs, increases the likelihood of settlement. 
 A defendant who is more confident about its Liability to be determined as lower 
amounts at trial will more likely reject the higher settlement offers.   
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4.4. One-Sided Private Information - Signaling game 
 
 
Signaling game is a type of one-sided private information game where the informed 
player (the party who holds private information) makes the settlement offer. The informed 
player may reveal its private information to its opponent through the settlement offer. 
Literature categorize the signaling games based on the level of revealed information to 
identify the equilibrium of the game. The equilibriums include Revealing Equilibrium, 
Pooling Equilibrium, and Semi-Pooling Equilibrium.  
Revealing Equilibrium applies to cases where full information is transferred 
through the settlement offer. Pooling Equilibrium (Separating Equilibrium) is used when 
the proposer does not transfer any private information to its opponent. Hybrid or Semi-
Pooling Equilibrium is the cases that the proposer partially transfer its private information 
to its opponent through the settlement offer. This Section assumes that the game is the 











4.4.1. Defendant Signals with Settlement Offer 
In this model, the defendant holds private information about Liability and signals 
plaintiff through a settlement offer. Defendant (Player B) is assumed to have private 
information on Liability  𝑌. The private information is denoted as the player’s type such 
that a defendant with Liability 𝑦 is called Defendant type 𝑦. Defendant forms a Probability 
Distribution Function (PDF) over y (its own type) denoted  𝑏𝑌(𝑦). Plaintiff (Player A) does 
not have the private information about the Liability, but it estimates Liability to be within 
[𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻] interval. Plaintiff’s prior PDF over Liability (B’s type) is denoted  𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) . It is 
assumed that both parties agree on the true value of Damages. The assumptions on parties’ 
information are summarized as follows: 
Table 4-6  Player’s Information 








𝒌𝑨 , 𝒌𝑩 
 
A’s Damages 
A’s prior PDF over 𝑦 
A’s updated PDF over 𝑦 
A’s limits of Damages 
Litigation Costs 






(𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻) 
𝑘𝐴 , 𝑘𝐵 
A’s PDF on Liability 
A’s Damages 
A’s prior PDF over 𝑦 
A’s updated PDF over 𝑦 
A’s limits of Damages 
Litigation Costs 
 
The following provides details for the main stages of the game: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the parties 





Table 4-7  Screening Model for Defendant Screens with Settlement Offer 
stage Plaintiff (Player A) Defendant (Player B) 
0 A forms a PDF 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) B forms a prior PDF   𝑏𝑌(𝑦) 
1 
1.1 
Submit a complaint 𝐶𝐴  
B does not receive any new 













































B’s Decision Analysis  
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛      
 









B estimates A’s interim outcome, (û𝐴) 
 û𝐴 (𝑥, 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑘𝐴)  = 𝑥 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  −  𝑘𝐴  
 
B thinks A would only accept SB if: 
𝑆𝐵    ≥  x 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  −  𝑘𝐴 
 
𝐸[𝑎𝑌





A’s critical type:   𝑦𝑐 =  
𝑆𝐵+ 𝑘𝐴 
𝑥





*Blue with the white text represents the plaintiff  
*Green with the black text represents the defendant 
 
A updated its belief over Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
A Decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐴 
{
  If 𝑆𝐵  ≥  𝑢𝐴    =>     A would accept
 






′ (𝑦)]    ≤  𝑦𝑐    =>   𝐴 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]    >  𝑦𝑐    =>    𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
B’s belief over A’s belief 
B’s belief over A’s belief 
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Stage  0    Players A and B form their prior beliefs as follows: 
i. Plaintiff forms a belief over Liability, 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
ii. Defendant forms a prior belief over Damages,  𝑏𝑌(𝑦) 
 
Stage 1.1    The plaintiff submit its claim 𝐶𝐴 to the Defendant. It is assumed that the 
Plaintiff files a claim only when the minimum expected outcome from litigation exceeds 
the Litigation Costs. 
  𝑥  𝑦𝐻  −   𝑘𝐴  >   0   
 
Stage 1.2    The Defendant does not updates its beliefs since it has superior knowledge 
over Liability. 
 
Stage 2.1    The Defendant makes a decision based on the following options: 
 
i. Avoid Negotiations and Pursue Litigation 
If the Defendant avoids settlement negotiations and pursue the litigation 
process, the Judge will define the true level of Liability, to the Defendant is 
found liable. 
ii. Send a Settlement Offer 𝑆𝐵 
If the Defendant decides to offer a settlement, the offer will signals its 
private information to the Plaintiff.  
 
Stage 2.2    Defendant put itself in Plaintiff’s situation to see how the Plaintiff would react 
to the settlement offer. The Plaintiff updates its beliefs over Liability given the settlement 
offer as follows: 
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𝑎𝑌(𝑦| 𝑆𝐵)    or    𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
 
Stage 2.3    Defendant analyzes Plaintiff’s decision before making its final offer. 
Defendant thinks Plaintiff would only accept the settlement offer if the amount offered is 
more than Plaintiff’s expected outcome from the trial minus litigation costs. Plaintiff would 
make a decision based on its interim payoff  𝑢𝐴: 
               {
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≥  𝑢𝐴       =>     Plaintiff would accept
 
  If 𝑆𝐴 <  𝑢𝐴       =>      Plaintiff  would reject
 
 
Stage 2.4    Defendant estimates Plaintiff’s interim expected payoff, û𝐵 , from litigation 
using Plaintiff’s updated beliefs 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦). û𝐴 is Defendant’s estimate on Plaintiff’s expected 
payoff given the settlement offer 𝑆𝐵.  
û𝐴 (𝑥, 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑘𝐴)  = 𝑥 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  −  𝑘𝐴 
 
Stage 2.5    Defendant thinks Plaintiff would only accept settlement offers that are equal 
or greater than Plaintiff’s expected outcome from litigation. 
𝑆𝐵    ≥    𝑥 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  −  𝑘𝐴 
Rearranging the above equation results in: 
𝐸[𝑎𝑌





This analysis results in determination of the critical type for Plaintiff. Plaintiff only accepts 
offer 𝑆𝐵 if the proposed Liability are more than its expected Liability at trial. Plaintiff’s 
critical type will be: 
𝑦𝑐 =  





Stage 2.6    The Defendant considers Plaintiff’s critical type, which impacts plaintiff 
decision in acceptance or rejection of the settlement offer  𝑆𝐵 . From Defendant’s view 
Plaintiff’s Strategy would be: 
               {
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]    ≤    𝑦𝑐     =>   𝐴 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]    >    𝑦𝑐   =>     𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Defendant’s Strategic Analyses 
Based on Plaintiff’s settlement offer  𝑆𝐵, 
               {
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑓                   𝑦  ≤    𝑦𝑐
 
 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑓                    𝑦  >   𝑦𝑐  
 
Probability of Plaintiff accepting or rejecting Defendant’s offer will be 
               {
 𝑃𝑟𝐴{𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒}  =                    𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦𝑐)                  
 
  𝑃𝑟𝐴{𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}      =            1 −  𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦𝑐)                   
 
Defendant’s payoff given Plaintiff’s action will be 
               {
   𝑆𝐵                                   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 
 
 𝑥  𝐸[𝑏𝑌(𝑦)]  +   𝑘𝐵       𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Therefore B’s expected value of its own offer 𝑆𝐵 is: 
𝑈𝐵 (𝑆𝐵, x, 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑏𝑌(𝑦), 𝑘𝐵) =     𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦𝑐)   𝑆𝐵 + {1 – 𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦𝑐)} { 𝑥  𝐸[𝑏𝑌(𝑦)]  +   𝑘𝐵   }  
 
Solving this equation results in Defendant’s optimal settlement amount, denoted by  𝑆𝐴
∗.  
 
𝑈𝐵 (𝑆𝐵, x, 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑏𝑌(𝑦), 𝑘𝐵) =   𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦𝑐) 𝑆𝐵 +  {1 – 𝐴𝑌
′ (𝑦𝑐)} { 𝑥  








To maximize Defendant’s expected outcome, the right hand side of the equation above is 
differentiated respective to SB. The solution to the differentiated equation identifies 
Plaintiff’s critical type  y𝑐. This value specifies Plaintiff’s optimized settlement offer 𝑆𝐵
∗ .  
The optimal settlement amount needs to be within Plaintiff’s lowest and highest expected 
outcome. 
𝑥  𝑦𝐿 +  𝑘𝐵  ≤   𝑆𝐵
∗     ≤    𝑥  𝑦𝐻 +  𝑘𝐵 
This equation eliminates the opportunity of having a strictly dominated strategies for the 
Plaintiff, meaning that the settlement offer will not be accepted or rejected regardless of 
Defendant’s beliefs over Damages. 
 
Conclusions 
 The likelihood of settlement is identified by the optimal amount of settlement and 
as a result optimal amount of critical type as follow: 
Pr{Settlement}  =  1 − 𝐵𝑌(𝑦
𝑐∗) 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s updated belief over Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) will increase the 
settlement amount and decrease the likelihood of a settlement. 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s litigation costs will decrease the settlement offer 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s litigation costs will increase the likelihood of settlement. 
 A plaintiff who is more confident about the Liability to be determined as higher 





4.4.2. Plaintiff Signals with Settlement Demand 
 
In this model, the plaintiff holds private information about Damages and signals 
defendant through a settlement offer. Plaintiff (Player A) is assumed to have private 
information on Damages 𝑋. The private information is denoted as the player’s type such 
that a plaintiff with Damages 𝑥  is called Plaintiff type 𝑥 . Plaintiff forms a Probability 
Distribution Function (PDF) over x (its own type) denoted  𝑎𝑋(𝑥). Defendant (Player B) 
does not have the private information about Damages, but it estimates Damages to be 
within [𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝐻]  interval. Defendant’s prior PDF over Damages (A’s type) is 
denoted  𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) . It is assumed that both parties agree on the true value of Liability. The 
assumptions on parties’ information are summarized as follows: 
Table 4-8  Player’s Information 
A (Plaintiff) B (Defendant) 
  𝒂𝑿(𝒙) 
 𝐲 
 𝒃𝑿







𝒌𝑨 , 𝒌𝑩 
A’s PDF on Damages 
B’s Liability 
B’s prior PDF over 𝑥 
B’s first update over 𝑥 
B’s updated belief over 𝑥 
given the settlement offer 











(𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝐻) 
𝑘𝐴 , 𝑘𝐵 
 
B’s Liability 
B’s prior PDF over 𝑥 
B’s first update over 𝑥 
B’s updated belief over 𝑥 
after the settlement offer 
A’s limits of Damages 
Litigation Costs 
 
The following provides details for the main stages of the game: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the parties 
Stage 2 – Defendant’s Decision Analysis  
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Table 4-9  Screening Model for Defendant Screens with Settlement Offer 
stage PlayerA (Plaintiff) Player B (Defendant) 




Submit a claim 𝐶𝐴  




























A’s Decision Analysis 
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 Litigation        
 








A estimates B’s interim payoff, (û𝐵) 
û𝐵 (  𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥), y, 𝑘𝐵) =  𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)] 𝑦 +  𝑘𝐵  
 
B thinks A would only accept 𝑆𝐴 if: 
𝑆𝐴    ≤   𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)] 𝑦 +   𝑘𝐵 
 
 𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)]  ≥   




B’s critical type:   𝑥𝑐 =  





















*Blue with the white text represents the plaintiff  
*Green with the black text represents the defendant 
 
A’s belief over  
B’s belief 
B updates PDF over x given 𝑆𝐴, 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 
B decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐵 
{
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵    =>    B would accept
 












′′(𝑥)]  ≥  𝑥𝑐    =>   𝐵 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠
 
  𝐼𝑓 𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋








Stage  0    Players A and B form their prior beliefs as follows: 
i. Plaintiff forms a belief over Liability, 𝑎𝑋(𝑥) 
ii. Defendant forms a prior belief over Damages, 𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) 
 
Stage 1.1    The Plaintiff submits its claim 𝐶𝐴 to the Defendant. It is assumed the Plaintiff 
files a claim only when the minimum expected outcome from litigation exceeds the 
Litigation Costs. 
 𝑥𝐻   y −  𝑘𝐴  >   0   
 
Stage 1.2    The Defendant updates its beliefs over damages given Plaintiff’s claim as 
follows: 
𝑏𝑋(𝑥|𝐶𝐴)    or    𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥) 
 
Stage 2.1    The Plaintiff makes a decision based on the following options: 
 
iii. Avoid Negotiations and Pursue Litigation 
If the plaintiff avoids settlement negotiations and pursue the litigation 
process, the Judge will define the true level of Damages. 
iv. Send a Settlement Offer 𝑆𝐴. 
If the Plaintiff decides to offer a settlement, the offer will signals its private 
information to the Defendant.  
 
Stage 2.2    Plaintiff put himself in Defendant’s situation to see how the defendant would 
react to the settlement offer. The Defendant updates its beliefs over damages given 
Plaintiff’s settlement offer as follows: 
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Stage 2.3    Plaintiff analyzes Defendant’s decision before making its final offer. Plaintiff 
thinks Defendant would only accept the settlement offer if the amount offered is lower than 
Defendant’s expected outcome (payments) from the trial plus litigation costs. Defendant’s 
expected outcome is defined as total amount that it realize as out of pocket expenditures. 
Defendant would make a decision based on its interim payoff  𝑢𝐵: 
               {
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵       =>     Defendant would accept
 
  If 𝑆𝐴 >  𝑢𝐵       =>      Defendant  would reject
 
 
Stage 2.4    Plaintiff estimates Defendant’s interim expected payoff, û𝐵 , from litigation 
using Defendant’s updated beliefs 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) . û𝐵 is Plaintiff’s estimate on Defendant’s 
expected payoff given the settlement offer 𝑆𝐴.  
û𝐵 ( 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥), y, 𝑘𝐵) =  𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)] 𝑦 +  𝑘𝐵 
 
Stage 2.5    Plaintiff thinks Defendant would only accept settlement offers that are equal 
or less than Defendant’s expected outcome from litigation. 
𝑆𝐴    ≤   𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)] 𝑦 +  𝑘𝐵 
Rearranging the above equation results in: 
𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)]  ≥   




This analysis results in determination of the critical type for Defendant. Defendant only 
accepts offer 𝑆𝐴 if the proposed damages are less than its expected Damages at trial. 
Defendant’s critical type will be: 
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𝑥𝑐 =  
𝑆𝐴  −  𝑘𝐵  
𝑦
 
Stage 2.6    The Plaintiff considers Defendant’s critical type, which impacts defendant’s 
decision in acceptance or rejection of the settlement offer   𝑆𝐴 . From Plaintiff’s view 
Defendant’s Strategy would be: 
               {
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)]  ≥   𝑥𝑐       =>   𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 
 
  𝐼𝑓 𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)]  <    𝑥𝑐     =>     𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠     
 
 
Plaintiff’s Strategic Analyses 
Based on Plaintiff’s settlement offer  𝑆𝐵, 
               {
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑓                   𝑥  ≥    𝑥𝑐
 
 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑓                    𝑥 <    𝑥𝑐   
 
Probability of Defendant accepting or rejecting Plaintiff’s offer will be 
               {
 𝑃𝑟𝐵{𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒}  =    1 − 𝐵𝑋
′′(𝑥𝑐)       
 
  𝑃𝑟𝐵{𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}      =    𝐵𝑋
′′(𝑥𝑐)                 
 
Plaintiff’s payoff given Defendant’s action will be 
               {
   𝑆𝐴                                   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 
 
 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)]  𝑦 −  𝑘𝐴       𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Therefore Defendant’s expected value from the settlement offer SA will be 
𝑈𝐴(𝑆𝐴, 𝑥, 𝑥
𝑐 , 𝑦, 𝑘𝐴)  =   {1 − 𝐵𝑋
′′(𝑥𝑐)}  𝑆𝐴   +    𝐵𝑋
′′(𝑥𝑐) { 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)]  𝑦 −  𝑘𝐴}  
Solving this equation results in Defendant’s optimal settlement amount, denoted by  𝑆𝐴
∗.  
𝑈𝐴(𝑆𝐴, 𝑥, 𝑥
𝑐 , 𝑦, 𝑘𝐴)  =   {1 − 𝐵𝑋
′′(𝑥𝑐)}  𝑆𝐴 +  𝐵𝑋







  − 𝑘𝐴}   
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To maximize Plaintiff’s expected outcome, the right hand side of the equation above is 
differentiated respective to SA. The solution to the differentiated equation identifies 
Defendant’s critical type  x𝑐. This value specifies Plaintiff’s optimized settlement offer 𝑆𝐴
∗.  
The optimal settlement amount needs to be within Defendant’s lowest and highest expected 
outcome. 
𝑥𝐿 y +  𝑘𝐵  ≤   𝑆𝐴
∗    ≤    𝑥𝐻  y +  𝑘𝐵 
 
This equation eliminates the opportunity of having a strictly dominated strategies for the 
Defendant, meaning that the settlement offer will not be accepted or rejected regardless of 
Defendant’s beliefs over Damages. 
 
Conclusions 
 The likelihood of settlement is identified by the optimal amount of settlement and 
as a result optimal amount of critical type as follows: 
Pr{Settlement}  =  𝐴𝑋(𝑥
𝑐∗) 
 Increase in Defendant’s belief over Damages 𝑏𝑋(𝑥), increases the settlement offer 
and decrease the likelihood of a settlement 
 Increase in Defendant’s litigation costs, increases the settlement demand  
 Increase in Defendant’s litigation costs, increases the likelihood of settlement. 
 A Defendant who is confident about the true damages to be determined at lower 
amounts at trial will more likely reject the higher settlement demands 
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4.5. Two-Sided Private Information Model 
This model consolidates both Screening and Signaling games into one model. The 
two-sided asymmetric information game considers both parties (players A and B) have 
private information on the specifics of the claim.  Each party has private information on 
Damages and Liability. The analysis varies depending on which party submits the final 
settlement offer. The following describes information that each party holds regarding the 
claim. 
Each player is assumed to have private information on Damages 𝑋 and Liability Y. 
The private information is denoted as the player’s type. For example, Plaintiff with 
Damages  𝑥  is called Plaintiff type  𝑥 . Plaintiff forms a prior Probability Distribution 
Function (PDF) on Damages denoted  𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥), and Liability denoted  𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦). Defendant 
forms a prior PDF on Damages denoted  𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥), and Liability denoted 𝑏𝑌
𝑜(𝑦).  
 
Each player is assumed to form a PDF over its estimated litigation costs and its 
opponent’s litigation costs. Plaintiff’s beliefs over its own litigation costs are 
denoted  𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐴), and Plaintiff’s beliefs over Defendant’s litigation costs are 
denoted  𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵). Defendant’s beliefs over its own litigation costs are denoted  𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐵), and 
Defendant’s beliefs over Plaintiff’s litigation costs are denoted  𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴). The assumptions 





Table 4-10  Player’s Information 







A’s prior PDF over 𝑥 
A’s prior PDF over 𝑦 
A’s Litigation Costs 







B’s prior PDF over 𝑥 
B’s prior PDF over y 
A’s Litigation Costs 
B’s Litigation Costs 
 
4.5.1. Defendant Signals with Settlement offer  
In this model, the defendant signals plaintiff about its private information by 
submitting a settlement offer.  The following provides details for the main stages of the 
game: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the parties 
Stage 2 – Defendant’s Decision Analysis  
 
Stage  0    Players A and B form their prior beliefs as follows: 
i. Plaintiff forms prior beliefs over Damages 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥), and Liability 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
ii. Defendant forms prior beliefs over Damages 𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥), and Liability 𝑏𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
 
Stage 1.1    The Plaintiff submit its claim 𝐶𝐴 to the Defendant. It is assumed the Plaintiff 
files a claim only when the minimum expected outcome from litigation exceeds the 
Litigation Costs. 




Table 4-11  Two-sided private information – Defendant Offers Settlement 
stage PlayerA (Plaintiff) Player B (Defendant) 
0 A forms prior PDFs 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) and 𝑎𝑌





Submit a claim 𝐶𝐴  
B updates its belief over  
Damages 𝑏𝑋















































B’s Decision Analysis  
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛      
 










B estimates A’s interim outcome, (û𝐴) 
 û𝐴 (𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥), 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴))  = 
𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]   −  𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
 
B thinks A would only accept SB if: 




′ (𝑦)]  ≤ 𝑆𝐵 + 𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
  
A’s critical type:   






*Blue with the white text represents the plaintiff  
*Green with the black text represents the defendant 
 
A updated its belief over  
Damages  𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥), and Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
A Decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐴 
{
  If 𝑆𝐵  ≥  𝑢𝐴    =>     A would accept
 











′ (𝑦)]   >  𝐴𝑐   𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
 
B’s belief over A’s belief 




Stage 1.2    The Defendant updates its beliefs over both Damages and Liability. 
𝑏𝑋(𝑥|𝐶𝐴)    or    𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥) 




Stage 2.1    The Defendant makes a decision based on the following options: 
 
v. Avoid Negotiations and pursue litigation.  
If the Defendant avoids settlement negotiations and pursue the litigation 
process, the Judge will define the true Liability and true Damages. 
vi. Send a settlement offer  𝑆𝐵. 
If the Defendant decides to offer a settlement, the offer will signals its 
private information to the Plaintiff.  
 
Stage 2.2    Defendant put himself in Plaintiff’s situation to see how the Plaintiff would 
react to the settlement offer. The Plaintiff updates its beliefs over Damages and Liability 
given the settlement offer as follows: 
𝑎𝑋(𝑥|𝑆𝐵)    or    𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥) 
𝑎𝑌(𝑦|𝑆𝐵)    or    𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
 
Stage 2.3    Defendant analyzes Plaintiff’s decision before making its final offer. 
Defendant thinks Plaintiff would only accept the settlement offer if the amount offered is 
more than Plaintiff’s expected outcome from litigation minus litigation costs. Plaintiff 
would make a decision based on its interim payoff  𝑢𝐴: 
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               {
  If 𝑆𝐵  ≥  𝑢𝐴       =>     Plaintiff would accept
 
  If 𝑆𝐵 <  𝑢𝐴       =>      Plaintiff  would reject
 
 
Stage 2.4    Defendant estimates Plaintiff’s interim expected payoff, û𝐵 , from litigation 
using Plaintiff’s updated beliefs. û𝐴 is Defendant’s estimate on Plaintiff’s expected payoff 
given the settlement offer 𝑆𝐵.  
û𝐴 (𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥), 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴))   =    𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)   𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]   −  𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
 
Stage 2.5    Defendant thinks Plaintiff would only accept settlement offers that are equal 
or more than Plaintiff’s expected outcome from litigation. 
𝑆𝐵    ≥    𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]   −  𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
Rearranging the above equation results in: 
𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  ≤    𝑆𝐵 + 𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
 
This analysis results in determination of the critical type for Plaintiff. Plaintiff only accepts 
offer 𝑆𝐵 if the proposed damages and liability are more than its expected outcome at trial. 
Plaintiff’s critical type will be: 
𝐴𝑐 =    𝑆𝐵 + 𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
Stage 2.6    The Defendant considers Plaintiff’s critical type, which impacts plaintiff 
decision in acceptance or rejection of the settlement offer  𝑆𝐵 . From Defendant’s view 
Plaintiff’s Strategy would be: 
               {
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝒂𝒀




′ (𝒚)]    >    𝐴𝑐   =>     𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
Defendant’s Strategic Analyses 
Based on Defendant’s settlement offer  𝑆𝐵, 
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               {
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑓                   𝑥𝑦  ≤    𝐴𝑐
 
 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑓                    𝑥𝑦  >   𝐴𝑐   
 
Probability of Plaintiff accepting or rejecting Defendant’s offer will be 
               {
 𝑃𝑟𝐴{𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒}  =           𝐴𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)                            
 
  𝑃𝑟𝐴{𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}      =           1 −  𝐴𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)                   
 
Defendant’s payoff given Plaintiff’s action will be 
               {
   𝑆𝐵                                                           𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 
 
 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑏𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  + 𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐵)]       𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 





′ (𝑦), 𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴), 𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐵)) = 
      𝐴𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)    𝑆𝐵     +     {1 −  𝐴𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)}         { 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑏𝑌
′ (𝑦)]  +  𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐵)] }  
 
To maximize Defendant’s expected outcome, the equation above can be differentiated 
respective to SB. The solution to the differentiated equation identifies Plaintiff’s critical 
type  𝐴𝑐. This value specifies Plaintiff’s optimized settlement offer 𝑆𝐵
∗ .  
min(𝑋) min(𝑌) + min(𝐾𝐵)  ≤      𝑆𝐵
∗       ≤    max(𝑋) max(𝑌) + max(𝐾𝐵) 
 
The equation above ensures that the settlement offer will not be rejected or accepted 
no matter what the plaintiff’s beliefs are on the case. This equation eliminates opportunity 




 The likelihood of settlement is identified by probability of defendant offers above 
plaintiff’s critical type, and plaintiff acceptance of that settlement offer: 
Pr{Settlement}  =   𝐴𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)  {1 −  𝐵𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐∗)} 
 An increase in plaintiff’s updated belief over Damages 𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥) 𝑜𝑟  Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
will increase the settlement amount and decrease the likelihood of a settlement. 
 An increase in defendant’s updated belief over Damages 𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥) 𝑜𝑟  Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
will increase the settlement amount and increase the likelihood of a settlement. 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s litigation costs will decrease the settlement offer and 
increase the likelihood of settlement. 
 An increase in Defendant’s litigation costs will increase the settlement offer and 
increase the likelihood of settlement. 
 A Plaintiff who is more confident about his Damages to be determined as higher 
amounts at trial will more likely reject the lower settlement offers.   
 A Defendant who is more confident that the Liability will be determined as higher 
amounts at trial will more likely willing to offer higher settlement amounts 
4.5.2. Plaintiff Signals with Settlement Demand 
In this model, the Plaintiff signals defendant about its private information by 
submitting a settlement offer.  The following provides details for the main stages of the 
game: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the parties 
Stage 2 – Defendant’s Decision Analysis  
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Table 4-12  Two-sided private information – Defendant Offers Settlement 
stage Player A (Plaintiff) Player B (Defendant) 
0 A forms prior PDFs 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) and 𝑎𝑌





Submit a claim 𝐶𝐴  
B updates its belief over  
Damages 𝑏𝑋



























A’s Decision Analysis 
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 Litigation        
 









A estimates B’s interim payoff, (û𝐵) 
û𝐵 (𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥), 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑦), 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵)) = 
 𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 𝑏𝑌
′′(𝑦) ]   +  𝐸[ 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵) ]  
 
A thinks B would only accept 𝑆𝐴 if: 




′′(𝒚) ]    ≥   𝑆𝐴 - 𝐸[ 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵) ]    
 
B’s critical type:   






















*Blue with the white text represents the plaintiff  
*Green with the black text represents the defendant 
 
A’s belief over  
B’s belief 
B updates its belief give  𝑆𝐴     
Damages  𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥), and Liability 𝑏𝑌
′′(𝑦) 
B decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐵 
{
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵    =>    B would accept
 











𝐼𝑓  𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 𝑏𝑌
′′(𝒚) ]  ≥  𝐵𝑐      𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡
 
𝐼𝑓  𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 𝑏𝑌









Stage  0    Players A and B form their prior beliefs as follows: 
iii. Plaintiff forms prior beliefs over Damages 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥), and Liability 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
iv. Defendant forms prior beliefs over Damages 𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥), and Liability 𝑏𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
 
Stage 1.1    The Plaintiff submit its claim 𝐶𝐴 to the Defendant. It is assumed that the 
Plaintiff files a claim only when the minimum expected outcome from litigation exceeds 
the Litigation Costs. 
min(X) ×  min (𝑌)   −   max(𝑘𝐴)  >   0   
 
Stage 1.2    The Defendant updates its beliefs over both Damages and Liability. 
𝑏𝑋(𝑥|𝐶𝐴)    or    𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥) 




Stage 2.1    The Plaintiff makes a decision based on the following options: 
 
vii. Avoid Negotiations and Pursue Litigation  
If the Plaintiff avoids settlement negotiations and pursue the litigation 
process, the Judge will define the true Liability and true Damages. 
viii. Send a settlement offer  𝑆𝐴 
If the Plaintiff decides to offer a settlement, the offer will signals its private 




Stage 2.2    Plaintiff put himself in Defendant’s situation to see how the Defendant would 
react to the settlement offer. The Defendant updates its beliefs on damages and Liability 
given the settlement offer as follows: 
𝑏𝑋(𝑥|𝐶𝐴, 𝑆𝐵)    or    𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 
𝑏𝑌(𝑦|𝐶𝐴, 𝑆𝐵)    or    𝑏𝑌
′′(𝑦) 
 
Stage 2.3    Plaintiff analyzes Defendant’s decision before making its final offer. Plaintiff 
thinks Defendant would only accept the settlement offer if the amount offered is equal or 
less than Defendant’s expected outcome from litigation plus litigation costs. Defendant 
would make a decision based on its interim payoff  𝑢𝐵: 
               {
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵       =>     Defendant would accept
 
  If 𝑆𝐴 >  𝑢𝐵      =>      Defendant  would reject
 
 
Stage 2.4    Plaintiff estimates Defendant’s interim expected payoff, û𝐵 , from litigation 
using Defendant’s updated beliefs. û𝐵 is Plaintiff’s estimate on Defendant’s expected 
payoff given the settlement offer 𝑆𝐴.  
û𝐵 (𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥), 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑦), 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵)) =  𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 𝑏𝑌
′′(𝑦) ]   +  𝐸[ 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵) ]  
 
Stage 2.5    Plaintiff thinks Defendant would only accept settlement offers that are equal 
or less than Defendant’s expected payoff from litigation (defendant’s payoffs are out of 
pocket expenditures at trial). 
𝑆𝐴    ≤    𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 𝑏𝑌
′′(𝑦) ]   +  𝐸[ 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵) ]  
Rearranging the above equation results in: 
𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) 𝑏𝑌




This analysis results in determination of the critical type for Defendant. Defendant only 
accepts offer 𝑆𝐵 if the proposed damages and liability are less than its expected outcome at 
trial. Defendant’s critical type will be: 
𝐵𝑐 = 𝑆𝐴 −  𝐸[ 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵)] 
 
 
Stage 2.6    The Plaintiff considers Defendant’s critical type, which impacts defendant’s 
decision in acceptance or rejection of the settlement offer   𝑆𝐴 . From Plaintiff’s view 
Defendant’s Strategy would be: 
               {
𝐼𝑓 𝐸[𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)  𝑏𝑌




′ (𝑦)]   <    𝐵𝑐   =>       𝐵 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
Defendant’s Strategic Analyses 
Based on Plaintiff’s settlement offer  𝑆𝐴, 
               {
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑖𝑓                   𝑥𝑦  ≥    𝐵𝑐
 
 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑓                    𝑥𝑦 <    𝐵𝑐  
 
Probability of Defendant accepting or rejecting Plaintiff’s offer will be 
               {
 𝑃𝑟𝐵{𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒}  =           1 −  𝐵𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)           
 
  𝑃𝑟𝐵{𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}      =            𝐵𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)                   
 
Plaintiff’s payoff given Defendant’s action will be 
               {
   𝑆𝐴                                                           𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 
 
 𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)] −  𝐸[𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐴)]       𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 







′′(𝑦), 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐴), 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵)) = 
      {1 −  𝐵𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)}    𝑆𝐴     +     𝐵𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)      { 𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)] −  𝐸[𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] }  
 
To maximize Defendant’s expected outcome, the equation above can be differentiated 
respective to SB. The solution to the differentiated equation identifies Plaintiff’s critical 
type  𝐴𝑐. This value specifies Plaintiff’s optimized settlement offer 𝑆𝐵
∗ .  
 
 
min(𝑋) min(𝑌) −  max(𝐾𝐴)  ≤      𝑆𝐴
∗      ≤    max(𝑋) max(𝑌) − min(𝐾𝐴) 
 
The equation above ensures that the settlement offer will not be rejected or accepted 
no matter what the Plaintiff’s beliefs are on the case. This equation eliminates opportunity 
of having a strictly dominant strategy for the Plaintiff.  
 
Conclusions 
 The likelihood of settlement is identified by the optimal amount of settlement and 
as a result optimal amount of critical type as follow: 
Pr{Settlement}  =  {1 −  𝐴𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)}   𝐵𝑋𝑌
′ (𝐴𝑐)      
 Increase in Defendant’s belief over Damages 𝑏𝑋(𝑥), will increase the settlement 
demand and decrease the likelihood of a settlement. 
 Increase in Defendant’s litigation costs will increase the settlement demand and/or 
increase the likelihood of settlement. 
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A Defendant who is confident about its Damages to be determined as lower amounts at 
trial will more likely reject the higher settlement demands 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s updated belief over Damages 𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥) 𝑜𝑟  Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
will increase the settlement amount and decrease the likelihood of a settlement. 
 An increase in Defendant’s updated belief over Damages 𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥) 𝑜𝑟  Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
will increase the settlement amount and increase the likelihood of a settlement 
 An increase in Plaintiff’s litigation costs will decrease the settlement offer and 
increase the likelihood of settlement 
 An increase in Defendant’s litigation costs will increase the settlement offer and 
increase the likelihood of settlement. 
 A Plaintiff who is more confident about its Damages to be as higher amounts at 
trial will more likely offer lower settlement amounts.   
 A Defendant who is more confident that the Liability to be determined as higher 
amounts at trial will more likely willing to accept higher settlement amounts 
 
4.6. Refinements to Sequential Equilibrium 
There are multiple equilibriums defined for the non-cooperative asymmetric 
information game. These equilibriums refine the  
4.6.1.  Interiority of Equilibrium  
Interiority of the equilibrium is an equilibrium defined in non-cooperative 
sequential games. This equilibrium provides limits to the range for the settlement offers 
85 
 
each party may make. Plaintiff’s maximum possible outcome should exceed defendant’s 
minimum possible payment, and vise versa. 
for defendant’s settlement demand 𝑦𝐻 (𝑥𝐻 – 𝑥𝐿 )  ≥  𝑘𝐴  +  𝑘𝐵  
for contractor’s settlement demand 𝑥𝐻 (𝑦𝐻 – 𝑦𝐿 )  ≥  𝑘𝐴  +  𝑘𝐵 
 
4.6.2. Intuitive and Divinity Refinements 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and sequential equilibrium has provided multiple 
restrictions to the outcome of this game. In addition, Intuitive Criteria and Divinity Criteria 
(D1) are widely accepted refinements that provide additional restrictions to the range of 
possible outcomes. Based on refinements of Divinity Equilibrium, all pure and semi-
pooling equilibria are eliminated. Therefore, optimal settlement offer by B, 𝑆𝐵
∗  , to 
maximize A’s expected payoff needs to satisfy the following criteria: 
 
E[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)] = 𝑥   or  E[𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥)] = 𝑥 
E[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)] = 𝑦  or  E[𝑏𝑌
′ (𝑦)] = 𝑦 
 
As a result, B’s optimal settlement offer should update A’s beliefs in a way that A’s 
posterior belief equals to B’s beliefs over true level of Damages and Liability. This would 






 Legal Reasoning with Bayesian Networks 
 
This Chapter provides a framework to model parties’ legal arguments for claims as 
presented in the previous Chapter. Bayesian Networks are used to measure parties’ beliefs 
over the dispute elements, Liability, defined as the likelihood of the defendant being found 
liable at the trial, or the portion of the damages that the defendant will be held liable at the 
trial  and Damages, or the unanticipated expenditures plaintiff may have incurred due to 
the defendant’s alleged fault. Disputed elements are classified into measurable variable and 
the model then delivers structured patterns to define dependencies among the variables. 
Parties’ arguments or counterarguments are formed based on assembling the structure 
patterns together. The Bayesian Networks update parties’ beliefs over Liability and 
Damages after observing new information. The models in this chapter become inputs to 
the game theoretic model discussed in Chapter 4 - Modeling Settlement Negotiation. 
 
5.1. Opposition to Statistical Analysis in Legal Practice 
Although scientific research has made progress on quantifying legal reasoning, the 
statistical analysis often faces objections by the legal community. Despite significant 
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literature on the application of Bayesian theory in quantifying legal arguments,3 especially 
in criminal cases, legal communities are resistant to using statistical analyses for legal 
arguments is because it is considered to be overreliance on the use of the likelihood ratios 
and odds as probability measures. In addition, there are complicated underlying 
mathematical calculations, or engaging probabilities,4 in calculating the verdict.  
The concept of probability and prediction are often misinterpreted in the legal 
community. For example, one may argue: “a defendant is either liable or not liable; there 
is no such verdict that says the defendant is liable with probability of 70%.” To respond to 
this concern, Liability is defined as a party’s prediction on the Judge’s decision over this 
element in future (at the time of trial). This should not be misinterpreted as the partial 
liability of the party. In fact, Liability is the likelihood that the judge rules the verdict. Once 
the Judge makes its decision on Liability (i.e., guilty, or not guilty) there is no 
proportionality on Liability of a party. 
Subjective beliefs as prior probability is another objection of the legal community 
in applications of the Bayesian theory in the law. This research addresses the problem with 
subjectivity of beliefs by using ranges of probabilities for the variables (i.e., probability 
                                                 
 
3 Legal argument refers to any rational discussion presented as part of support for legal cases. 
 
4  Probability is a statement expressing an uncertainty about an event happening. Probability can 
be expressed as percentages. In the law literature it is common to express probability by odds. 
Odds are defined as a ratio of a chance that an event not happening divided by the chance of the 





distribution functions with continuous variables). Details regarding using continuous 
variables in game theoretic analysis is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
5.2. Bayesian Networks 
The Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical tool to calculate causal dependencies 
among a set of variables. The BN graph is in a form of nodes and edges. The nodes 
correspond to variables, and the edges correspond to the direction of the causal 
dependencies between the nodes. Each node has an underlying probability distribution 
called Node Probability Table (NPT). The NPT defines conditional dependencies between 
a variable node and its parent node(s)5.  
Bayesian Networks contain two main components, graphs and NPTs. The BN 
graphs represent the variables in the model as nodes and show the direction of the edges 
between the variables. NPTs are sets of conditional probability tables (or probability 
distributions) that define the interrelationship between the nodes. For example, the 
application of NPTs in this research outlines the underlying interrelationships between the 
variables of a claim so that each NPT define the impact of each cause to its parent node(s). 
 
                                                 
 
5 The direction of the edge in Bayesian Networks is from the parent node to its child node  
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5.3. Steps in Building a BN Model for Claims 
This section illustrates building a Bayesian Network for claims. The first step is to 
identify the sets of variables (nodes), second, to identify the states for the variables. The 
third step is to define the edges between the nodes as the casual relationships among these 
variables. Last, the NPTs for each variable form dependencies between the parent and child 
nodes. The following describes these steps in detail. 
5.3.1. Step One: Identifying the Set of Variables  
There are two different groups of variables, inputs and outputs. The input variables 
for construction claims include: relevant contract languages, factual evidence, and strength 
or credibility of the arguments. The output variables for construction claims are Liability 
and Damages. The output variables are considered to be independent, meaning changing 
Liability does not impact Damages, and changing Damages does not impact Liability. 
5.3.2. Step Two: Identify Set of States for Each Variable 
Each variable can be either discrete or continuous. The number of states for discrete 
variables varies depending on the measurement accuracies.  The Bayesian Network allows 
continuous variables as long as they are discretized6. Depending on the accuracy of the 
data, the number of states can be selected for each node.  
                                                 
 
6 Discretization is a process of defining continuous variables into discrete intervals. This process 




5.3.3. Step Three: Identify the Direction of the Edges between Variables 
Edges represent relationships between each two sets of variables (nodes). This 
direction clarifies the direct dependencies between the parent and child nodes. 
Mathematically, the direction of the edge between cause and effect does not change the 
final results as long as the NPTs are adjusted accordingly. In general, if there is a clear 
cause and effect relationship between two node, the direction would be from the cause to 
the effect. However, if the prior probability of the effect is more readily available than the 
cause, the direction can be set from the effect to the cause.  
5.3.4. Step Four: Specify NPTs for Each Node 
NPTs are sets of conditional probability tables (or probability distributions) that 
define the interrelationship among variables. The NPTs structure shows how the inferences 
and learning occur in the BN model. Considerations of defining proper NPTs are discussed 
individually for each structure pattern. 
 
5.4. Bayesian Reasoning for Civil Cases 
Bayesian Networks can improve understanding of legal arguments by quantifying 
its underlying rational. The model provided in this research defines the causal relationship 
between the variables of a legal arguments. The underlying calculations of this casual 
model allows claim parties to form a beliefs over the claim variables, and update those 
beliefs after observing new information. 
The application of the Bayesian Network to the law has grown in recent decades. 
However, as noted, the literature is mostly focused on modeling criminal cases. The 
following provides details on transitioning the advanced models from criminal cases to a 
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model for criminal cases. The differences between civil and criminal cases are briefed 
below in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1  Comparison between Criminal Cases and Civil Cases 
Comparison Criminal Cases Civil Cases 
Players Judge vs Suspect Plaintiff vs Defendant 
Hypothesis Suspect is innocent Opponent is at fault 
Evidence Evidence to prove guilty Evidence to prove faulty action 
Constitution Law Contract Agreement 
 
Defining similarities between the civil and criminal cases helps to use the similar 
concepts developed primarily for criminal cases. The following provides details regarding 
the contrast between criminal and civil cases: 
 In criminal cases the Judge institutes legal proceedings against the suspect. In civil 
cases the plaintiff files a claim against the defendant.  
 The Judge’s hypothesis in a criminal case is the exact opposite of parties’ 
hypothesis in civil cases. For example, the plaintiff starts with a hypothesis that the 
opponent is at fault and finds evidence in support of his claim. On the other hand, 
in criminal justice the Judge first assumes the defendant is innocent until proven 
guilty (Presumption of Innocence). The Presumption of Innocence is a hypothesis 
developed by the prosecutor over the innocence of the suspect. The prosecutor then 
finds factual evidence in support of the case, or in substantiation of the accusations.  
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 In civil cases, litigants make assumptions about their opponent’s guilt (or their own 
innocence). For example, a plaintiff typically assumes that the defendant is at fault 
and then tries to find evidence to support this hypothesis. A defendant, on the other 
hand, assumed no Liability for himself for the complaint prepared by the plaintiff. 
These hypotheses form the prior beliefs for both parties over their Liability and 
Damages. 
 In criminal cases, the prosecutor considers evidence to define the innocence or guilt 
of the suspect by applying an appropriate law to the case. In contrast, in civil cases 
the prosecutor applies the contract agreement to the case given factual evidence. 
 
5.5. Probabilistic Reasoning of Legal Evidence 
The process of defining legal reasoning contains a hypothesis and evidence as a 
support to truthfulness of the hypothesis. Each party starts with a hypothesis H, (opponent’s 
failure to fulfill a contract requirement), and for the hypothesis there is evidence, E, 
defined as the factual event that supports parity’s failure to follow that specific contract 
requirement..  Evidence updates parties’ beliefs over the hypothesis. Figure 5-1 shows the 
legal reasoning as a simple Bayesian Network model. 
 
Figure 5-1 Hypothesis Evidence Relationship 
The direction of the causal structure indicates that if the Hypothesis 𝑯 is true, the 
probability Evidence 𝑬 being true increases. If Evidence 𝑬 is proven to be true, player’s 
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belief in Hypothesis 𝑯 being true increases. Therefore, the Bayesian inference between 𝑯 
and 𝑬 can go in both directions. 
5.5.1. Plaintiff’s Reasoning 
The legal reasoning described above is consistent with Bayesian inference. The 
Plaintiff starts with 𝑯 and prior probability 𝑃(𝑯) for the hypothesis (defendant is at fault). 
The probability of observing 𝑬 given 𝑯 is true denotes  𝑷(𝑬|𝑯). Therefore, observing 𝑬 
updates plaintiff’s prior probability over 𝑯 by backward propagation. Propagation is the 
updating process in a Bayesian Network model.  
In claim proceedings, both parties observe new evidence on the specifics of a case. 
Observing new evidence includes finding new information found during document 
investigation, or revealing information during parties’ communication and information 
transfer between them. Taking the new evidence into the equation may change parties’ 
beliefs on Liability and Damages. In the Bayesian Network, model observations are used 
as inputs to update the marginal probabilities of all the unobserved variables.  
5.5.2. Defendant’s Reasoning 
 Defendant starts with a complementary prior probability for the hypothesis 
“defendant is not at fault.” A defendant consider itself at no fault until proven guilty. Once 
the plaintiff submits its complaint, the defendant updates his beliefs over Liability.  
Plaintiff’s complaint is defined as the document that plaintiff submits to the Judge as his 
statement of claim. This document typically contains legal reasoning, argumentation, and 




5.5.3. Modeling a Legal Reasoning 
The Plaintiff starts with the Hypothesis 𝐻 “defendant at fault,” and prior probability 
of 𝑎𝑜(𝐻). The Defendant, on the other hand starts with the reverse Hypothesis “defendant 
at no fault” and prior probability of 𝑏𝑜(𝐻). Then, parties connect their available evidence 
𝐸 to their hypothesis. The Bayesian Network provides the following model to calculate 
updated beliefs over 𝐻, which is the conditional probability of 𝐸 given H.  
 

































False 0.99 0.01 













False 0.99 0.01 
True 0.01 0.99 
Figure 5-2. Parties’ prior beliefs and NPTs 
                                                 
 
7 It is assumed that patties always leave a small probability for their hypothesis to be wrong. This 




The basis of legal reasoning includes inference from Evidence 𝐸 to Hypothesis  𝐻. 
This reasoning is a perfect match for Bayesian inference where the prior assumption over 
𝐻 and the likelihood of the evidence 𝐸 is captured formally by the node probability tables. 
 
Bayes’ theorem provides the following equation for updating parties’ prior beliefs 







5.6. Building Legal Arguments Using Bayesian Network Model 
This Chapter provides a systematic approach for modeling legal arguments with 
Bayesian Networks. The approach contains structure patterns that define repeatable 
arrangements for a set of nodes. The structure patterns are built based on previous models 
of both Hepler and Fenton. Hepler introduces an object oriented approach (Hepler & 
Dawid, 2007) and Fenton uses a notion of idioms8 for development of legal arguments 
(Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 2013). These two methods are focused on developing legal 
                                                 
 
8 Idioms are defined as single cause-effect BN structures that are a part of a bigger BN model. 
Combination of multiple Idioms can form a complete BN structure for a case. In this research I use 
the term Structure Pattern in lieu of the word Idiom. 
96 
 
arguments for criminal cases. The following illustrates how those concepts are converted 
to a model for civil cases using the comparison analyses discussed in the previous sections.  
Legal arguments often involve multiple variables with complicated 
interdependencies. This section articulates complex legal issues into a simplified model. 
The dependencies are defined in repeatable structure patterns, single cause-effect BN 
structures which are similar to the concept of Idiom by Fenton. The structure patterns 
breakdown the node interdependencies into distinguishable variables. The structure 
patterns connect together to form a larger structure that defines parties’ beliefs over 
Liability and Damages. This section provides examples of structure patterns specific to 
legal arguments. The repeatable structure patterns reflect the way human mind analyzes 
complex cases to develop legal reasoning and sound arguments.  
5.6.1. Evidence Pattern 
The Evidence Pattern is the cause-consequence structure that models the 
uncertainty based on observable evidence. This pattern resembles legal reasoning that 
creates connection between the Hypothesis and the Evidence in a civil case:  
 The Hypothesis is the opponent’s failure to fulfill a contract requirement. The 
plaintiff, for example, believes that the defendant failed to perform the work as 
specified in the contract.  
 The Evidence is the factual event that supports party’s failure to follow that specific 




The purpose is to attribute a value to Liability9, the probability of the defendant 
being held liable at the trial, or the portion of the damages that the defendant will be held 
liable for at the trial. Figure 5-3 demonstrates the BN structure for a cause-effect 
relationship between the Hypothesis and the Evidence.  
 
 
Figure 5-3  Evidence Pattern 
 
Each hypothesis may contain more than one piece of Evidence. Not every Evidence 
is in support of the hypothesis. There may be contradicting Evidence that declines 
argument strength and eventually declines the Hypothesis. One piece of Evidence may 
support that the “defendant is at fault,” and the other Evidence supports that the “defendant 
is at no fault.” Therefore, there are two groups of structure patterns for Evidence, 
corroboration pattern and conflict pattern.   
 Corroboration pattern is the situation where two pieces of evidence that both 
support one side of the argument 
 Conflict pattern is the situation where two pieces of evidence are in conflict with 
each other, and support different sides of the argument 
                                                 
 




Figure 5-4 shows the evidence structure with multiple supporting facts including 
corroboration and conflict patterns. 
 
Corroboration Pattern                  Conflict Pattern 
Figure 5-4  Corroboration / Conflict Patterns 
Although the supporting and declining facts look identical in the model, the 
underlying Node Probability Table (NPT) over the Evidence distinguishes between the two 
factual parameters. One method that plaintiffs often use is to include all possible supporting 
Evidence. Defendants in return try to disqualify the supporting Evidence by adding the 
declining facts. Detailed discussions over interaction between the claim parties are 
provided toward the end of this chapter. The following is a hypothetical example that is 
used throughout this section to provide a detailed explanation of the application of structure 
patterns.  
Table 5-2 provides the Node Probability Table for the Evidence Pattern that can be 





Table 5-2  Node Probability Table for Evidence Pattern 
 H: Hypothesis False True 
E: 
Evidence 
False 0.99 0.0 
True 0.01 1.0 
 
 
The Lakehouse Example: 
The Lakehouse Example is a hypothetical example to explain the 
application of Structure Patterns in a claim through the section. 
Imagine a Contractor and an Owner signed an agreement to build a 
house next to a lake. As part of their contract agreement, the 
contractor was obligated to perform soil testing in the design phase 
to design appropriate foundations.. The Contractor did perform the 
soil testing and then designed and built the house. A few months after 
the house was built, the walls started to crack due to unbalanced 
settlement (Evidence 1). The Owner hired an expert to inspect the 
foundation. The expert identified that the unusual settlement is due to 
inadequate design for the footings (Evidence 2). The Owner then filed 
a claim against the Contractor for failing to test the existing soil 
conditions as part of the contract requirement (Hypothesis). 
Contractor received the statement of claim from the Owner. 
Contractor argued that he did an adequate number of borings as a 
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standard practice for soil testing for this size of project, but the 
borings did not show the poor soil conditions (Evidence 3).10 
Figure 5-5 provides the model of this hypothetical scenario. (The blue 
with white text represents the Contractor and green with black text 
represents the Owner’s Evidence.) 
 
 
Figure 5-5 - Example for Evidence pattern 
 
5.6.2. Soundness Pattern 
There are two main types of arguments in legal disputes, deductive and inductive 
arguments. A deductive argument is an argument that a party claims is the truth of its 
statement (premises or assumptions) and guarantees the truth of its evidence. Inductive 
argument will be discussed in the Validity Pattern, Section 5.6.3.  
                                                 
 
10 This case will continue in the following sub-sections 
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In a deductive argument, the hypothesis provides a full support to the evidence, 
such that if the hypothesis is true, then it is impossible for the evidence to be false. An 
argument in which the hypothesis successfully guarantees the evidence is called a valid 
argument. If a valid argument has true hypothesis, the argument is said to be a sound 
argument. Figure 5-6 provides the structure pattern for a sound argument. 
 
Figure 5-6  Soundness Patter (for Deductive Arguments) 
Table 5-3 provides the Node Probability Table for the Soundness Pattern which can 
be used for all Hypothesis nodes if deductive argument applies. 
Table 5-3  Node Probability Table for Soundness Pattern 
 H: Hypothesis False True 
E: 
Evidence 
False 0.99 0.01 
True 0.01 0.99 
 
The Lakehouse Example (Cont.)  
Continuing with the Lakehouse example: the Owner argues that the 
Contractor failed to provide warranty of his design and construction 
and it resulted in failure of the product. The Contractor responded 
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that he did his due diligence to design and construct per industry 
standard, similar to what any other reasonable Contractor would do. 
Figure 5-5 provides the model of this hypothetical scenario. (blue with 
white text represents the Contractor and green with black text 
represents the Owner’s evidence.) 
 
 
Figure 5-7  Example for Soundness Pattern 
 
5.6.3.  Validity Pattern  
Typically in legal arguments, the validity (also called legitimacy and accuracy) of 
each party’s argument is directly related to the strength of the link between the Hypothesis 
and the Evidence. Parties only accept the presentation of an evidence as a proof to the 
hypothesis if they are strongly connected. Therefore, the conditional probability between 
the Hypothesis and the Evidence defines the accuracy of an argument.  
An inductive argument is an argument where a party (or party’s attorney) attempts 
to establish or increase the probability of the evidence. In an inductive argument, parties 
try to increase the likelihood of the hypothesis by providing factual evidence. Proving the 
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truthfulness of a piece of evidence or increasing the number of true pieces of evidence may 
increase the probability that a hypothesis is true. In this type of argument, the argument 
strength is conditioned on the overall accuracy or reliability of an evidence node. This 
accuracy is called the Validity node, which is measured by a parent node to each Evidence 
node. Figure 5-8 shows the BN structure of the accuracy pattern. 
.  
Figure 5-8  Validity for Inductive Argument 
 
The NPT for the explaining away Pattern is provided in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4  Node Probability Table for Validity Pattern 
 V: Validity Node False True 
 H: Plaintiff’s Hypothesis False True False True 
C 
Constraint 
False 0.5 0.5 0.99 0.01 
True 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.99 
 
The validity is designed in a way that if the argument is not valid, then the judge will stay 
neutral about defendant’s liability. If the argument is valid, then the judge will weight that 




The Lakehouse Example (Cont.) 
In the example provided above (Section 5.6.1), the Defendant’s failure 
to perform adequate soil testing gave rise to an improper design of 
the foundations that then lead to unbalanced settlement of the house. 
This argument contains a number of assumptions. First, the design of 
the foundation was truly inadequate. Second, the Contractor did not 
have any impact on the design process11. Third, there is no other 
reason besides lack of soil testing that could have resulted in 
inadequate design and the house settlement. Fourth, the Plaintiff 
provides the evidence in the entirety (i.e., all facts are presented). In 
fact, responding to any of these assumptions changes parties’ beliefs 
about the argument.  The Validity Pattern takes all of these four 
considerations into account as shown in Figure 5-9. 
 
Figure 5-9  Example for Validity Pattern 
                                                 
 





Validity of an argument impacts the strength of the argument by influencing the 
evidence. This aspect of the evidence can be lumped into one node in the Bayesian Network 
model. Validity is described as the underlying assumption about the accuracy or reliability 
of a piece of evidence. The structure pattern to model the strength of an argument measures 
the level of truth for the hypothesis. The more accurate level of evidence results in a closer 
value of the evidence to the true value of the hypothesis.12  
The Validity node is an input to the model and represents subjective beliefs of the 
attorney(s). This pattern clarifies what inferences should be drawn from a piece of 
evidence. In practice, this concept is important becuase calculating the strength of the case 
is done by subjective judgements of attorneys and experts on the argument. 
This research uses a binary variable for the Validity node. The prior beliefs come 
from the attorney’s subjective judgement on the strength of each evidence to its hypothesis. 
Updating the node occurs by using the true/false scenario for the node in BN software. If 
there is almost no uncertainty about the relationship between the evidence and the 
hypotheses, the scenario is true. If the evidence is either inaccurate or unrelated to the 
hypothesis, the scenario is false. 
                                                 
 
12 The validity node introduced here is similar to the accuracy node mentioned by Fenton (N. 
Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013) which is used for criminal cases, and also similar to the reliability 




Although inductive arguments are more common in legal arguments, the deductive 
argument also exists. However, deductive arguments are not useful in this model as they 
usually result in summary judgement, dismissal, or settlement of the case.  
 
5.6.4. Liability Pattern  
The Evidence Pattern (Section 5.6.1) shows the relationship between a single 
contractual failure and its associated Evidence. In construction claims, it is common to 
argue a party’s failure to meet multiple contractual obligations. Therefore, each claim 
contains multiple Evidence structures. The Liability Pattern measures the overall Liability 
of the defendant based on parties’ beliefs over the claim elements. In this structure, all 
hypothesis nodes are linked to the Liability to form a conditional probability based on the 
NPTs. Figure 5-10 – Liability Pattern shows a general structure model as follows: 
  
Figure 5-10 – Liability Pattern 
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The Node Probability Table for Liability may vary based on the number of 
hypotheses and comparative strength of each hypothesis over the liability of a party. This 
study suggests continuous node type for the Liability for accuracy. In this case, conditional 
probabilities are defined using probability functions. This model uses Truncated Normal 
Distribution13 to define the end limits for the Liability node.   Table 5-5 is an example for 
NPT of the Liability node. 
Table 5-5  Node Probability Table for Liability Pattern 
H1 False True 
H2 False True False True 
Expre
ssions 
TNormal(0,0.1,0,1) TNormal(0.4,0.3,0,1) TNormal(0.6,0.3,0,1) TNormal(1,0.1,0,1) 
 
The Lakehouse Example (Cont.) 
Once both the Owner and Contractor exchange their arguments as 
shown in the previous sections, they can use the Liability Pattern to 
form their beliefs over Liability (the probability that the Contractor 
(defendant) will be held liable at the court). The parties do not 
necessarily use both Validity and Soundness Patterns at the same 
time. Figure 5-11 provides Owner’s assessment of its Liability.  
 
                                                 
 
13 Truncated Normal Distribution is the probability distribution of a normally distributed 




Figure 5-11  Example for Liability Pattern 
 
5.6.5. Explaining Away Pattern  
Plaintiff and Defendant, each as players, attempt to disqualify their opponent’s 
argument using a variety of methods. One of the common disqualification approaches is to 
disconnect the Evidence nodes from their parent node, Hypothesis. For this purpose, a 
player may introduce a contradictory Hypothesis with the original supporting Hypotheses 
to argue that the evidence is originated by a different root cause. Since the Hypothesis 
nodes eventually will be connected to the Liability node, this can directly impact parties 
estimate on the Liability.  
The Explaining Away Pattern includes a new constraint node that has three states, 
one for each causal path from the hypothesis to the constraint, and an additional state called 
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the Impossible State. The NPT for this node is defined such that the Impossible State is 
only true when both causes are true, or both causes are false as follows14  
 
 
Figure 5-12  Explaining Away Pattern 
 
Table 5-6  Node Probability Table for Explaining Away Pattern 
 H1: Plaintiff’s Hypothesis False True 
 H2: Defendant’s Hypothesis False True False True 
C 
Constraint 
False 0 0.99 0.01 0 
True 0 0.01 0.99 0 
Impossible 1 0 0 1 
 
                                                 
 
14 In order to ensure the impossible node is excluded from the model the constraint node is set as a 




The Lakehouse Example (Cont.) 
In the Lakehouse example, the Contractor argues that the improper 
foundation design is the result of an unforeseen condition of the soil 
(Constraint). The Contractor argues that based on the Contract the 
unforeseen conditions, such as differing site conditions are the 
Owner’s risk, and not the Contractor (Defendant’s Statement). 
Figure 5-13 shows the example of the explaining away pattern. 
 
 
Figure 5-13  Example for Explaining Away Pattern 
 
The Explaining Away Pattern is a tool to use for quantifying attorney’s opinion on 
evidence that can be connected to two contradicting clauses of the contract. This Pattern 
should only be used if it is impossible to define values for the Validity Nodes.  
 
5.6.6. Damages Pattern  
This section provides a structure pattern that defines parties’ updated beliefs over 
Damages using the Bayesian Predictive Model. The structure pattern models parties’ 
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updated beliefs by calculating the weighted average of the new information and prior 
beliefs. The formula for the weighted average is conditioned to the quality of the new 
information. The quality of the new information is measured by the amount or level of 
revealed private information15.  The Revealing node identifies the accuracy or reliability 
of the new information that as supportive evidence for the true amount of damages.  
 
  
Figure 5-14  BN Structure for Damages Pattern 
 
The dashed line identifies no probabilistic relationship between the nodes. 
The Revealing node is defined as a ranked node to measure Plaintiff’s degree of revealing 
information to the Defendant. Following Table 5-7 is the NPT for the Updated Belief over 
damages conditioned to the Revealing node: 
 
                                                 
 
15 The player who holds the private information is called informed player (See chapter 4). 
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The Lakehouse Example (Cont.) 
In the Lakehouse example, the Owner believes the damages incurred 
are approximately $3M. The Contractor estimates Damages to be 
between $2M to $4M with the best estimate of $2.5M.  The Contractor 
updates its beliefs over Damages once he receives the official claim 
from the Owner. The Contractor verifies the degree of information 
revealed regarding the actual damages incurred in the Owner’s 
statement of Claim is low. The Contractor’s belief is identified using 
applying this scenario as follows. (The blue nodes with white text 
represents the Contractor and light green with black text represents 





Figure 5-15 Example for Damages Pattern 
 
 
5.7. Legal Arguments in Bayesian Networks 
Legal arguments are a series of statements is typically used to persuade a conclusion 
that can be reached through logical reasoning on hypotheses. Legal arguments include 
debates and negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable conclusion. It also encompasses a 
debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal. This art and science is often 
the means by which parties protect their beliefs or self-interests in rational dialogue in the 
claims proceedings. Legal arguments are a tool that a party (or party’s attorney) presents 
to the Judge, in testing the validity of certain kinds of evidence.  
Legal arguments usually involve a number of hypotheses and are supported by 
evidence. Hypothesis typically start with a belief that one party has breached at least one 
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of the contract clauses. The hypothesis usually needs to be reinforced by Evidence. 
Evidence is supporting facts of the case to prove the truthfulness of the assumptions made 
in the hypothesis. A group of such hypotheses with their underlying premises, assumptions, 
and evidence forms the liability of a party in failing to comply with contract obligations. 
The Conflict Pattern (Section 5.6.1) and Explaining Away Pattern (Section 5.6.4) 
are examples of legal arguments using Bayesian Networks. By using the Soundness 
Patterns (Section 5.6.2) parties’ focuses on lowering the accuracy and reliability of their 
opponent’s Hypothesis. By using the Validity Pattern (5.6.3) parties try to distort the direct 
relationship between Evidence and its Hypothesis.  
5.8.  Application of Software 
Hybrid Bayesian Network is a BN structure that incorporates both discrete and 
continuous nodes. AgenaRiskTM uses a new iterative algorithm that efficiently combines 
dynamic discretization with propagation algorithms to perform inference in hybrid BNs. 
AgenaRiskTM models continuous by numerical approximations using static discretization. 
Discretization allows approximate inference in a hybrid BN without limitations on 
relationships among continuous and discrete variables. The implementations require 
defining a uniform discretization of the states in pre-defined intervals. The more intervals 
defined achieves the more accuracy, but at a heavy cost of computational complexity and 
excessive time to run the model.  
To keep this model simple, all nodes (except Liability) are considered binary. The 
accuracy of the model can be increased by defining ranked or continuous nodes. Evidence 
nodes require expert’s inputs. Validity and Soundness nodes require attorneys’ inputs. 
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Hypothesis nodes are outputs of the model which predicts Judge’s decision on each 
contract clause.  
Once the NPT is defined, the Contractor’s belief regarding the truthfulness of the 
evidence itself can be inserted to the model using scenario function in AgenariskTM. The 
scenario function allows the structure to insert an observation to a node and calculate 
updates throughout the structure. The scenario is “Yes” for a pieces of evidence that is 




 Case Analysis & Result Discussions 
 
 
This chapter provides two case studies to show how the game theoretic models 
introduced in the Chapter 4 and Bayesian Network model introduced in the Chapter 5 can 
be used together in analyzing settlement negotiations in real-world construction claims. 
Researches in the literature of modeling settlement negotiations and in general non-
cooperative games often face limited access to the information of real world cases. 
Construction claims and disputes are usually solely discussed between top level managers 
and attorneys of the claimant parties. In addition, detailed information and communication 
between attorneys and their clients or even construction experts are typically privileged 
and confidential. However, all court documents are typically available to public, those 
information are often focused on the final verdicts. The information regarding cases that 
settle before the final trial, or those cases that are never filed in court system would not be 
publicly available. Since this research models decision making during the dispute process, 
historical data for individual claims are necessary to model the parties’ thought process. 
The cases analyzed in this chapter are based on data acquired from real-world 
construction claims. In addition to acquire access to confidential information for 
performing case studies, the theories behind the process have been discussed with 
construction attorneys and attorneys. Due to sensitivity of the information and 
nondisclosure agreements the case studies are redacted and simplified. 
The cases include each party’s proposal and claims over the span of the claim 
process. This include all written documentation regarding initial proposals, plaintiff’s 
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claims, defendant’s counterclaims, offers, settlements, and verdicts. The people involved 
in the claims were interviewed to assess their views about the process as follows: 
 
1. Conduct initial interviews and discussions with attorneys, 
2. Sign non-disclosure agreements to get access the claim documents, 
3. Review, assemble, index, and organize documents, 
4. Perform project familiarization including reviews of contract and agreements, 
project plans, specifications, correspondences,  meeting minutes, and other related 
documents, 
5. Identify and analyze specific project issues related to the claim, 
6. Conduct interviews with project personnel, 
7. Conduct interviews with attorneys and experts, 
8. Review expert reports, 
9. Prepare summary of parties’ claim and defense referencing the contract language, 
10. Review Judges’ Verdict or Settlement Agreement documents, 
11. Analyze the case in the model. 
 
The models were analyzed using AgenaRiskTM, a Bayesian Network software 
application for modeling risk and making predictions about uncertain events. Advanced 
features of AgenaRiskTM such as ranked nodes, simulation nodes, partitioned expressions, 
and continuous variable are used to create a predictive model. The Hybrid BN Model16 
provided reflects uncertainties for both discrete and continuous variables.  
                                                 
 




6.1. Case I – Claim between Contractor and A/E 
This section studies a Design-Build project where a Construction Management firm 
(“Contractor”) hired an Architecture/Engineering firm (“A/E”) to design a new roadway 
project for a local government (“Owner”). Contractor encountered cost overruns during the 
construction phase, after which it investigated the issue and noticed significant differences 
between A/E’s Preliminary Design and Final Design. Contractor priced and bid the project 
based on a deficient Preliminary Design which lead to Contractor’s low estimates and low 
bid. Later in Final Design, the A/E made modifications to its Preliminary Design which 
resulted in Contractor’s cost overrun. Contractor submitted a claim against the A/E to 
recover cost overruns due to A/E’s negligence in preparing the Preliminary Design. 
 
6.1.1. Project background 
The roadway project included construction of a 32-mile highway. The project 
included construction of reversible tolled express lanes, the addition of general purpose 
lanes, and installation of toll stations. This Project was developed in cooperation with local 
and regional stakeholders to relieve traffic congestion. It was also the first project of a 
multi-phased program that was implemented through a series of contracts.  
In this project, Contractor in two separate phases signed agreements (“Contract”) 
with the A/E to provide design engineering services under two separate agreements: 
 
1. The Preliminary Design Agreement required A/E to prepare and 
furnish preliminary design documents (“Preliminary Design”) to 
contractor for use in preparing the proposal submission to the Owner. 
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2. The Final Design Agreement required A/E to advance the 
Preliminary Design documents to prepare Issued-For-Construction 
design documents (“Final Design”).  
 
The Owner specified the scope of work and all related requirements for design-
build Contractor to build the project in a format of Request for Proposal (“RFP”). Based 
on the agreement between Contractor and A/E, the A/E had a contractual obligation with 
the Contractor to prepare the Preliminary Design which complies with the RFP such that 
Contractor could rely on that design and perform detailed cost estimates. Contractor then 
used the detailed cost estimates to price the proposal.  
 
6.1.2. Expert Analysis 
A roadway design engineer (“Expert”) was hired to perform claims analysis of the 
project. Expert reviewed project documents including all contracts and agreements, project 
requirements, proposal and Final Design documents, correspondence, and other related 
materials. Expert also conducted multiple interviews with project personnel to identify and 
examine the issues that gave rise to the claim.  
Expert reports concluded that Contractor relied on the Preliminary Design to 
perform detailed cost estimates and a proposal for the Project. Owner subsequently 
awarded the Project to the Contractor and, in turn, the Contractor commissioned the A/E 
to provide further design services under the Final Design Contract. A/E while progressing 
the Preliminary Design to Final Design corrected major portions of its Preliminary Design. 
Some of these corrections were required to bring the Final Design in compliance with the 
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Owner’s RFP. Other corrections were required to comply with safety codes and roadway 
standards, and other portions related to constructability issues. Those corrections gave rise 
to scope growth, large variations in estimated quantities, and additional Project costs.  
The scope growth and cost overruns included different elements of the highway 
such as roadway geometry, pavement, structures, retaining walls, and drainage. 
 
6.1.3. Game Theory Model for Parties Interactions 
Chapter 4 provided game theoretic models to analyze construction claims from the 
economic standpoint. The intent of these models is to identify the optimal settlement 
amount by predicting the game strategies. The analysis of the game will identify how 
parties should make decisions based on their beliefs over Damages and Liability. Parties 
consider their opponent’s beliefs over these two variables before taking their actions. The 
model shows how parties’ actions updates their opponent’s belief over the private 
information of their opponent.  
The game theoretic model contains three main stages as follows: 
Stage 0 – Formation of Prior Beliefs 
On this stage Contractor emailed the A/E about the potential issues and 
claims. At this stage both parties gather information before plaintiff files a claim.  
Stage 1 – Information Exchange between the Contractor and the A/E 
At this stage parties formally exchange their beliefs on the specifics of the 
issues through attorneys. The information exchanges results in updated beliefs for 
both parties over Liability and Damages. 
Stage 2 – Contractor’s Decision Analysis on Settlement 
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Table 6-1 – Game Theoretic Interaction between the Claimants 
stage A  -  Contractor B  -  A/E 
0 Contractor forms its prior beliefs over 
Liability 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) and Damages 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) 
A/E forms its prior beliefs over  
Liability 𝑏𝑌











Contractor updated its belief over  
Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) and Damages 𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥) 
 
A/E updates its belief over Liability 
𝑏𝑌
′ (𝑦) and Damages 𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥) 















Contractor’s Decision Analysis 
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙                     
 






Contractor estimates A/E’s interim payoff,  
û𝐵 (  𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥), 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵)) = 
     𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)] 𝐸[𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)] +  𝐸[𝑎𝐾(𝑘𝐵)] 
  
Contractor believes A/E only accept 𝑆𝐴 if: 
𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝐸[ 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥)] 𝐸[𝑎𝑌










Contractor’s belief over  
A/E’s belief 
If Contractor Demands 𝑆𝐴 
A/E updates its belief over  
Damages 𝑏𝑋
′′(𝑥) and Liability 𝑏𝑌
′′(𝑦) 
 
A/E decides based on its payoff, 𝑢𝐵  
{
  If 𝑆𝐴  ≤  𝑢𝐵    =>     A would accept
 








6.1.4. Stage 0 – Contractor’s Prior Beliefs 
At this stage parties have negotiated and exchanged some information in an effort 
to reach settlement. The settlement has failed, and parties formed their prior beliefs such 
that they both believe their expected outcome from the trial exceeds their litigation costs. 
The parties’ beliefs over the claim variables are as follows: 
Contractor argued that the A/E failed to prepare and submit to Contractor a 
Preliminary Design that fully complied with the requirements of the Owner’s RFP. The 
RFP stated that the Preliminary Design needed to be sufficient for the Contractor such that 
it could accurately perform detailed cost estimates to bid the project. Contractor argues 
that, after the proposal phase, A/E made numerous corrections to its Preliminary Design to 
produce a Final Design that were fully compliant with the requirements of the Owner’s 
RFP. Many of the design corrections that A/E made to its Preliminary Design to bring the 
Final Design into compliance with the Owner’s RFP resulted in scope growth and cost 
increases on the Project.  A/E’s failure to meet its contractual obligation to Contractor was 
a breach of contract.  
In the Preliminary Design Contract, A/E warranted that the Preliminary Design that 
would fully comply with the requirements of the Owner’s RFP such that Contractor could 
price the Preliminary Design with confidence that the work shown there would comply 
with the Owner’s RFP. The Preliminary Design, in many respects, did not depict the actual 
scope of work and actual work quantities necessary for Contractor to construct the Project 
in accordance with the requirements of the Owner’s RFP and the Final Design. A/E’s 
failure to deliver on its promise to prepare and submit to Contractor a Preliminary Design 
that fully complied with the requirements of the Owner’s RFP is a breach of warranty.  
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Contractor also believed that A/E failed to perform all services under its Design 
Contracts with Contractor in a manner consistent with the care and skill ordinarily 
exercised by members of the same profession currently practicing on projects of similar 
size and complexity. This act is considered a violation of the professional standard of care. 
Contractor stated that the damages incurred due to changes in the Final Design are 
approximately $8 million dollars. Contractor also estimates its litigation costs would be 
approximately $800 thousand dollars. 
 
a. Contractor’s Argument 1 at Stage 0 
Contractor argues that A/E was negligent in preparing its Preliminary Design. The 
Standard of Care for the A/E is defined in the contract as follow: 
 
Article IV.E: STANDARD OF CARE. The standard of care for all 
professional Services provided by the A/E pursuant to this Design 
Agreement shall be the care and skill ordinarily exercised by members 
of the same profession currently practicing in United States, on 
projects of similar size and complexity at the time the Services are 
performed. 
 
Contractor hired an independent third party designer to review the case and 
determine whether the A/E followed the applicable professional Standard of Care. The 
Expert report determined that the other designers in the area with the same professional 
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license would perform differently to avoid the issues caused in this project. Therefore, the 
A/E is subject to violation of Standard of Care. 
 Contractor’s Hypothesis 1: A/E Violated the Standard of Care based on the 
contract Article IV.E. 
 Evidence 1: The evidence to prove violation of Standard of Care is expert 
testimony provided by another licensed engineering in the same field. In this case 
the expert provided affidavit to prove this violation. Figure 6-1 provides is the BN 
model for this argument. 
 
For this argument, Standard of Care, the Contractor provides a deductive argument 
from legal standpoint. Contractor shows Expert Affidavit as Evidence to A/E’s negligence. 
Evidence Pattern defines the structure of Contractor’s reasoning as discussed in 
Section 5.6.1. The proper way to show the strength of this evidence is to show the 
truthfulness of the affidavit report via Soundness node. As discussed in Section 5.6.2, the 
Soundness Pattern is designed to model the accuracy of this argument. Figure 6-1 shows 





Figure 6-1 Contractor’s prior belief over A/E’s Liability 
 
The argument 1 is a key argument in Contractor’s Claim. Contractor knows that if 
this argument is proven to be wrong, the entire claim will be questionable. If the Contractor 
cannot prove that the A/E was negligent and didn’t fail to fulfill the requirements of the 
professional Standard of Care, then Contractor will not be entitled to any of the Damages. 
Providing NPTs discussed in Section 5.6.4 and adding the Liability pattern results in 
Contractor’s prior belief over Liability s follows: 
 
 
Figure 6-2 – Contractor’s Prior Belief over Liability, 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
  
Contractor’s Prior beliefs over Damages are defined by the following truncated normal 
distribution: 
𝑎𝑋





Figure 6-3 – Contractor’s Prior Belief over Damages, 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) 
 
6.1.5. Stage 0 - A/E’s Prior Beliefs 
A/E on the other hand believed that the Preliminary Design was intended to be a 
work product which establishes the basis for the Project designs. A/E further stated that the 
Preliminary Design was not supposed to include all details and full information for the 
Contractor to build the project. In the standard practice the Preliminary Design will be 
advanced and refined so as to become the final, “for construction” Project designs. 
A/E further argued that the Contractor was involved in all the design decisions that 
were made during the proposal design. The A/E stated that the Contractor is subject to 
Contributory Negligence where the Contractor provided input and insights during the 
design process to the A/E, and A/E’s negligence is result of those inputs from the 
Contractor. Therefore, the Contractor is barred from recovering for damages proximately 
caused by its Contributory Negligence. 
A/E’s Prior beliefs over its own Liability is formed based on its disagreement on 
the soundness of Contractor’s argument. This function is defined by applying scenario 






Figure 6-4 – A/E’s Prior Belief over Liability, 𝑏𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
 
A/E received estimates from its attorneys and experts and concluded that the total 
litigation costs will be approximately $600 thousand dollars. A/E does not have accurate 
information regarding the damages, but it estimates the damages to be from $4 million to 
$7 million dollars with the best estimated of $5 million dollars.  
 





6.1.6. Stage 1.1 – Contractor’s Claim 
 
Contractor makes a decision whether to pursue the case in litigation. Contractor use 
attorneys and experts to develop legal arguments including hypotheses of A/E’s failure to 
follow the contract language and evidence(s) to support the hypotheses. In addition to 
Argument 1 discussed in Section 6.1.4.a, the following are other arguments that Contractor 
forms against the A/E.  
 
a. Contractor’s Argument 2 – A/E’s Inadequate Soil Investigation 
The contract agreement between the Contractor and the A/E states that the A/E is 
obligated to perform site investigation to determine soil and subsurface conditions as 
follow: 
Article IV.C.8: Architect/Engineer shall furnish Services of 
geotechnical engineers and other consultants for determining site, 
subsoil, subsurface, air and water conditions. Architect/Engineer 
shall select and pay said geotechnical architect/engineers or other 
consultants. Such Services shall include, as required, applicable test 
borings, test pits, soil bearing values, percolation tests, air and water 
pollution tests, and other necessary operations for determining site, 
subsoil, subsurface, air and water conditions, with reports and 
appropriate professional recommendations. Notwithstanding, unless 
Architect/Engineer fails to perform Services in accordance with the 
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standard of care set forth in Article IV.E., Architect/Engineer assumes 
no liability for unanticipated subsurface conditions, including the 
locating of underground utility lines. 
 
Contractor believed that A/E failed to consider the existing soil conditions in the 
vicinity of a road interchange in its Preliminary Design. The interchange involved a series 
of new bridge structures and ramps located near a railroad. During the proposal phase, A/E 
had access to all historic data of the soil including borings for the railroad project. The 
railroad borings indicated the presence of poor soils in the area. In addition, the soil test 
reports showed high amounts of sulfate in the area. Soil with high sulfate can have negative 
impact on foundations need to be designed accordingly. A/E prepared and submitted to 
Contractor a Preliminary Design for the Interchange that did not adequately consider the 
poor soil conditions and high amount of sulfate. A/E later in Final Design corrected its 
deficient Proposal Design by increasing the length of bridges and using deeper foundations 
and drilled shafts to accommodate the existing soil conditions. These modifications also 
necessitated changes to the roadway (ramps), drainage, and maintenance of traffic design 
at the Interchange. This variation between Proposal Design and Final Design increased 
Contractor’s scope, work quantities, and costs for the Project. 
The Contractor believes that a substantial portion of the scope growth, variations in 
the estimated quantities, and additional costs that arose on the Project were the direct result 
of A/E’s failure to prepare satisfactory Preliminary Design. Contractor identified the 
number of individual design errors and/or omissions contained in the Proposal is gross 
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negligence. Contractor believed that the A/E committed breach of contract, breach of 
warranty, and violations of the professional standard of care. 
 
 Contractor’s Hypothesis 2: A/E breached the contract Article IV.C.8. The 
contract clearly states that it is A/E’s Liability to perform all the soil investigations 
and design accordingly. However, the A/E failed to perform adequate site borings 
and failed to investigate the historic data regarding the subsurface condition.  
 Evidence 2.1: The length of the bridges were increased significantly from 
Preliminary Design to the Final design. 
 Evidence 2.1: The concrete foundations and drilled shafts were bigger and longer 
in the Final Design comparing to the Preliminary Design to suffice geotechnical 
requirements for the high level of sulfate and poor soil conditions. 
 
Figure 6-6 Contractor’s Argument Regarding A/E’s Failure to perform soil investigation  
 
Based on the expert reports as part of Contractor’s claims, he believes his argument 
is accurate and he is confident that the argument will hold the A/E liable for its failures. 
The reflection of attorneys’ belief is defined by the Node Probability Tables for the 




Figure 6-7 NPT for Evidence Nodes 
 As described in Section 5.8, the scenario function from AgenariskTM allows the 
structure to insert an observation to a node and calculate updates throughout the structure. 
The scenario for all pieces of evidence are “Yes”. This means the Contractor believes that 
the event actually occurred. 
 
Figure 6-8 - Contractor’s Prior Belief for Argument 2 
 
The model incorporates Validity Pattern as discussed in Section 5.6.3. The Validity 
node measures the strength of the link between the hypothesis and a piece of evidence. The 
NPT of the Validity node depends on attorney’s judgement on the credibility of the 
argument.  
 
b. Contractor’s Argument 3 – Express Lanes at Entrance Ramps 
Contractor believed that the A/E failed to provide its Preliminary Design in 
compliance with the Owner’s RFP. Specifically, 
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Article IV.C.3: The design contained in the Preliminary Design 
Documents shall substantively respond to, and be in compliance with, 
the Owner's RFP and all applicable standards, laws, statutes, 
ordinances, building codes, orders, rules, and regulations. 
Article IV.C.12: The A/E shall provide Services reasonably required 
to fully comply with the requirements of the Owner's RFP, including 
the design of the size, quality and character of the Project, its 
architectural, structural, mechanical and electrical systems, and the 
materials and such other elements of the Project to permit Contractor 
to do the cost estimating and scheduling. 
 
The express lane included multiple entrance ramps along the length of the highway. 
There is a toll station at each entrance ramp to the express lane. A/E’s Preliminary Design 
for toll stations failed to comply with the Owner’s RFP requirements. The Owner’s RFP 
required the Preliminary Design to include a minimum of 400 linear feet (LF) of entrance 
ramp with concrete barrier on each side of the toll station. The purpose of express lane is 
to let traffic go either direction based on the peak hours of traffic.17  Contrary to this 
requirement, the Preliminary Design showed less than 200 LF of concrete traffic barrier 
                                                 
 
17 The expressed lanes are designed to give additional lanes between the northbound and 
southbound. Vehicles that are traveling toward the city may use these additional lanes in the 
morning peak hours. The managed lane changes direction in the afternoon to let vehicles travel out 
of the city during the afternoon peak hours. 
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and on only one side of the toll stations throughout the project. A/E later discovered this 
error was corrected in the Final Design to meet the RFP requirements. To correct its 
Preliminary Design, A/E increased the length and width of several express lane entrance 
ramps. This change had a profound impact on the horizontal and vertical roadway geometry 
at the toll stations and gave rise to scope growth related to numerous Project elements 
including structures, retaining walls, roadway, and drainage system.  
This issue required modification in the design of the interchange egress/ingress 
ramps and the geometry of retaining walls. The change of retaining walls is evidenced in 
the Final Design documents which show those retaining walls to be significantly larger 
than the walls shown in the Preliminary Design. In other instances, A/E had to increase the 
width of the entire roadway at the toll station in the Final Design to be able to extend the 
length of the entrance ramps. The widening in turn increased work quantities, and costs 
associated with roadway work and retaining walls. 
A/E’s deficient Preliminary Design also occurred at multiple bridges. A/E designed 
the express lane entrance ramps to begin in the span of the bridge.  A/E corrected the 
Preliminary Design by lengthening the entrance ramps in the Final Design which, in turn, 
necessitated the realignment of the entire roadway. Consequently, the Final Design 
included larger concrete decks, concrete piers, and concrete girders for bridges.  
 
The first step in creating the model is to define defendant’s Liability using the 
Bayesian Network model, Chapter 5. Contractor’s Argument 3 includes:  
 Contractor’s Hypothesis 3: A/E failed to comply with Owner’s RFP as specified 
in the contract Article IV.C.12 and Article IV.C.12.  
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 Evidence 3.1: A/E designed short  entrance ramps for the express lanes. 
 Evidence 3.2: A/E’s failure to incorporate DIS to its Preliminary Design and 
therefore, missing entrance ramps that are specified in the DIS.  
Per Evidence Pattern introduced in Section 5.6.1 the Argument is modeled as 
follows: 
 
Figure 6-9 - Contractor’s Argument Regarding A/E’s Failure to Comply with Owner’s RFP  
 
Based on the expert reports as part of Contractor’s claims, he believes his argument 
is accurate and he is confident that the argument will hold the A/E liable for its failures. 
The reflection of attorneys’ belief is defined by the Node Probability Tables for the 
Evidence Node as described in Section 5.6.1. This NPT shows  
 
Figure 6-10 NPT for Evidence Nodes 
 
The scenario for all pieces of evidence are “Yes”. This means the Contractor 




Figure 6-11 - Contractor’s (Attorney and Expert) Prior Belief for Argument 1 
 
c. Contractor’s updated Belief over Liability 
Connecting the hypotheses 2 and 3 to the Liability node results in Contractor’s 
updated belief over Liability as follows. 
 




The next step is to use the Liability Pattern which measures the Liability (for 
Defendant) that each party assume. The Liability node is a continuous node, which is then 
discretized using 0.1 intervals. The NPT for the Liability is conditioned based on 
partitioned expressions using Truncated Normal (TNormal) distributions. The strategy in 
defining the NPT is to consider Hypothesis 3 (H3), Standard of Care, the main driver of 
the Liability. If it’s proven that the A/E violated the standard of care, the Liability will be 




Figure 6-13 – Node Probability Table for Liability Node 
 
The Argument 2 and 3 in this case are both related to one location of the project. 
As a result the total damages from both arguments are included into one node. If the 
arguments are for separate locations of the project, their Liability and Damages need to be 
calculated separately.  
 In addition, it is preferred to include the litigation costs in the calculations as a 
separate node that is deducted from the outcome for Contractor as the plaintiff. Due to 











6.1.7. Stage 2.2 – Contractor’s Estimate on A/E’s Updated Beliefs 
Once A/E receives the claim from the Contractor, it makes an effort to disqualify 
the arguments by associating new reasoning or counterarguments to the original claims. 
Following are the counterarguments that A/E presents as a defense to Contractor’s Claim. 
 
a. A/E’s Counterargument 1 – Insufficient Design Time 
A/E argued that rarely for such large highway projects a design-build contractor 
choose to invest substantial funds in pre-proposal preliminary plans. Rather, at the pre-
proposal stage the design-build contractor will usually opt for Preliminary Design with 
little details or dimensioning. The contract agreement provides the following statement  
Article IV.A.8: The Parties acknowledge that the Project quantity 
estimates shall be based upon partial design development, the RFP 
documents, publically available reference documents and any studies 
and tests performed during Proposal preparation. Prior to submittal 
of the Proposal, the Parties will make a mutual determination 
regarding quantity contingencies, additional studies and testing 
required for design development, and probability of substantial 
changes in estimated quantities. 
 
A/E believes it followed the industry norm and did not fully designed the entire 
highway will exhaustive details. The Preliminary Design were not to be used for 
construction as is standard engineering practice in design-build Preliminary Design. It is 
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the contractor's Liability to determine the financial risks and allocate adequate 
contingencies to the unknown elements to avoid project cost overruns. 
In this counterargument the A/E tries to prove that it did not violate the Standard of 
Care. A/E does not recognize Contractor’s argument soundness and believes it followed 
the contract agreement Article IV.A.8 and also it is a common practice in the industry to 
produce Preliminary Design that is subject to minor changes later in the Final Design.  
 
b. A/E’s Counterargument 2 – Lack of Design Review Comments 
A/E’s used contract Article IV.A.5 to argue that the Contractor failed to provide 
design review comments and corrections as specified in the contract. A/E stated that 
however the Preliminary Design was not intended to be finalized, the Contractor was 
obligated to review and raise its concern during the proposal phase. Contractor’s failure to 
review the drawings would not hold the designer liable for deficiencies or omissions during 
the rough Preliminary Design.  
Article V.D.1: Contractor shall meet with the Architect/Engineer at 
appropriate intervals to review the progress of the 
Architect/Engineer's Phase I Services, exchange information and 
provide design review comments for completion of the Proposal and 
to discuss any other matters requiring Contractor's decisions. 





c. A/E’s Counterargument 3 – Insufficient Design Time 
A/E also counter argued that the Contractor did not allow the A/E sufficient time 
to review the final proposal submitted to the Owner. Contractor did the quantity take-offs 
solely on its own and shared the detailed quantity take-offs used for project estimates with 
the A/E a day before proposal. One day is not considered sufficient time for the A/E to 
review and comment on the proposal. Therefore, Contractor’s claim regarding the 
quantities has not merit. 
Article III.B.11: The A/E shall prepare and submit to Contractor, 
Preliminary Design Documents which are compliant with the 
requirements of the Owner's RFP based on the approach to design 
and construction of the Project selected by Contractor in sufficient 
time for A/E to incorporate them into the Preliminary Design and 
meet the Proposal Deliverables and Schedule.” 
Article IV.A.5: The Architect/Engineer and Contractor shall prepare 
a Phase I Deliverables and Schedule, setting forth the dates for 
completion of Architect/Engineer's Phase I Services sufficient to allow 
Contractor and the Architect/Engineer to meet the RFP's 







d. A/E’s Updated Belief over Liability 
According to the counterarguments 1, 2 and 3, as describe above, the A/E 
would updates its belief over liability as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6-15 A/E’s Updated Belief over Liability, 𝑏𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
 
e. A/E’s updated Belief over Damages 
A/E’s updated belief over Damages is calculated using Damages Pattern. The 
underlying calculation is conditioned to Contractor’s revealing of the private information.  
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Following is the NPT for the Updated Belief over damages conditioned to the revealing 
node: 
 
Figure 6-16 – NPT for Revealing Private Information 
 
A/E updates its belief over Damages given its belief on Contractor’s degree of 
revealing private information as follows. 
 







6.1.8. Stage 2.3 – Contractor’s Settlement Analysis 
Contractor considers its belief over expected outcome (blue distributions) and 
compares it to A/E’s beliefs (green distributions) as shown. 
 
 
Figure 6-18 – Parties’ Belief Regarding Expected Payoffs 
 
6.1.9. Stage 2.4 – Contractor’s Settlement Analysis 
 
As discussed in Section 4.4.1, the probability of settlement is directly related to the 
expected outcome of the party who receives the settlement offer. In this case the Contractor 
is analyzing to send a settlement demand to A/E. Therefore, A/E’s expected payoff from 
trial defines the likelihood of settlement. This likelihood is defined in form of Commulative 





Figure 6-19 – A/E’s Expected Outcome from Litigation 




Standard Deviation 1.39 
Lower Percentile [25.0] 1.31 
Upper Percentile [75.0] 3.19 
 
The Contractor’s expected payoff from trial defines his decision on demanding the 
settlement amount as follows. 
 
 
Figure 6-20 – Contractor’s Expected Outcome from Litigation 
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Standard Deviation 1.46 
Lower Percentile [25.0] 3.31 
Upper Percentile [75.0] 5.34 
 
Parties may evaluate their expected litigation costs if they decide to proceed with 
trial and then make a decision for a settlement offer. Using the mix strategy introduced in  
the Game theoretic section provides the following graph regarding Contractor’s belief over 
its expected value given its settlement offer. 
 




6.2. Case II – Schedule and Productivity Delay in a Windfarm Construction Project 
This case analyze the Mountain Wind Energy project (“Project”), which was a large 
and complicated project that involved the construction of over fifty wind turbine generators 
(“Turbine”) along a mountain ridge. The project site access and climate conditions were 
extremely challenging to the point where the project delivery system was fraught with risk 
for all parties. Although the project was completed and equipment operate in its full 
functionality, there were significant schedule delays, costs overrun in the project that 
resulted in numerous lawsuits.  The lawsuits were eventually settled in arbitration process. 
 
Figure 6-22 Installed Turbines on the ridge of the mountain 
 
Site access was a major controlling factor on this project. Construction included a 
one-way access road over twenty miles of the mountainous terrain. Construction of that 
access road was impacted by third-party agreements and land leases and environmental 
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issues. In addition, the owner delivered turbine components on large off-road trailers 
without any dedicated location for storage. The turbine components were roughly 25 
pounds and 100 feet long. The Project constrains included access limitations, difficult 
weather conditions, owner-supplied components, construction schedule maintenance, 
contractual notice provisions, and assignment of risk for third party obligations. 
 
6.2.1. Project Background 
The Mountain Wind Energy Project (“Project”) is a 100-megawatt electric 
generation facility, comprising over fifty turbines, located along twenty mile stretch of the 
Mountain ridge line. The Contractor agreed to construct a windfarm, to clear, grub and 
construct a road, construct foundations for the erection of the turbines, offload and erect 
the components for the wind turbines, and build a substation and interconnect the entire 
facility. Contractor also provided certain engineering services limited to road design layout, 
wind turbine collection system design layout and procurement of long lead items.  
Access to the site was limited, where the only way to enter or leave the site was 
through a single point. The road was only eighteen feet wide, one-way in and one-way out. 
As a result, the progress of the construction was controlled by the capacity of the road. 
Using a single one-way lane road and traversing mountainous terrain to provide means of 
egress for all construction traffic were one of the most important constraints of the Project.  
Construction of the Project required several operations to be done in a sequence of 
work orders. The first order of business was for the Owner to obtain full access to the site. 
Based on the agreement between Contractor and Owner (“Contract”), the Owner was 
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required to acquire Real Property Rights18  prior to the start of the construction. This 
included obtaining signed leased agreements from all impacted property owners.  
Next, the Owner was obligated to remove the timber from the site and then issue 
the Clearing Access Notice.  The Clearing Access Notice would allow Contractor to 
mobilize the equipment to the site to begin clearing and grubbing (removal of vegetation, 
tree stumps, etc.). This equipment included large track-mounted dozers, loaders, and large 
trucks. Clearing and grubbing was the first phase of Contractor’s work on-site and was 
necessary to begin before any other operations on-site.  
As the Project site was cleared, grading (the next step in building the road) followed 
behind. The grading operation involved large dozers, loaders, and earthmoving equipment. 
The grading operation involved removing earth from high spots (cut) and placing that 
material in low spots (fill) in order to create a road surface, which followed the design 
profile (This operation is known as cut and fill). As earth is placed in fills it had to be 
compacted by large compaction equipment. The final step in building the road involved 
placing gravel on the road surface. Placing the gravel involved moving thousands of truck-
loads of stone and using large dozers, loaders, trucks and motor graders for placing and 
leveling.  
                                                 
 
18 “Real Property Rights” means all rights in or to real property (such as leasehold or other rights 
to use or access the Project Site), leases, agreements, Permits, easements, including licenses, 
private rights-of-way, and utility and railroad crossing rights required to be obtained or 
maintained by Owner in connection with construction of the Project on the Project Site, 
transmission of electricity to the Grid, performance of the Work, or operation of the Project, etc. 
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The Project also involved excavation of turbine foundations, delivering reinforcing 
steel, delivering concrete, delivering wind turbine components to the site, erecting 
components, construction of the Operations and Maintenance Building, and construction 
of the substations. Each subsequent major component of work required thousands of 
truckloads of material, equipment and personnel. Each turbine foundation required about 
1800 truckloads of concrete for the foundation, and 600 truckloads of turbine components. 
It was recorded that over 20,000 trucks would passed through the single access point to 
construct the Project. 
Working space at each pad site was limited because the pad sites were carved out 
of a densely wooded forest and the constructed foundation and crane pads occupied a large 
portion of the cleared area. Therefore, erection of the wind turbines required careful 
coordination of the deliveries, off-loading of components to specific locations within the 
pad site, and the crane movement between pad sites. Cranes had to be set-up on stable pads 
and once the crane was set-up on the pad, it was stationary. The major components had to 
be strategically placed where they could be reached by the crane in order to begin erection. 
To optimize productivity during the erection of the wind turbines, the delivery of 
major components, off-loading those components and erection of those components had to 
proceed in a linear sequence from one wind turbine pad site to the next. Off-loading the 
turbine components from the trailers and erecting those components required three types 
of cranes: cranes to unload trailers (off-load cranes), cranes to erect the base and middle 




6.2.2. Development of Claim 
In order to plan this Project properly and ultimately develop a reasonable schedule, 
the sequences of work described above had to be integrated with the constraints of the site, 
the limited capacity of the road, severe weather conditions, and the delivery schedule for 
the turbines. Owner would benefit from a schedule that allowed it to take delivery of all 
turbines by December 31, 2010, and would allow those turbines to be delivered directly to 
their pad sites. This would allow Owner to avoid the cost of off-site storage and double 
handling of the turbines. 
Because of the severe winter weather, the ideal plan was to begin construction in 
early spring in order to get majority of weather sensitive work done before the winter. In 
fact, Contractor in its early planning, prior to the Contract, envisioned a March 2010 start 
of construction.  
Later the Owner notified the Contractor that construction cannot be started until 
summer. Contractor proposed the concept of a two-phase schedule, whereby the most 
weather-sensitive work would be performed before and after winter weather season and 
less weather-sensitive work would proceed through the winter. This concept would require 
suspension of most on-site construction activity during the winter months, off-site storage 
of some turbines, and double handling of those wind turbines stored off-site. 
Ultimately, aside from the late (summer) start of construction, Owner decided to 
proceed with an accelerated schedule that would not require an off-site laydown yard or 
double handling of the turbine components. That new schedule required all wind turbine 
pad sites to be complete prior to winter, which would have reduced overall project cost 
151 
 
because Owner would avoid the cost of an off-site laydown yard and double handling of 
wind turbine components. 
The key of success for this schedule was maintaining the road traffic capacity. This 
was to be accomplished in the schedule by minimizing the overlap between the two 
operations that placed the heaviest demand on the road, the Concrete Operations and the 
Delivery. In fact the Project Schedule provided that these two operations would overlap by 
only one week. For example, the delivery would not start until the Concrete Operation was 
one week from completion. 
As-planned, the site work was to begin in June 2010, the other construction 
operations could not begin until August 2010, the road had to be complete by October 
2010, the delivery could only overlap with the Concrete Operation for one week and the 
delivery had to be carefully coordinated with a complex crane operation, minimizing crane 
movements between turbine pads. All of this had to occur in a linear manner beginning at 
the south end of the Project, proceeding in sequence to the north. 
Unfortunately this did not happen. Interruptions and major events during the 
construction caused significant delays in the Project. Complicated contractual obligations 
and unbalanced risk allocations between the parties, caused disagreements between the 
parties and resulted in a timely and costly litigation. The project was behind the schedule 
and over budget. Following is a snapshot of one month comparison between as-planned 












6.2.3. Accelerated Project Schedule 
One of the largest risk for all parties was the accelerated project schedule. The 
Contract Schedule was developed over the contract negotiations between the Owner and 
Contractor. The Project Schedule was an important part of Owner’s financial projections 
for the Project, particularly with respect to the delivery of turbines and potential off-site 
storage of turbines. Off-site storage would also require double handling of the components. 
Owner’s desire was to reduce its cost by eliminating off-site storage of turbines. This would 
require that all turbines be delivered directly to the site by Dec 2010. 
In May 2010, Contractor provided three schedule scenarios requested by Owner 
that were expressly contingent upon several key assumptions, the most critical including 
no overlap of major tasks, i.e. pouring of concrete foundations and delivery and erection 
of turbine components. All three schedule scenarios included the concept of a two-phase 
schedule, whereby the most weather-sensitive would be performed before and after the 
anticipated winter weather season and less weather-sensitive work would proceed through 
the winter. The three options were are follows: 
 Option 1: Start August  2010, Winter Suspension, Restart in March 2011 
 Option 2: Road starts in June 2010, August 2010 Full Notice to Proceed, turbine 
Erection in Spring 2011 
 Option 3: Road starts in June 2010, August 2010 Full Notice to Proceed, Split 
turbine Erection between Fall 2010 and Spring 2011 
Later in May 2010, Owner requested that Contractor reduce its proposal by one 
million dollar ($1M). Owner told Contractor that without the reduction the Project would 
not be approved by the executive board. Contractor and its subcontractors reviewed 
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possible schedule scenarios that would yield cost savings. Contractor submitted another 
cost proposal to Owner that reduced the overall cost of the Project by one million dollars.  
The savings would be achieved by accelerating the Project to have all of the 
turbines erected by mid-January 2011 and receive substantial completion in mid May 2011. 
The accelerated schedule contained significant risk for all parties given that the schedule 
required little overlap of major construction activities on a project that was scheduled to 
take place from fall through winter into spring on a mountain ridgeline.  
 
Figure 6-24 Project Schedule Delayed to the winter time 
 
6.2.4. Game Theory Model for Parties Interactions 
Table 6-2  provides the mathematical approach for interactions between the 




Table 6-2   Game Theoretic Interaction between the Claimants 
stage PlayerA (Plaintiff) Player B (Defendant) 
0 A forms a PDF 𝑎𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) 
A forms a prior PDF 𝑎𝑌
𝑜(𝑦) 
B forms a prior PDF   𝑏𝑋
𝑜(𝑥) 








A updates its beliefs as follows 
𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  or  𝑎𝑋(𝑥 | 𝐷𝐴 )   
            𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)  or  𝑎𝑌(𝑦 | 𝐷𝐴 )   
 
B updates its belief over  
Damages 𝑏𝑋
′ (𝑥) and Liability  𝑏𝑌
′ (𝑦) 







































B’s Decision Analysis  
{
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛      
 









B estimates A’s interim outcome, (û𝐴) 
 û𝐴 (𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥), 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦), 𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴))  = 
𝐸[𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦)]   −  𝐸[𝑏𝐾(𝑘𝐴)] 
B thinks A would only accept SB if: 
𝑆𝐵    ≥  û𝐴 





A updated its belief over  
Damages  𝑎𝑋
′ (𝑥), and Liability 𝑎𝑌
′ (𝑦) 
A Decides based on its interim payoff, 
𝑢𝐴 
{
  If 𝑆𝐵  ≥  𝑢𝐴    =>     A would accept
 






′ (𝑥)  𝑎𝑌




′ (𝑦)]   >  𝐴𝑐   𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
 
B’s belief over A’s belief 
B’s belief over A’s belief 
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6.2.5. Stages of the game 
Before filing a claim, parties typically discuss the issues through several emails or 
meetings. During such communications the parties exchange some private information 
with in a hope of resolving the dispute. Before filing a claim parties form their beliefs over 
specifics of the game. These beliefs are referenced as prior beliefs in the Stage 0 of 
Table 6-2. 
The project described above experienced 5 months of delay in substantial 
completion. The delay caused damages to both parties in different ways. The Owner 
particularly suffered from the late completion since the Wind Power Plant was not operable 
and couldn’t generate the estimated revenue and return on investment. 
The significant delay resulted in multiple meetings and discussions between the 
Contractor and the Owner. These meetings raised so many conflicts between the parties 
regarding who is liable for the delay and how to calculate the damages. During these 
conversation some information were exchanged that formed parties’ prior over these 
variables. Stage 0 describes the beliefs formed in these communications. 
At stage 1, Contractor decided to file a claim against the Owner. The Owner 
responded with a defense argument. These information exchanges updated parties’ beliefs 
over specifics of the case. At stage 2, Owner is analyzing the case and make determinations 
of its limits to submit final settlement offer to the Contractor.  
6.2.6. Stage 0 - Owner’s Prior Beliefs 
The Owner believed that the delays were mostly occurred due to Contractor’s 
failure to identify the risks which resulted into failure to meet the substantial completion 
deadline. Owner pursued compensation using liquidated damages clause in the agreement. 
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Liquidated damages are identified as damages that the Contractor owes to the Owner if it 
fails to complete the construction of each Turbine on time as follows: 
Article 6.9.1 Turbine Delay Liquidated Damages. Owner and 
Contractor acknowledge and agree that any failure of Contractor to 
cause the minimum number of Turbines to achieve Turbine 
Substantial Completion by the applicable Guaranteed Substantial 
Completion Date will directly cause substantial damage to Owner, 
which damage cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty. Thus, 
if such failure occurs, Contractor shall pay to Owner, as liquidated 
and agreed damages and not as a penalty, the following amounts: For 
the first 30 days of delay $800 per day per Turbine, and for Day 31 to 
date of Turbine Substantial Completion for applicable Turbine $1,200 
per Day per Turbine. 
 
a. Stage 0 - Owner’s Prior Belief over Liability 
Owner forms its prior belief  𝑏𝑋
0(𝑥) such that the Contractor failed to meet the 
substantial completion date, Dec 31, 2010. The Contractor instead completed the project 
five months later, May 15, 2011. The following is Owner’s hypothesis and evidence used 
to support its case.   
 Owner’s Hypothesis H1: Contractor’s failure to meet contract Article 6.9.1. 
 Owner’s Evidence E1: Contractor did not meet the substantial 




Figure 6-25 BN Structure Pattern for Owner’s Prior Belief 
The Validity node specifies the strength of this argument as described in Chapter 5.6.3. 
 






b. Stage 0 - Owner’s Prior Belief over Damages 
The Contractor delayed the substantial completion from Dec. 31, 2010 to May 18, 
2011.  This durations is equal to 135 days. Per Contractor Article 6.9.1, for the first 14 days 
of delay $800 per day per Turbine, and for Day 15 to date of Turbine Substantial 
Completion for applicable Turbine $1,200 per Day per Turbine. The calculations for 
liquated damages are as follows: 








per Turbine per day 
 Damages 
30 × 50 × $800 = $1,200,000 
108 × 50 × $1,200 = $6,300,000 
       
    Total  $7,500,000 
 
The Owner’s best estimate for the amount that Contractor owes as liquidated damages is 
$7.5M. Based on other Owner’s calculations the total amount that contractor may owe to 
the Owner is between $2M to $10. Owner forms a triangle distribution over Damages. 
Owner’s PDF over Damages are considered as Contractor’s expenditure (negative 
amounts). 
 
Figure 6-27  Owner’s Prior Belief over Damages 
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6.2.7. Stage 0 - Contractor’s Prior Belief  
Contractor forms its prior beliefs over Damages   𝑎𝑋
0 (𝑥)  and Liability  𝑎𝑌
0(𝑦) . 
Contractor believes that late site access, owner-supplied Turbines, and weather related 
delays are all attributed to Owner’s Liability based on the agreement. Following are the 
detailed reasoning from contractor regarding the three arguments (Arguments 2 through 
4). 
a. Argument 2 - Third-Party Controlled Site Access 
Contractor believed Owner failed to acquire Real Property Rights prior to the start 
of construction. In addition, the Contract Agreement required Owner to issue a Clearing 
Access Notice by June 14, 2010 in order for Contractor to begin clearing operations 
(clearing and grubbing). The Contract Agreement also required Owner to issue a Limited 
Notice to Proceed on the same date (by June 14, 2010) in order for Contractor to begin 
work on the Substation and road. The Clearing Access Notice and Limited Notice to 
Proceed contained the following language: 
Article 2.6.1 Access to Project Site; Commencement of Work. 
Contractor will commence performance of all off-Site Work not 
previously authorized under the Service Contract promptly after the 
Effective Date, including engineering work and ordering “long lead 
time” Equipment. Contractor will not perform any clearing Work on 
the Project Site until Owner issues to Contractor a written notice 
allowing the same (the “Clearing Access Notice”). Other than as 
required for such clearing Work, Contractor will not otherwise 
mobilize to the Project Site until it receives a Limited Notice to 
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Proceed from Owner. When Owner is prepared for Contractor to 
mobilize to the Site and commence the Work as required in relation to 
the Substations and the roads, Owner will issue a written notice to 
Contractor directing the same (the “Notice to Proceed”), and 
Contractor will promptly thereafter commence such scope of the 
Work. If Owner has not issued the Clearing Access Notice or Notice 
to Proceed by June 14, 2010, or an equivalent release under the 
Service Agreement, then Contractor shall be entitled to a Change 
Order as provided in Section 9.5.1. 
 
The Contract Agreement indicated that Contractor should have been able to proceed 
immediately with all clearing work and all work beginning June 14, 2010. Owner failed to 
acquire all of the property rights and failed to have the properties timbered prior to 
Contractor and its subcontractors mobilizing to the site. The result of Owner’s failures 
caused Contractor and its subcontractors to perform the work out of sequence and resulted 
in delays and disruptions to the major elements of work later on in the Project. Dead-zones 
existed in which no road work could begin until the logging was completed. The total 
length of these Dead-zones was approximately 1.7 miles, or roughly 12% of the length of 
the Project.  
As a result of delayed access to portions of the Site (Dead Zones), Contractor had 
less borrow material than anticipated to help build the access road at the southern end of 
the Project. As a result, Contractor required additional time to complete the work, since the 
fill material had to be hauled a longer distance than anticipated. Due to the delayed access 
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caused by Owner, Contractor was forced to complete the access road in a chaotic manner, 
therefore, completion of the roadway took much longer than anticipated and stretched into 
winter weather. In addition, the roadwork was performed concurrently with the turbine 
deliveries and turbine erection, which was not anticipated in the contract schedule. This 
resulted in a major congestion on the road, further obstructing the ability to complete the 
access road and delaying turbine component deliveries. 
Contractor forms the following belief regarding this issue as follow: 
 Contractor’s Hypothesis H2: Owner breached contract Article 2.6.1. 
 Evidence E2.1: Owner failed to acquire property rights and timer the site. 
 Evidence E2.2: following the Evidence E2.1 Owner failed to give Notice to 
Proceed to the contractor for clearing and grubbing the site. 
 




b. Argument 3 - Owner-Supplied Turbine Components 
Another significant source of risk imposed on Contractor by Owner was the Owner-
supplied turbine components. Owner separately contracted with the Turbine Vendor for 
the Project.  
Article 2.3.1: Owner shall cause Turbine Vendor to deliver the 
Turbines to the Project Site in accordance with the delivery schedule 
attached as Exhibit E-2. Delivery shall be to the nearest point to the 
Unit site pad that is accessible by standard highway configured 
vehicles used for transportation of wind turbine 
components…..Exhibit E-2; provided, that if a Turbine is delivered 
early, Contractor and Owner shall use Commercially Reasonable 
Efforts to accommodate and accept such early Turbine delivery; 
provided, further, that if Contractor’s accommodation results in 
acceptance of delivery at a location on the Project Site other than 
adjacent to the applicable pad site, then the reasonable additional 
handling cost incurred by Contractor in moving the subject Turbine 
to the location adjacent to the applicable pad site shall be borne by 
Owner…. From time to time, Owner shall provide Contractor with 
updates of the actual anticipated dates of delivery of all Turbine 
components.  
The turbine delivery schedule indicated eight complete units planned for delivery 
each week beginning the week of October 18, 2010 and ending the week of December 17, 
2010. A complete turbine included one base, one mid, one top, one nacelle, one hub and 
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one set of three blades. Contractor was not required to unload more than thirty truckloads 
per Business Day. 
According to the turbine delivery reports, during the month of November, Owner 
delivered a mixture of twenty-one bases, twenty-three midsections, twenty-three tops, 
twenty-one hubs, seventeen nacelles and thirteen sets of blades.  Therefore, during the 
month of November, Owner only delivered thirteen complete units, compared to the 
twenty-seven complete turbines that were planned to be delivered. By mid-December 2010, 
Contractor and its concrete subcontractor expected to have received in total to date forty-
five complete turbine units. However, Owner/GE had delivered enough pieces for only 
twenty-four complete turbines. Equipment inefficiencies became a problem, as large cranes 
were constantly moving back and forth between pad sites to offload the various turbine 
components that were being delivered in a random and haphazard manner. Ultimately, 
Owner and turbine vendors completed delivery of the turbine components to the site during 
the week of March 18, 2011 – twelve weeks later than the agreed upon turbine delivery 
schedule. 
Article 8.3.1 Force Majeure; Turbine-Vendor-Caused Delays. 
Without limiting the definition of Turbine-Vendor-Caused-Delays, 
notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, in any 
case where this Agreement states that Owner “shall cause” Turbine 
Vendor to take or not to take a certain action, the Parties agree that 
if the Owner fails to meet that obligation, such failure shall exclusively 
constitute a Turbine-Vendor-Caused Delay and shall not constitute an 
Owner Event of Default, and Contractor’s sole and exclusive 
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remedies as a result thereof will be as set forth in this Article 8.3 and 
Sections 9.5.1(e) and 13.7. 
Contractor forms the following belief regarding this issue as follow: 
 Contractor’s Hypothesis H3: Owner breached contract Articles 2.3.1 and 8.3.1. 
 Evidence E3.1: Owner (or its vendor) failed to deliver Turbine components as 
specified in the delivery schedule. 
 
Figure 6-29  BN Structure Pattern for Contract’s Prior Belief – Argument 2 
 
c. Argument 4 - WEATHER RELATED DELAYS 
The Contract Agreement contained several clauses related to weather that allocated 
risk related to weather entirely to Contractor. In accordance with the Contract Agreement, 
there were only two ways that Contractor was granted relief from weather related delays:  
 
Article 8.5.1. The occurrence of a Weather Delay was determined in 
increments of half-day periods (7:00AM to 11:59AM was the first 
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half-day period and 12:00PM to 5:00 PM was the second half-day 
period). Weather conditions were evaluated at the start of each half-
day period, at 7:00 AM and 12:00 PM. A Weather Delay condition 
only existed if fog or ice accumulation was present at the start of a 
half-day period when weather measurements were taken. Wind speeds 
in excess of 11 m/s during base and mid-section erection or 
installation or 10 m/s during all other crane operations constituted a 
Weather Delay. 
A force majeure event was the other form of relief available to Contractor and its 
subcontractors for weather related delays. A force majeure event was defined as: 
Article 8.5.2. An unavoidable event beyond the control of Contractor 
such as: acts of God, natural disasters, wildfire, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, lightning, floods, etc. In addition, severe inclement 
weather conditions that cannot be considered Weather Delays can 
also be force majeure events if the severe inclement weather condition 
exceeds by ten percent (10%) the twenty-five year daily average for 
such weather condition for the date of the occurrence according to the 
records of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for 
the vicinity of the Project Site. 
Further increasing the risk for Contractor was a contractually stipulated $50,000 
cap as the maximum relief that Contractor could receive due to force majeure events.  
Article 9.5. Change Order Due to Weather Delays. Subject to Section 
9.5.1 if a Weather Delay has occurred with respect to a Half-Day 
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Period, Owner will issue a Change Order to increase the Contract 
Price by a flat amount of four thousand dollars ($4,000) per day…. 
Contractor agrees that weather delay charges shall not exceed fifty 
thousand dollars ($50,000) in total. The Change Order(s) described 
herein shall be Contractor’s sole and exclusive remedy for any delays 
and increased costs resulting from excessive winds, fog or ice 
accumulation, and Contractor will not be entitled to any payment, 
damages or other compensation in connection with any such delays 
or increased costs. 
 
Contractor forms the following belief regarding this issue as follow: 
 Contractor’s Hypothesis H4: Owner accepts risk per contract Articles 8.5 and 9.5. 
 Evidence E4.1: Contractor observed severe weather conditions as described above. 
 




a. Contractor’s Prior Belief over Liability 
 
Based on the Liability Pattern discussed in Section 5.6.4, the Contractor’s 
Arguments are modeled as follows: 
 
Figure 6-31  Liability Pattern for Contractor’s Prior Beliefs 
 
As discussed in Section 5.6.1 the Evidence nodes are inputs from the Experts. The 
Experts determine the factual evidences and whether the evidence supports the hypothesis. 
Validity nodes are inputs from the Attorneys. These node determine the strength of each 
Hypothesis with its associated Evidence(s). For example the Expert determines if the 
severe weather conditions support the contract Article 8.5, and the attorney determines the 
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strength of that argument is. The Validity nodes are set to be 90% true and 10% false as 
prior beliefs of the contractor.  Providing inputs to the model results as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6-32 Contractor’s Prior Beliefs over Liability 
 
a. Contractor’s Prior Belief over Damages 
The contractor believes that it has incurred approximately $18M in damages 
including direct and indirect costs. Direct costs included additional equipment and labor 
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on-site, and sub-contractor’s extra charges for the additional work, and indirect costs are 
overhead and management fees due to additional 135 days of involvement in the project. 
The details for Contractor’s damages are eliminated to simplify the case. Contractor forms 
its PDF over Damages using Truncated Normal Distribution as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6-33 Contractor’s Prior Beliefs over Damages 
 
The mean for the Truncated Normal function is considered $18M with $1M variance. In 
Contractor in its statement of claim asks for $21M in damages, which is the highest 
possible award that the Judge can determine. 
 
 
6.2.1. Stage 1.1 – Contractor Submits its Claim  
Contractor prepares a statement of Claim and submit it to the Owner. The scenarios 
applied to the evidence nodes (True/False) represent Contractor’s belief regarding 





Figure 6-34 Contractor’s Claim  
 
Contractor’s belief for the credibility of all are identified high. The 90% validity 
for the evidences reflects attorney’s inputs. All the evidences are identified to be related to 
the hypothesis by experts. The Contractor’s Belief scenario “True” for the evidence nodes 
reflects expert’s suggestions in preparing the statement of claim. 
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6.2.2. Stage 1.2 &1.3 – Owner’s updated beliefs and Defense 
Owner installs the liquidated damages Clause to the model provided by contractor. 
Therefore, the model will be updated as follow to form Contractor’s belief regarding 
Liability: 
 
Figure 6-35 – Owner’s Updated Belief over Liability in its Defense 
 
Owner responded to the Contractor’s Claim with its denfense statement. Owner 
rejected that the acquiring property site and timerbring the site (Evidence 2.1) can be used 
as evidences for breach of contract Article 2.6.1 (Hypothesis 2). Owner also does not 
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consider the weather condition severe in this year (Evidence 4) comparing to the previous 
years; therfore, Owner does not accept the weather caused delay argument (Argument 4).  
These counterarguments are reflected in the the Owner’s Updated Belief by using the 
scenario “False” for Evidences 2 and 4. 
Owner also found failure to provide notice on-time (Evidence 2.2) as a result of late 
timbering a weak arugment. It also stated that the delay in delivery of the turbines 
(Evidence 3) is not a totally accurate since the delivery were partially on-time. These two 
aker counterarguments are reflected by using 70% true for the Validity nodes V2.2 and V3.   
 Owner received Contractor’s argument regarding damages and believes that the 
amount of supporting documents provided are revealing average amount of information.  
Based on Damages Pattern provided in Section 5.6.6Error! Reference source not found., 
the Owner’s updated belief over damages is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6-36  Owner’s Updated Belief over Damages 
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6.2.3. Stage 1.4 – Contractor’s Updated Beliefs 




Figure 6-37  Contractor’s Updated Belief over Liability 
 




6.2.4. Stage 2.1 – Owner’s Settlement Analysis 
At this stage owner makes its decision on the settlement offer. For the settlement 
decisions, Owner compares its beliefs with contractor’s belief as follows 
 




Figure 6-39   Owner’s Comparison of its Beliefs with Contractor’s Beliefs over Damages 
 
Owner calculates its expected payment from litigation as product of Damages and 
Liabilities plus its litigation costs. 
 




The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Owner’s belief over litigation 
outcomes follows: 
 
Figure 6-41 Owner’s CDF over Litigation Outcome 
 
Owner calculates Contractor’s expected outcome from litigation as product of 
Damages and Liabilities minus Contractor’s litigation costs. 
 
 
Figure 6-42 Owner’s Belief on Contractor’s Belief over Litigation Outcome 
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The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Owner’s belief on Contractor’s 
Belief over litigation outcomes follows: 
 
 
Figure 6-43 Owner’s CDF over Litigation Outcome 
 
6.2.5. Case II Summary and Conclusions 
Here is the summary conclusion for case study II: 
 Owner’s expected value of the litigation outcome is $6M 
 Contractor’s expected value of the litigation outcome is $11M 
 Parties changed beliefs significantly during the Claim process. 










 Limitations and Future Research 
 
This  chapter  elaborates  on  the  assumptions  used  to  develop  the  model  and 
opportunities to relax those assumptions. In general, the use of Bayesian Networks in Game 
theory has been limited. Consequently, there are numerous opportunities to expand the 
game theoretic models using Bayesian Networks s in different sciences. The focus area in 
this research is non-cooperative game theory in settlement negotiation. The following 
includes different paths to develop the model introduced in this research with reference to 
current literature. 
 
7.1. Final Offer vs Unlimited Offers 
Spier (1992) has extended this framework by considering a sequence of settlement 
offers before trial. Her work considers the phase of bargaining before trial where parties 
may sequentially argue over the case. In each period, the plaintiff makes a settlement offer 
that the defendant can either accept or reject. If agreement is not reached, then the case will 
go to trial. These two approaches are both used in different settlement negotiation models. 
However the sequential bargaining model seems to be more in parallel with the actual 
claims, the high cost and time to prepare an offer in each period is not practical 
7.2. Allocating Litigation Costs 
As discussed in the modeling chapter, the model developed in this research applies 
American Rule for allocation of litigation costs. The alternative method is the British Rule, 
where the loser at trial pays for all litigation costs. There are many researchers who based 
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their model on the British Rule including Shavell (1982). In case of using British Rule, a 
player’s outcome losing the case will be deducted by both players’ litigation costs, 𝑘𝐴 and 
𝑘𝐵, and player’s outcome given wining the case becomes the expected award at the trial. 
The following equation illustrates the player’s analysis: 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑚𝑒 =  {
 𝑥 ×  𝑦                                   𝐼𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠         
 
𝑥 ×  𝑦 − 𝑘𝐴 − 𝑘𝐴                    𝐼𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
 
7.3. Risk Preference 
This study assumes parties to be risk neutral. An alternative is to assume a risk 
preference for players over the outcomes. There are number of studies analyzed games with 
risk aversion in different ways. Binmore et al. (1986) analyzed this factor as a relative risk 
aversion of the players to define the portion of outcome they may receive. Another 
approach is to consider player’s risk preference as a private information  (Farmer & 
Pecorino, 1994). Bayesian Network is a helpful tool to assess the impact of private 
information on the outcome. Considering utilities for players’ outcomes, rather than 
monetary values, could build on this model. 
 
7.4. Optimistic Behavior 
Optimistic behavior toward an expected outcome causes divergent expectations, or 
gaps between parties’ prior beliefs. Yildiz (2004) analyzed this concept using a sequential 
bargaining model, where players were optimistic about their bargaining power. Watanabe 
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(2006) successfully employed this idea in his pretrial negotiations model  on a medical 
claim case. In a later study Yildiz (2004) analyzed the impact of optimistic behavior on 
delays in settlement negotiations x. Deeporter and Mot (2011) provided a comprehensive 
literature review on this idea. There are significant opportunities to compare the optimism 
behavior models with advanced models developed in cognitive sciences literature. This 
comparison analysis may provide inside on concepts in behavioral game theory. 
 
7.5. Considering Business Decisions 
This research analyzes claims and settlement negotiations from the pure economic 
view point, and assumes parties have full intentions and capabilities to litigate the case. 
Business decisions and any other considerations that can be expanded in this research is 
considering parties’ current economic status into the decision model. A plaintiff may 
believe that he will be entitled to damages if he pursue the claim to the trial, but he may 
settle with a lesser amount that expected from the trial due to his present financial issues. 
There are multiple other scenarios that a claim party may decide if to pursue the claim 
because of factors other than the issues directly related to the claim itself. 
There may be other considerations such as work relationship and future 
opportunities between the claim parties. Measuring the relationship in monetary values is 
another way to advance the game theoretic models. For example, a contractor may consider 
maintaining its relationship with a project owner in hope of making profit in the owner’s 
future project. Predictions of the future profit and calculating the Net Present Value is a 
logical way to model the relationship aspect.  
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7.6. Nuisance Suits 
Nuisance Suit is the term used for a claim where the plaintiff pursues a case, 
understanding there is little or negative expected value in pursuing the case.  This research 
assumes a party will not bring a Nuisance Suit, meaning if settlement negotiations fail, the 
party will only proceed to trial if the expected outcome from trial exceeds litigation costs. 
However, the literature suggests players may pursue a Nuisance Suit for a variety of 
reasons. 
 
Several papers, starting with Nalebuff ( 1987), suggested players may pursue a case 
even if the litigation costs exceeds their expected outcome from the trial. The analysis of 
Nuisance Suits is evolved from P’ng’s research (1983) to Rosenberg and Shavell’s research 
(2006). Incorporation of the possibility of a Nuisance Suit could improve this model.   
 
7.7. Multiple Litigants and Claims 
This study considered one plaintiff and one defendant as the only two players of 
the game. A model could be developed considering multiple individuals or entities (i.e. 
joint ventures) for either party. The individuals that form either the plaintiff or the 
defendant may have different prior beliefs on the claim elements. Speirs and Prescott et al. 
(2010) proposed a model where two plaintiffs non-cooperatively respond to defendant’s 
actions. The challenge is splitting the award amount between the players of one side of the 
game. One solution may be applying bargaining negotiations with complete information 
such as a Nash Bargaining Solution. For example, the bargaining model will need to 
include a concealed complete information game between the individuals or entities who 
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form the plaintiff. These individuals as the plaintiff still participate in an asymmetric 
information game. 
Another approach is to consider two different claims that are intertwined. It means 
that the actions and outcomes of one game impacts the other game. For instance, Che and 
Shearman (1993) have developed a model that a plaintiff claims against two separate 
defendants and the outcome of each opponent may affect the other. These situations can 
also be modeled as private information for each party. The private information can be 
assessed applying Bayesian Network structures as discussed in chapter 5. 
 
7.8. Including the Judge as a Player in the Game 
This research assumed the Judge learns actual damages in the discovery process. It 
means that the player’s private information is assumed to be fully revealed in the pleadings. 
This assumption can be changed by assuming partial information transfer from the parties 
to the Judge. The partial information transfer may result from the Judge’s error in receiving 
and processing the information. This case can be modeled by considering random errors 
for the Judge’s process in finding the truth. For example, Baker et al. (2007) studied the 
relationship between court errors and settlement timing.  
If the players hide the information from the Judge, the model requires input to 
include the Judge as a third player to the game. Adding the Judge as a player will require 
defining all the game theory elements described in Chapter 3 for the Judge including: 
actions, outcomes, timing, information and predictions. In this case the Judge’s point of 
interest in the game would be finding the true level of Damages and Liability to grant an 
accurate award to the damaged party. However, the Judge’s view is significantly different 
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than parties’ interest, which is maximizing their monetary outcome at trial. Therefore, the 
challenge is to find a method that can measure these two different goals in a same scale. 
Another solution may be designing a multi-objective game theory model including 
Attorneys and Experts in the Game 
 
 
7.9. Including Attorneys and Experts as Players in the Game 
Attorneys or experts can also be considered as players in the settlement negotiation 
games but will require defining all the game theory elements described in Chapter 3 for the 
added player(s) including: actions, outcomes, timing, information and predictions. This 
model assumes the attorneys want to maximize the outcome for their clients (the plaintiff 
or the defendant), not maximize their own profit by extending the duration of the claim. 
This assumption is consistent with the attorney code of ethics, and the belief that attorneys 
maximize their long-term profit by maintaining a positive reputation. However, there are 
number of researchers that assume attorney’s fees is a tool for maximizing their own 
outcome (Watts, 1994) (Miller, 1987). The attorney fees can be arranged as contingent fees 
or hourly fees. Contingent fees are usually set to be a certain percentage of the Judge’s 
award.  Hourly fees are flat rates that an attorney charges to its client in exchange of each 
hour of work on the case. Hourly fee arrangement is a more common approach in the 
industry practice in construction claims. 
Contingent fees are common in claims that involves individuals versus 
corporations. There are numbers of studies analyzing contingent fee contract attorneys. For 
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example, Polinsky and Rubnifield (2001) studied the impact of contingent fee on settlement 
time and amount. 
Timing is not the only aspect of the attorneys and expert involvement that can 
impact the settlement negotiations. Friehe and Baumann (2016) analyze the impact of the 
relationship of a party and its attorney in a discovery process. Analyses like this research 
provide insight to a new area of expanding on settlement negotiation games. However, 
further research requires legal background and understanding the common industry 
practice. 
 
7.10. Historic Data to Form Prior Beliefs 
Gathering historical data from different sources aids in assessing parties’ prior 
beliefs over the claim elements, leading to an accurate prediction of parties’ decisions. 
Using this method requires data gathering from diverse resources including sources from 
a project level, corporate level, general counsels, law firms, experts, and eventually the 
public court documents. However, not all the disputes are discussed with the attorneys or 
experts or go through discovery, or which limits the method of calculating the parties’ 
decisions. Furthermore, considering the root causes in construction claims can be a helpful 
tool in classifying the data. 
 
7.11. Estimating Judge’s Award 
This model assumes the award at trial is calculated as product of Liability and 
Damages. This is not the only acceptable approach the Judge may employ. For example, 
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the Judge may choose awards for the purpose of maximizing the overall social efficiency, 
or minimizing the probability of trial.  Daugherty and Reinganum (2008) provided a 
comprehensive literature review on this matter.  
 
7.12.  Mechanism Design for Contract Adjustments 
Mechanism Design is a game theoretic approach applying engineering 
methodology to designing economic incentives toward desired objectives in strategic 
settings. The Mechanism Design starts at the end of the game, from the outcomes, and goes 
backwards to find the routes that leads (or does not lead) to the desired outcome. This 
approach is widely used to draft a contract agreements. Chatterjee (2014) provides a 
selective literature review of the mechanism design with a focus on Bayesian games. 
 
7.13. Multi Criteria Decision Making Models 
Decision trees are one of the most relevant and sound approaches to perform a 
decision analysis in claims. Traditional decision tree models cannot analyze the interaction 
between claim parties, since they only consider the outcomes for one party. Using the 
multi-criteria decision making approach can include additional parameters such as 
opponent’s beliefs and Judge’s decision. 
The Judge’s goal is to properly apply the law to a case, where player’s goal are 
often maximizing the monetary outcomes of a claim. These two goals completely different 
in nature. Hypothetically, the multi-criteria decisions making analysis can capture these 
goals simultaneously. The challenge in this method would be quantifying Judge’s goal or 
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his considerations in ruling the verdict. This topic needs to be addressed by working hand-
in hand with law scholars who are familiar with the fundamentals of Judge’s decision 
process. 
7.14. Game Theory and Influence Diagrams  
Influence diagrams are a different type of graphical and mathematical 
representations of decision making analysis. Since the decision making processes are 
combined with probabilistic inferences in influence diagrams, these diagrams are a 
generalization of Bayesian Networks. There are multiple examples where influence 
diagrams are used in game theoretic approaches including Koller and Milch (2001), who 
introduce Multi-Agent Influence Diagram (MAID), where they claim MAIDs provide a 
complete graphical representation of any extensive form games.   
The influence diagrams are also used in analyzing non-cooperative games to model 
opponent’s decision behavior in context of adversarial risk analysis (Banks, & Rios, 2016). 
Some of the concepts provided in this research can be applied to settlement negotiation 
games in future research 
 
7.15. Artificial Neural Network (AAN) Model for Updating Beliefs  
The model in this research relies on Bayesian thinking approach for updating 
parties’ beliefs over the claim elements once they have anew observation. An alternative 
to Bayesian Networks is Artificial Neural Network (ANN), a computational model based 
on the structure and functions of biological neural networks. The ANN model contains a 
dynamic structure which changes based on the information that flows through the network. 
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ANNs are capable of applying nonlinear statistical modeling to define complex 
relationships between inputs and outputs and provide system updates using a learning 
process. The ANN model can replaces the BN model discussed in chapter 6. If ANN is 





















 Conclusion and Remarks 
 
This dissertation provided a model to predict outcomes in construction claims using 
economic theory to analyze construction disputes. This researched defined construction 
disputes in quantifiable elements, categorized the elements into measurable variables given 
complexities and interrelationships, and input the variables into the model to ascertain each 
party’s decision making process based on their beliefs over the specifics of the dispute. 
This research provided a broad literature review on construction claims to ascertain 
the root causes for claims. It identified construction claims often occur due to divergent 
expectations, or parties’ belief gap over Liability and Damages. It was shown that the 
Bayesian Network model for legal reasoning accurately measures parties’ beliefs over 
these two variables. In addition, the Bayesian Network updates parties’ beliefs based on 
new information they may receive during the claim processes. The belief update is a key 
tool for parties to bring their opponent to settlement before litigation.  
The analysis in the case studies show the parties continuously exchange information 
during the claim process. As parties advance in the claim processes, they update their 
beliefs and expected outcome from trial. In both cases the updated beliefs resulted in less 
gap between parties’ expected outcome from trial. Therefore, a party that is motivated to 
reach settlement, attempts to update their opponent’s beliefs through information exchange 






The following are main remarks of this dissertation:  
 
 Party’s best action depends on his belief over the specifics of the case and beliefs 
over its opponent’s beliefs.  
 Claim parties update their opponent’s beliefs over Liability and Damages to get 
closer to their desirable outcome  
 A successful settlement negotiation requires the following actions: 
o Finding all relevant contract articles 
o Having Experts to find pieces of evidence relevant to the contract articles 
o Inquire attorney’s opinion on credibility and strength of arguments 
o Use robust methods to calculate the damages 















This document is only intended to be for academic used and does not represent legal 
interpretation, guidance or advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy of the 
models, these methods are not applicable to any legal dispute and shall not be addressed in 
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